feat: ship Tier 1 — auth, authz, rate limits, real notifications, CSV import, billing, backups/DR, privacy
Closes every block in docs/TIER1_PLAN.md from the Claude-scope side. The
homelab / cloud setup steps (SES verification, restore drill, lawyer-
drafted ToS) remain operator-owned but are unblocked.
Block A — Authentication
- Migration 0003: password_hash, email_verified, email_verification_tokens,
password_reset_tokens, refresh_tokens (with replaced_by family chain).
- Bcrypt hasher, HS256 JWT signer, single-use refresh tokens with rotation
+ replay-detection (revokes the family on reuse).
- /auth/signup, /login, /refresh, /logout, /verify-email,
/forgot-password, /reset-password — enumeration-safe.
- requireAuth middleware + GET /me.
- Frontend useAuth/useApi with auto-refresh-on-401, login/signup/verify/
forgot/reset pages, route-guard middleware.
Block B — Authorisation
- EventRepo.GetForHost; Update/Delete scoped by host_id.
- All host routes behind requireAuth + ownership; cross-tenant returns
404 (no enumeration). ?host_id removed.
- WS auth via short-lived single-use tickets (POST /auth/ws-ticket).
- Tests: TestCrossTenantIsolation — 9 probes.
Block C — Rate limiting
- Redis sliding-window via Lua (atomic ZADD+ZCARD+PEXPIRE).
- Per-route limits matching the plan (signup IP, login IP+email, RSVP/
access by token, events/guests/tokens by user_id).
- 429 with Retry-After header and JSON body.
- Auth lockout: 5 failed logins → account locked, only password reset
clears it.
- Frontend: useErrMessage normalises 429 + locked messaging.
Block D — Real notifications
- Migration 0004: provider_message_id, bounce_type, complained columns
+ unsubscribes (CITEXT) suppression table.
- Branded HTML + plaintext templates for verification, reset, invitation,
confirmation, reminder. Per-page templates avoid html/template's
contextual-escape collisions.
- Senders: SESv2, Twilio (SMS), SMTP (Mailpit-friendly), Resend HTTP.
- PickEmailSender priority Resend > SMTP > SES > Log — system boots
cleanly in dev with Mailpit; production flips one env var.
- Webhook endpoints (Twilio status + SES SNS) — bounces add to suppression;
signature verification stubbed pending creds.
- Auto-send: POST /tokens publishes invitation.send; notifier renders +
delivers via the configured backend; suppression list honoured.
- Bulk + per-row invitation flow: POST /events/{id}/guests/invitations/bulk
returns per-guest tokens so phone-only guests can be SMS'd manually.
- Unsubscribe: signed HMAC token (no TTL) + /unsubscribe/[token] page.
- WhatsApp Option A+: wa.me click-to-chat wizard with per-guest progress
tracking, isLikelyE164 validation, edit-from-wizard.
- Token rotate (POST /tokens/rotate) invalidates the old URL — used by
the regenerate-link flow.
- Mailpit added to docker-compose for dev inbox.
Block E — CSV import
- Streaming parser: tolerant header detection, UTF-8 BOM + UTF-16 LE/BE
decoding, row-level validation, 5,000-row cap.
- Strict E.164 phone validation with helpful error message.
- POST /preview + /import + GET /template; preview UI on event page;
atomic per-batch with dedup on existing emails.
Phone capture across UI
- PhoneInput component: country picker (~50 ISO codes) + national input +
live E.164 preview + inline length validation.
- Used in Add Guest and Edit Guest modals. Smart paste-handling extracts
country code from full E.164 strings.
Block F — Billing (Stripe)
- Migration 0005: subscriptions table (user_id → tier/status/period_end +
Stripe customer/sub ids). Partial unique index keeps one granting sub
per user.
- internal/billing: Tier + Limits model (Free 1/50, Pro 10/1000, Business
∞/5000), Stripe SDK wrapper with IgnoreAPIVersionMismatch for newer
account API versions.
- /billing/checkout-session, /billing/portal, /billing/status,
/webhooks/stripe (signature-verified, lifecycle events).
- Tier enforcement: 402 on POST /events, /guests, /import with
{error, reason, tier, used, limit, upgrade_url} body.
- Frontend: useBilling composable, /dashboard/billing page (current plan,
usage bars, tier cards), global UpgradeModal triggered by useApi's
402 interceptor.
- Customer portal kept for self-service cancel/payment-method changes.
Block G — Backups & DR (application side)
- Every migration has a tested .down.sql.
- TestMigrationRoundtrip applies all ups → all downs → all ups against a
fresh container; catches asymmetric down migrations.
- cmd/restore-verify: 28-check post-restore invariant tool (schema
presence, no orphans across 10 FK relationships, email uniqueness,
single-active subscription, row-count snapshot).
- docs/RUNBOOK_RESTORE.md: 9-step restore procedure with RTO/RPO
targets, drill instructions, rollback path.
Block H — Privacy compliance (application side)
- Migration 0006: deleted_at + terms_accepted_at + privacy_policy_accepted_at
on users. Partial index on email for live-only uniqueness.
- GET /me/data-export — synchronous JSON dump (user, events, guests,
tokens, rsvps, access_logs, notifications).
- DELETE /me — soft-delete with PII scrub + refresh-token revocation;
re-signup with same email works.
- POST /me/accept-terms — idempotent consent recording.
- Frontend /privacy + /terms placeholder pages with substantive (pending
legal review) copy; footer links; signup terms checkbox; TermsGateModal
for accounts created before the rollout; export + delete buttons on
/dashboard/billing.
Tests
- All migrations verified up/down/up.
- Integration suite: TestE2EHappyPath, TestAuthFlow, TestCrossTenantIsolation,
TestRateLimitSignup, TestLoginLockout, TestUnsubscribeFlow,
TestSESBounceWebhook, TestTwilioStatusWebhook, TestCsvImportFlow,
TestCsvImportAtomicRollback, TestBulkIssueInvitations, TestBulkIssueExplicitSubset,
TestTokenIssuePublishesInvitation, TestTokenIssueWithoutGuestEmailSkipsInvitation,
TestGuestUpdate, TestGuestDelete, TestTokenRotate, TestSMTPSenderAgainstMailpit,
TestFreeTierEventLimit, TestFreeTierGuestLimit, TestBusinessTierBypassesLimits,
TestDataExport, TestDeleteMe, TestAcceptTerms, TestMigrationRoundtrip.
Full suite runs in ~120s against real Postgres + NATS + Redis + Mailpit.
- Unit suite green across internal/auth, internal/csvimport,
internal/notification, internal/ratelimit, internal/domain.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
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// Auth state for the host-facing app.
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//
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// The access token lives only in memory (useState — Nuxt's SSR-safe wrapper).
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// The refresh token lives in an HttpOnly cookie set by the API at
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// `/auth/refresh` scope, so JavaScript here can never read it. On a hard
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// reload we lose the access token but the cookie survives, so `bootstrap()`
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// calls `/auth/refresh` to mint a fresh access token + reload the user.
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interface AuthUser {
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id: string
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email: string
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name: string
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email_verified: boolean
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}
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interface AuthSuccess {
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access_token: string
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expires_at: string
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user: AuthUser
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}
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interface AuthState {
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user: AuthUser | null
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accessToken: string | null
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expiresAt: number | null // unix ms
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bootstrapped: boolean
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}
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function emptyState(): AuthState {
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return { user: null, accessToken: null, expiresAt: null, bootstrapped: false }
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}
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function apiBase(): string {
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return useRuntimeConfig().public.apiBase as string
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}
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async function postJSON<T>(path: string, body?: unknown): Promise<T> {
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return await $fetch<T>(path, {
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baseURL: apiBase(),
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method: 'POST',
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body,
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credentials: 'include',
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headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
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})
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}
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export function useAuth() {
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const state = useState<AuthState>('gg-auth', emptyState)
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function setSession(s: AuthSuccess) {
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state.value = {
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user: s.user,
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accessToken: s.access_token,
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expiresAt: Date.parse(s.expires_at) || (Date.now() + 14 * 60 * 1000),
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bootstrapped: true,
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}
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}
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function clearSession() {
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state.value = { ...emptyState(), bootstrapped: true }
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}
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async function signup(email: string, name: string, password: string, acceptTerms = false) {
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return await postJSON<{ status: string }>('/auth/signup', {
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email, name, password,
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accept_terms: acceptTerms,
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})
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}
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async function login(email: string, password: string) {
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const s = await postJSON<AuthSuccess>('/auth/login', { email, password })
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setSession(s)
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return s
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}
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async function refresh(): Promise<boolean> {
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try {
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const s = await postJSON<AuthSuccess>('/auth/refresh')
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setSession(s)
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return true
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} catch {
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clearSession()
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return false
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}
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}
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async function logout() {
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try {
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await postJSON<void>('/auth/logout')
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} catch {
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// Best-effort — clear local state regardless.
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}
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clearSession()
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}
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async function verifyEmail(token: string) {
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return await postJSON<{ status: string }>('/auth/verify-email', { token })
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}
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async function forgotPassword(email: string) {
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return await postJSON<{ status: string }>('/auth/forgot-password', { email })
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}
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async function resetPassword(token: string, newPassword: string) {
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return await postJSON<{ status: string }>('/auth/reset-password', {
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token,
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new_password: newPassword,
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})
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}
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// Call on app entry / route guards. Returns true if the caller has a valid
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// session by the time it resolves.
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async function bootstrap(): Promise<boolean> {
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if (!import.meta.client) return false
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if (state.value.bootstrapped && state.value.user) return true
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if (state.value.bootstrapped && !state.value.user) return false
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return await refresh()
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}
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// Hint to useApi: returns the current token if not yet expired.
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function liveAccessToken(): string | null {
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if (!state.value.accessToken || !state.value.expiresAt) return null
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// 5s skew to avoid sending a just-expired token.
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if (Date.now() + 5000 >= state.value.expiresAt) return null
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return state.value.accessToken
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}
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const isAuthenticated = computed(() => !!state.value.user)
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const user = computed(() => state.value.user)
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const bootstrapped = computed(() => state.value.bootstrapped)
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return {
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user,
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isAuthenticated,
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bootstrapped,
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signup,
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login,
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refresh,
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logout,
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verifyEmail,
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forgotPassword,
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resetPassword,
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bootstrap,
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liveAccessToken,
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clearSession,
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}
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}
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