feat: ship Tier 1 — auth, authz, rate limits, real notifications, CSV import, billing, backups/DR, privacy
Closes every block in docs/TIER1_PLAN.md from the Claude-scope side. The
homelab / cloud setup steps (SES verification, restore drill, lawyer-
drafted ToS) remain operator-owned but are unblocked.
Block A — Authentication
- Migration 0003: password_hash, email_verified, email_verification_tokens,
password_reset_tokens, refresh_tokens (with replaced_by family chain).
- Bcrypt hasher, HS256 JWT signer, single-use refresh tokens with rotation
+ replay-detection (revokes the family on reuse).
- /auth/signup, /login, /refresh, /logout, /verify-email,
/forgot-password, /reset-password — enumeration-safe.
- requireAuth middleware + GET /me.
- Frontend useAuth/useApi with auto-refresh-on-401, login/signup/verify/
forgot/reset pages, route-guard middleware.
Block B — Authorisation
- EventRepo.GetForHost; Update/Delete scoped by host_id.
- All host routes behind requireAuth + ownership; cross-tenant returns
404 (no enumeration). ?host_id removed.
- WS auth via short-lived single-use tickets (POST /auth/ws-ticket).
- Tests: TestCrossTenantIsolation — 9 probes.
Block C — Rate limiting
- Redis sliding-window via Lua (atomic ZADD+ZCARD+PEXPIRE).
- Per-route limits matching the plan (signup IP, login IP+email, RSVP/
access by token, events/guests/tokens by user_id).
- 429 with Retry-After header and JSON body.
- Auth lockout: 5 failed logins → account locked, only password reset
clears it.
- Frontend: useErrMessage normalises 429 + locked messaging.
Block D — Real notifications
- Migration 0004: provider_message_id, bounce_type, complained columns
+ unsubscribes (CITEXT) suppression table.
- Branded HTML + plaintext templates for verification, reset, invitation,
confirmation, reminder. Per-page templates avoid html/template's
contextual-escape collisions.
- Senders: SESv2, Twilio (SMS), SMTP (Mailpit-friendly), Resend HTTP.
- PickEmailSender priority Resend > SMTP > SES > Log — system boots
cleanly in dev with Mailpit; production flips one env var.
- Webhook endpoints (Twilio status + SES SNS) — bounces add to suppression;
signature verification stubbed pending creds.
- Auto-send: POST /tokens publishes invitation.send; notifier renders +
delivers via the configured backend; suppression list honoured.
- Bulk + per-row invitation flow: POST /events/{id}/guests/invitations/bulk
returns per-guest tokens so phone-only guests can be SMS'd manually.
- Unsubscribe: signed HMAC token (no TTL) + /unsubscribe/[token] page.
- WhatsApp Option A+: wa.me click-to-chat wizard with per-guest progress
tracking, isLikelyE164 validation, edit-from-wizard.
- Token rotate (POST /tokens/rotate) invalidates the old URL — used by
the regenerate-link flow.
- Mailpit added to docker-compose for dev inbox.
Block E — CSV import
- Streaming parser: tolerant header detection, UTF-8 BOM + UTF-16 LE/BE
decoding, row-level validation, 5,000-row cap.
- Strict E.164 phone validation with helpful error message.
- POST /preview + /import + GET /template; preview UI on event page;
atomic per-batch with dedup on existing emails.
Phone capture across UI
- PhoneInput component: country picker (~50 ISO codes) + national input +
live E.164 preview + inline length validation.
- Used in Add Guest and Edit Guest modals. Smart paste-handling extracts
country code from full E.164 strings.
Block F — Billing (Stripe)
- Migration 0005: subscriptions table (user_id → tier/status/period_end +
Stripe customer/sub ids). Partial unique index keeps one granting sub
per user.
- internal/billing: Tier + Limits model (Free 1/50, Pro 10/1000, Business
∞/5000), Stripe SDK wrapper with IgnoreAPIVersionMismatch for newer
account API versions.
- /billing/checkout-session, /billing/portal, /billing/status,
/webhooks/stripe (signature-verified, lifecycle events).
- Tier enforcement: 402 on POST /events, /guests, /import with
{error, reason, tier, used, limit, upgrade_url} body.
- Frontend: useBilling composable, /dashboard/billing page (current plan,
usage bars, tier cards), global UpgradeModal triggered by useApi's
402 interceptor.
- Customer portal kept for self-service cancel/payment-method changes.
Block G — Backups & DR (application side)
- Every migration has a tested .down.sql.
- TestMigrationRoundtrip applies all ups → all downs → all ups against a
fresh container; catches asymmetric down migrations.
- cmd/restore-verify: 28-check post-restore invariant tool (schema
presence, no orphans across 10 FK relationships, email uniqueness,
single-active subscription, row-count snapshot).
- docs/RUNBOOK_RESTORE.md: 9-step restore procedure with RTO/RPO
targets, drill instructions, rollback path.
Block H — Privacy compliance (application side)
- Migration 0006: deleted_at + terms_accepted_at + privacy_policy_accepted_at
on users. Partial index on email for live-only uniqueness.
- GET /me/data-export — synchronous JSON dump (user, events, guests,
tokens, rsvps, access_logs, notifications).
- DELETE /me — soft-delete with PII scrub + refresh-token revocation;
re-signup with same email works.
- POST /me/accept-terms — idempotent consent recording.
- Frontend /privacy + /terms placeholder pages with substantive (pending
legal review) copy; footer links; signup terms checkbox; TermsGateModal
for accounts created before the rollout; export + delete buttons on
/dashboard/billing.
Tests
- All migrations verified up/down/up.
- Integration suite: TestE2EHappyPath, TestAuthFlow, TestCrossTenantIsolation,
TestRateLimitSignup, TestLoginLockout, TestUnsubscribeFlow,
TestSESBounceWebhook, TestTwilioStatusWebhook, TestCsvImportFlow,
TestCsvImportAtomicRollback, TestBulkIssueInvitations, TestBulkIssueExplicitSubset,
TestTokenIssuePublishesInvitation, TestTokenIssueWithoutGuestEmailSkipsInvitation,
TestGuestUpdate, TestGuestDelete, TestTokenRotate, TestSMTPSenderAgainstMailpit,
TestFreeTierEventLimit, TestFreeTierGuestLimit, TestBusinessTierBypassesLimits,
TestDataExport, TestDeleteMe, TestAcceptTerms, TestMigrationRoundtrip.
Full suite runs in ~120s against real Postgres + NATS + Redis + Mailpit.
- Unit suite green across internal/auth, internal/csvimport,
internal/notification, internal/ratelimit, internal/domain.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
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package api
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"io"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"github.com/alchemistkay/guestguard/internal/notification"
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)
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// webhookHandler accepts provider status notifications and reflects them
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// onto the notifications table + suppression list.
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//
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// Signature verification is intentionally a TODO until the user provisions
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// real Twilio + SES creds — verifying against test fixtures alone would
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// give a false sense of security. The endpoint is therefore *not* exposed
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// publicly until the deployment is ready.
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type webhookHandler struct {
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logger *slog.Logger
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notifs *notification.Repo
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suppress *notification.SuppressionRepo
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}
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// POST /webhooks/twilio/status — Twilio status callback (form-encoded).
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// Fields we care about: MessageSid, MessageStatus (sent|delivered|
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// undelivered|failed), ErrorCode, To.
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func (h *webhookHandler) twilio(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if h.notifs == nil {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return
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}
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// TODO(blockD2): verify X-Twilio-Signature with GG_TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN.
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if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid form")
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return
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}
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sid := r.PostForm.Get("MessageSid")
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status := r.PostForm.Get("MessageStatus")
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if sid == "" || status == "" {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "missing MessageSid / MessageStatus")
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return
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}
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ctx := r.Context()
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switch status {
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case "delivered":
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_ = h.notifs.MarkDelivered(ctx, sid)
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case "undelivered", "failed":
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_ = h.notifs.MarkBounce(ctx, sid, "permanent")
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}
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h.logger.Info("twilio status callback", "sid", sid, "status", status)
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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}
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// POST /webhooks/ses/notifications — SNS-delivered SES notification (JSON).
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// Handles the two shapes SES uses: bounce + complaint events. Each event
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// carries the messageId we stored in provider_message_id and an array of
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// affected recipients.
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func (h *webhookHandler) ses(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if h.notifs == nil {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return
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}
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// TODO(blockD2): verify SNS signature using the cert URL field.
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body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r.Body, 1<<20))
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "read body")
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return
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}
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defer r.Body.Close()
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var envelope struct {
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Type string `json:"Type"` // "Notification" | "SubscriptionConfirmation"
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Message string `json:"Message"` // stringified JSON for Notification
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}
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if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &envelope); err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid json envelope")
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return
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}
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if envelope.Type == "SubscriptionConfirmation" {
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// Confirmed by visiting SubscribeURL — manual op-side step.
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h.logger.Info("ses subscription confirmation received (manual confirm required)")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return
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}
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if envelope.Message == "" {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return
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}
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var inner struct {
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NotificationType string `json:"notificationType"` // "Bounce" | "Complaint" | "Delivery"
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Mail struct {
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MessageID string `json:"messageId"`
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} `json:"mail"`
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Bounce struct {
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BounceType string `json:"bounceType"` // "Permanent" | "Transient"
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BouncedRecipients []struct {
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EmailAddress string `json:"emailAddress"`
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} `json:"bouncedRecipients"`
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} `json:"bounce"`
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Complaint struct {
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ComplainedRecipients []struct {
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EmailAddress string `json:"emailAddress"`
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} `json:"complainedRecipients"`
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} `json:"complaint"`
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}
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if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(envelope.Message), &inner); err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid inner json")
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return
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}
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ctx := r.Context()
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switch inner.NotificationType {
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case "Bounce":
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bt := "transient"
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if inner.Bounce.BounceType == "Permanent" {
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bt = "permanent"
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}
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_ = h.notifs.MarkBounce(ctx, inner.Mail.MessageID, bt)
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if h.suppress != nil && bt == "permanent" {
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for _, rcp := range inner.Bounce.BouncedRecipients {
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_ = h.suppress.Add(ctx, rcp.EmailAddress, "ses permanent bounce", notification.SuppressionBounce)
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}
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}
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case "Complaint":
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_ = h.notifs.MarkComplaint(ctx, inner.Mail.MessageID)
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if h.suppress != nil {
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for _, rcp := range inner.Complaint.ComplainedRecipients {
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_ = h.suppress.Add(ctx, rcp.EmailAddress, "ses complaint", notification.SuppressionComplaint)
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}
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}
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case "Delivery":
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_ = h.notifs.MarkDelivered(ctx, inner.Mail.MessageID)
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}
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h.logger.Info("ses notification", "type", inner.NotificationType, "message_id", inner.Mail.MessageID)
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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}
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// Compile-time check that ctx is unused in package — silences linter on
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// some Go versions when the file would otherwise import context only for
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// the handler signatures.
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var _ = context.Background
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