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Author SHA1 Message Date
Kwaku Danso 98678ff5a3 feat(tier2): finish the finish line — Block H follow-ups, Block G geolocation, cross-cutting 
Three threads of work land here together to close out Tier 2.

### Block H follow-ups — day-of check-in
- Scanner is now an "open on your phone" magic-link flow. Hosts on
  desktop mint a scoped JWT via POST /events/{id}/scanner-ticket and
  render its URL into a QR; phone scans it and lands on /scanner with
  the ticket as bearer. The ticket carries Audience=scanner so it can
  never substitute for a session token.
- Plus-one confirmation at the door: scan → POST /check-in/preview to
  fetch guest + expected party size → confirm buttons ("Just them",
  "Party of N", custom) → POST /check-in. No more silent arrival_count=1.
- Offline scan queue: failed POSTs go into an IndexedDB store and drain
  on the 'online' event with poison-message protection.
- Day-of arrivals headline widget on the event overview, gated to the
  host's local calendar date so it doesn't dominate the page weeks out.
- Tab nav restyled with inline heroicons + scrollable segmented control;
  Check-in moves to the rightmost slot.
- PWA: manifest + service worker scoped to /scanner, generated 192/512
  icons (Go scripted renderer in scripts/gen-scanner-icons.go).
- Confirmation email QR was rendering broken because html/template
  rewrites data: URLs to #ZgotmplZ; mark the value as template.URL.
- Email "open your invitation" link 404'd because we had no token to
  put after /rsvp/. Threaded AccessLink through the RSVPConfirmed NATS
  event from the API at submit time.

### Block G remainder — geolocation + threshold preview
- Pluggable GeoResolver in the fraud engine (NullResolver, IPApiResolver
  for the free ip-api.com fallback, MaxMindResolver behind GG_GEOIP_DB_PATH).
  Wrapped in a Redis cache (30d TTL). Geo flows through both gRPC and
  NATS scoring paths.
- geo_jump scoring feature: >500km in <1h flags ("accessed from Lagos
  and Paris within 12 minutes"); >500km in <6h is a softer signal. The
  existing single-signal cap keeps a lone geo_jump in MEDIUM.
- FraudScored event carries geo_country/city/lat/lon; ApplyScore uses
  COALESCE so a later re-score without geo doesn't wipe earlier data.
- Threshold-slider live preview: GET /events/{id}/security/thresholds/preview
  returns band counts the host's existing access events would have
  fallen into under the proposed thresholds. Debounced (250ms) widget
  under the Advanced sliders so the host gets concrete feedback instead
  of guessing.

### Cross-cutting — audit, tier-gating, feature flags
- audit_log table + internal/audit.Recorder (async fire-and-forget on
  detached context so an audit blip never fails the real action). Wired
  into branding update, thresholds update, allowlist add/remove,
  collaborator invite/role-change/remove, message create/send-now/cancel.
- Tier-gating: extended billing.Limits with MaxCollaborators,
  CustomBranding, Scanner, Broadcasts. Free = none; Pro = 5 + all;
  Business = unlimited. Gates the scanner-ticket, message create,
  branding put, and collaborator invite endpoints with 402 +
  structured upgrade payload. Auto-reminders, fraud detection, and
  analytics deliberately stay on every tier — those are safety + visibility
  features, not upsell levers.
- Feature flags: feature_flags table + internal/flags.Store with 30s
  in-memory refresh, stable sha256(key + user_id) percent bucketing,
  unknown-key-defaults-on. Six Tier 2 flags pre-seeded. Three handlers
  (branding, broadcasts, scanner) check the kill switch ahead of the
  tier gate so ops can pull a feature back without a redeploy.

### Verified
- go test ./... + fraud-engine pytest (12/12 incl. 3 new geo_jump tests + 5
  new flags tests).
- docker compose build + up across api, fraud-engine, notifier, frontend.
- /health endpoints 200; migrations 0014 + 0015 applied; 6 flags
  seeded; audit_log table + partial indexes confirmed.
- Fraud-engine logs confirm geo resolver kind=CachedGeoResolver provider=auto.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-21 20:30:02 +01:00
Kwaku Danso dbddf17e3b fix(rsvp): defend the edit flow against forwarded invitation links 
When a guest submitted via their invitation and then forwarded the link
(or someone copied the URL), the recipient was shown the original guest's
response and a "Change my response" button. Two real problems:
  - Privacy leak: the original guest's reply was visible
  - Integrity: the recipient could silently overwrite the response

The fix is two layered defences plus a recovery path, matching the
industry pattern used by Eventbrite / Partiful / Lu.ma:

Backend
  - GET /access/{token} now compares the device fingerprint of the
    current request to the fingerprint stored on the existing RSVP.
    When they don't match, the rsvp field is omitted from the
    response and a new rsvp_submitted_elsewhere flag is set instead.
    The original guest's reply stays private.
  - PATCH /rsvp/{token} runs the same gate before scoring. A foreign
    device gets 403 with a hint to request an edit link.
  - The fingerprint check is intentionally narrow (user_agent only),
    so a guest jumping between Wi-Fi and mobile data on the same
    phone still sails through.

Recovery path
  - New POST /access/{token}/request-edit-link mints a short-lived
    edit nonce (Redis, 30-min TTL, SHA-256-hashed), then emails it
    to the guest's address on file via the existing EmailSender.
    Rate-limited to 3 per token per hour.
  - GET /access/{token}?edit=<nonce> and PATCH /rsvp with edit_nonce
    in the body both accept the nonce as a bypass for the
    same-device check. Lets the real guest edit from a new phone
    when their original device is gone.
  - New SendRSVPEditLink method on auth.EmailSender, implemented by
    every concrete sender (log stub / Resend / SMTP / SES), with a
    branded HTML+text template that explains the "we sent this
    because we didn't recognise the device" framing.

Frontend
  - rsvp/[token].vue learns the new "responded elsewhere" state.
    Renders "This invitation has already been used" + a
    "Send me an edit link" CTA when the access response says we
    have somewhere to deliver it. Empty-state copy reads "If you
    forwarded the link, please ask the original guest to reach
    out to the host".
  - When the URL carries ?edit=<nonce>, the page passes it on the
    /access call (so the backend unhides the RSVP), opens the edit
    form pre-populated, and forwards the nonce on PATCH.
  - Removed two leftover leaks from earlier — the page no longer
    shows internal "Risk score N · band" to confirmed or blocked
    guests; the blocked-attempt copy now reads "Something about
    this attempt looked off" rather than "suspicious access
    attempt".

Defensive nil-guard
  - The access handler's NATS publish goroutine now skips when
    deps.AccessPublisher is nil (matches the rsvp publisher's
    existing guard); without it the handler nil-panicked in tests
    that don't wire NATS.

Tests
  - TestFingerprintsSimilar (unit) covers the same-UA / different-UA
    / missing-UA matrix.
  - TestForwardedInvitationLinkDefence (integration) walks the full
    flow: submit from UA-A, hide on UA-B, request link, follow nonce
    from UA-B and edit, then verify a UA-C with a forged nonce is
    still refused.
  - Full integration suite passes (183.5s).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-20 15:09:07 +01:00
Kwaku Danso 3973e4058d feat(tier2): multi-host / collaborators — Block C 
Events can now have multiple users with distinct roles:
  owner   — manage collaborators, delete event, full access
  editor  — manage guests, tokens, CSV import, patch event
  viewer  — read-only access to everything

Schema (migration 0008)
- collaborator_role ENUM + event_collaborators + collaborator_invites
- Backfill: every existing events.host_id becomes an owner row
- EventRepo.Create seeds the owner row in the same transaction so
  no future event can exist without one

Authz
- New requireRole(eventID, userID, minRole) helper. Non-members 404;
  insufficient role 403. Replaces requireEventOwner across every
  shared-role handler (events.get/update, guests CRUD, tokens issue/
  rotate/bulk, csv preview/commit/template, activity, ws-ticket)
- events.delete + collaborator management stay owner-only
- GET /events lists every event the user has any role on
- /events/{id} response now embeds your_role for UI branching

Collaborator endpoints
- GET    /events/{id}/collaborators           (viewer+)
- POST   /events/{id}/collaborators           (owner)  — sends invite email
- PATCH  /events/{id}/collaborators/{user_id} (owner)  — role change
- DELETE /events/{id}/collaborators/{user_id} (owner)  — refuses last owner
- DELETE /events/{id}/collaborators/pending   (owner)  — cancel invite
- GET    /invites/{token}                     (public) — preview summary
- POST   /invites/{token}/accept              (authed) — atomic accept

Invitations
- SHA-256 hashed in DB; raw value only lives in the email link
- 7-day TTL, single-use, email-bound (caller's email must match)
- New SendCollaboratorInvite on auth.EmailSender + Resend/SMTP/SES
  senders + log stub; collaborator_invite.html/txt branded template

Frontend
- TeamCard.vue on the event detail page: lists collaborators with
  inline role-change + remove, pending-invites with cancel, invite
  modal (email + role). Owner-only actions hidden for editors/viewers
- /invites/[token] accept page: shows invite summary, prompts signup
  or sign-in with pre-filled email, refuses mismatched accounts

Tests (all 6 pass on the existing testcontainers harness)
- backfill: legacy host gets owner role
- role enforcement: viewer can read, editor can write guests but not
  delete/manage team, non-member 404s everywhere
- last-owner removal refused (400)
- shared events show up in collaborator's /events list
- invite flow: create → preview → accept → role granted → replay 410
- email mismatch on accept returns 403
- expired invite returns 410

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-17 22:14:50 +01:00
Kwaku Danso 59b8781659 feat: ship Tier 1 — auth, authz, rate limits, real notifications, CSV import, billing, backups/DR, privacy 
Closes every block in docs/TIER1_PLAN.md from the Claude-scope side. The
homelab / cloud setup steps (SES verification, restore drill, lawyer-
drafted ToS) remain operator-owned but are unblocked.

Block A — Authentication
- Migration 0003: password_hash, email_verified, email_verification_tokens,
  password_reset_tokens, refresh_tokens (with replaced_by family chain).
- Bcrypt hasher, HS256 JWT signer, single-use refresh tokens with rotation
  + replay-detection (revokes the family on reuse).
- /auth/signup, /login, /refresh, /logout, /verify-email,
  /forgot-password, /reset-password — enumeration-safe.
- requireAuth middleware + GET /me.
- Frontend useAuth/useApi with auto-refresh-on-401, login/signup/verify/
  forgot/reset pages, route-guard middleware.

Block B — Authorisation
- EventRepo.GetForHost; Update/Delete scoped by host_id.
- All host routes behind requireAuth + ownership; cross-tenant returns
  404 (no enumeration). ?host_id removed.
- WS auth via short-lived single-use tickets (POST /auth/ws-ticket).
- Tests: TestCrossTenantIsolation — 9 probes.

Block C — Rate limiting
- Redis sliding-window via Lua (atomic ZADD+ZCARD+PEXPIRE).
- Per-route limits matching the plan (signup IP, login IP+email, RSVP/
  access by token, events/guests/tokens by user_id).
- 429 with Retry-After header and JSON body.
- Auth lockout: 5 failed logins → account locked, only password reset
  clears it.
- Frontend: useErrMessage normalises 429 + locked messaging.

Block D — Real notifications
- Migration 0004: provider_message_id, bounce_type, complained columns
  + unsubscribes (CITEXT) suppression table.
- Branded HTML + plaintext templates for verification, reset, invitation,
  confirmation, reminder. Per-page templates avoid html/template's
  contextual-escape collisions.
- Senders: SESv2, Twilio (SMS), SMTP (Mailpit-friendly), Resend HTTP.
- PickEmailSender priority Resend > SMTP > SES > Log — system boots
  cleanly in dev with Mailpit; production flips one env var.
- Webhook endpoints (Twilio status + SES SNS) — bounces add to suppression;
  signature verification stubbed pending creds.
- Auto-send: POST /tokens publishes invitation.send; notifier renders +
  delivers via the configured backend; suppression list honoured.
- Bulk + per-row invitation flow: POST /events/{id}/guests/invitations/bulk
  returns per-guest tokens so phone-only guests can be SMS'd manually.
- Unsubscribe: signed HMAC token (no TTL) + /unsubscribe/[token] page.
- WhatsApp Option A+: wa.me click-to-chat wizard with per-guest progress
  tracking, isLikelyE164 validation, edit-from-wizard.
- Token rotate (POST /tokens/rotate) invalidates the old URL — used by
  the regenerate-link flow.
- Mailpit added to docker-compose for dev inbox.

Block E — CSV import
- Streaming parser: tolerant header detection, UTF-8 BOM + UTF-16 LE/BE
  decoding, row-level validation, 5,000-row cap.
- Strict E.164 phone validation with helpful error message.
- POST /preview + /import + GET /template; preview UI on event page;
  atomic per-batch with dedup on existing emails.

Phone capture across UI
- PhoneInput component: country picker (~50 ISO codes) + national input +
  live E.164 preview + inline length validation.
- Used in Add Guest and Edit Guest modals. Smart paste-handling extracts
  country code from full E.164 strings.

Block F — Billing (Stripe)
- Migration 0005: subscriptions table (user_id → tier/status/period_end +
  Stripe customer/sub ids). Partial unique index keeps one granting sub
  per user.
- internal/billing: Tier + Limits model (Free 1/50, Pro 10/1000, Business
  ∞/5000), Stripe SDK wrapper with IgnoreAPIVersionMismatch for newer
  account API versions.
- /billing/checkout-session, /billing/portal, /billing/status,
  /webhooks/stripe (signature-verified, lifecycle events).
- Tier enforcement: 402 on POST /events, /guests, /import with
  {error, reason, tier, used, limit, upgrade_url} body.
- Frontend: useBilling composable, /dashboard/billing page (current plan,
  usage bars, tier cards), global UpgradeModal triggered by useApi's
  402 interceptor.
- Customer portal kept for self-service cancel/payment-method changes.

Block G — Backups & DR (application side)
- Every migration has a tested .down.sql.
- TestMigrationRoundtrip applies all ups → all downs → all ups against a
  fresh container; catches asymmetric down migrations.
- cmd/restore-verify: 28-check post-restore invariant tool (schema
  presence, no orphans across 10 FK relationships, email uniqueness,
  single-active subscription, row-count snapshot).
- docs/RUNBOOK_RESTORE.md: 9-step restore procedure with RTO/RPO
  targets, drill instructions, rollback path.

Block H — Privacy compliance (application side)
- Migration 0006: deleted_at + terms_accepted_at + privacy_policy_accepted_at
  on users. Partial index on email for live-only uniqueness.
- GET /me/data-export — synchronous JSON dump (user, events, guests,
  tokens, rsvps, access_logs, notifications).
- DELETE /me — soft-delete with PII scrub + refresh-token revocation;
  re-signup with same email works.
- POST /me/accept-terms — idempotent consent recording.
- Frontend /privacy + /terms placeholder pages with substantive (pending
  legal review) copy; footer links; signup terms checkbox; TermsGateModal
  for accounts created before the rollout; export + delete buttons on
  /dashboard/billing.

Tests
- All migrations verified up/down/up.
- Integration suite: TestE2EHappyPath, TestAuthFlow, TestCrossTenantIsolation,
  TestRateLimitSignup, TestLoginLockout, TestUnsubscribeFlow,
  TestSESBounceWebhook, TestTwilioStatusWebhook, TestCsvImportFlow,
  TestCsvImportAtomicRollback, TestBulkIssueInvitations, TestBulkIssueExplicitSubset,
  TestTokenIssuePublishesInvitation, TestTokenIssueWithoutGuestEmailSkipsInvitation,
  TestGuestUpdate, TestGuestDelete, TestTokenRotate, TestSMTPSenderAgainstMailpit,
  TestFreeTierEventLimit, TestFreeTierGuestLimit, TestBusinessTierBypassesLimits,
  TestDataExport, TestDeleteMe, TestAcceptTerms, TestMigrationRoundtrip.
  Full suite runs in ~120s against real Postgres + NATS + Redis + Mailpit.
- Unit suite green across internal/auth, internal/csvimport,
  internal/notification, internal/ratelimit, internal/domain.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-16 23:54:22 +01:00
Kwaku Danso 3f8bc58ca9 feat: build core API, fraud engine, notifier, and frontend 
Phase 1 — Core API (Go):
- Events, guests, tokens, RSVPs CRUD on PostgreSQL via pgx/v5
- HMAC-signed per-guest tokens with format validation
- Health endpoint with DB ping, slog JSON logging, graceful shutdown

Phase 2 — NATS + Fraud Engine:
- NATS JetStream pub/sub with explicit-ack consumers
- Python/FastAPI fraud engine with heuristic risk scoring
  (fingerprint mismatch, IP change, missing signals, repeated access)
- gRPC sync scoring with 250ms fail-open timeout
- Per-guest baseline tracking; risk bands low/medium/high/block

Phase 3 — Notifications + Frontend:
- Notification worker scaffolding (Twilio/SES stubs, retry/backoff)
- Nuxt 3 frontend with Tailwind dark theme + brand green
- Live monitor via WebSocket with auto-reconnect
- Activity history endpoint backfills monitor with RSVPs +
  scored access checks (including blocked attempts)

UX polish:
- Marketing-friendly landing page (hero mockup, how-it-works,
  features, use cases, testimonials, FAQ, final CTA)
- Animated layered card mockups on landing + new-event page
- Plus-ones stepper, RSVP status badges, filter buttons
- Friendly access-check labels (Verified/Review/Suspicious/Blocked)
- Dashboard hydration fix via ClientOnly wrapper

Infrastructure:
- docker-compose for full local dev (postgres, nats, api,
  fraud-engine, notifier, frontend)
- Multi-stage Dockerfiles, non-root UID 1000
- Integration tests with testcontainers-go

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-11 21:08:56 +01:00