dbddf17e3b6e660af21c55ff5789cb0796537d87
4 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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b873012191 |
feat(tier2): smarter fraud detection — Block G
Per-event fraud tuning. Hosts can now dial the medium / high / block
boundaries, allowlist trusted networks, and feed verdicts back on
flagged accesses — the seed corpus for a future ML model.
Schema (migration 0011)
- events.fraud_{medium,high,block}_threshold default 30/60/85 so
existing events behave identically until a host changes them
- access_logs.geo_{country,city,lat,lon} for future enrichment
- fraud_feedback table — verdict ('legitimate' | 'suspicious') + note,
PK on access_log_id so re-mark is an upsert
- event_allowlists table — (event_id, ip_cidr) primary key, inet column
so containment checks use the native >>= operator (indexed lookup)
Domain
- FraudThresholds with Valid() + Band() helpers; Default trio echoed
through GET responses so the frontend doesn't duplicate constants
- ParseAllowlistCIDR accepts bare IPs (auto-widens to /32 or /128) and
canonicalises the output (203.0.113.42 → 203.0.113.42/32)
- Event.Thresholds() falls back to defaults if columns weren't
populated yet, so the API never wedges every score into "low"
Storage
- AllowlistRepo: List / Add / Remove + Matches() — the latter pushes
CIDR containment into Postgres rather than streaming rows back
- FeedbackRepo: Record (upserts) + ListForEvent (joined through guests)
- EventRepo.GetThresholds + UpdateThresholds, plus the threshold
columns baked into scanEvent so every event load carries them
- AccessLogRepo.BelongsToEvent — stops a hostile editor on event A
from marking event B's access logs
API
- GET/PUT /events/{id}/security/thresholds (viewer/editor)
- GET/POST/DELETE /events/{id}/security/allowlist
- POST /events/{id}/access-logs/{log_id}/feedback (editor)
- GET /events/{id}/security/feedback
- RSVP scoring path: allowlist short-circuit fires before the fraud
engine; the engine's score is then re-banded against the event's
thresholds (engine.Risk becomes advisory — API is the source of
truth for "what counts as block here")
- CORS Allow-Methods already includes PUT (Block D fix)
Fraud engine
- Single-signal cap: it now takes ≥2 sub-scores of ≥70 to push the
final into HIGH. Fixes the well-known "second visit with a slightly
shifted fingerprint scores 60+" false positive
- Engine band remains advisory; API re-bands using per-event
thresholds before deciding to block
Frontend
- SecurityCard.vue: visual band ribbon (proportional to thresholds),
three sliders with mutual clamping so dragging medium past high
pushes high (not an invalid ordering), reset-to-defaults button,
CIDR allowlist with inline add + per-row remove, verdict-history
inbox. Toast feedback on save/add/remove
- "Security" tab added to the event-detail tab nav (5th tab,
right of Analytics)
- Viewer role hides write affordances; server enforces too
Tests
- Domain: ThresholdsBand, ThresholdsValid, ParseAllowlistCIDR (bare
IP widening + traversal/typo rejection), FraudFeedbackValid
- Integration: thresholds round-trip + invalid ordering rejection,
allowlist CRUD + duplicate 409 + invalid CIDR 400 + IP auto-widen,
feedback record + upsert + cross-tenant 404 + invalid verdict 400,
viewer can read / editor can write / outsider gets 404
- Full integration suite green (315.8s, all 36 top-level tests pass)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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3973e4058d |
feat(tier2): multi-host / collaborators — Block C
Events can now have multiple users with distinct roles:
owner — manage collaborators, delete event, full access
editor — manage guests, tokens, CSV import, patch event
viewer — read-only access to everything
Schema (migration 0008)
- collaborator_role ENUM + event_collaborators + collaborator_invites
- Backfill: every existing events.host_id becomes an owner row
- EventRepo.Create seeds the owner row in the same transaction so
no future event can exist without one
Authz
- New requireRole(eventID, userID, minRole) helper. Non-members 404;
insufficient role 403. Replaces requireEventOwner across every
shared-role handler (events.get/update, guests CRUD, tokens issue/
rotate/bulk, csv preview/commit/template, activity, ws-ticket)
- events.delete + collaborator management stay owner-only
- GET /events lists every event the user has any role on
- /events/{id} response now embeds your_role for UI branching
Collaborator endpoints
- GET /events/{id}/collaborators (viewer+)
- POST /events/{id}/collaborators (owner) — sends invite email
- PATCH /events/{id}/collaborators/{user_id} (owner) — role change
- DELETE /events/{id}/collaborators/{user_id} (owner) — refuses last owner
- DELETE /events/{id}/collaborators/pending (owner) — cancel invite
- GET /invites/{token} (public) — preview summary
- POST /invites/{token}/accept (authed) — atomic accept
Invitations
- SHA-256 hashed in DB; raw value only lives in the email link
- 7-day TTL, single-use, email-bound (caller's email must match)
- New SendCollaboratorInvite on auth.EmailSender + Resend/SMTP/SES
senders + log stub; collaborator_invite.html/txt branded template
Frontend
- TeamCard.vue on the event detail page: lists collaborators with
inline role-change + remove, pending-invites with cancel, invite
modal (email + role). Owner-only actions hidden for editors/viewers
- /invites/[token] accept page: shows invite summary, prompts signup
or sign-in with pre-filled email, refuses mismatched accounts
Tests (all 6 pass on the existing testcontainers harness)
- backfill: legacy host gets owner role
- role enforcement: viewer can read, editor can write guests but not
delete/manage team, non-member 404s everywhere
- last-owner removal refused (400)
- shared events show up in collaborator's /events list
- invite flow: create → preview → accept → role granted → replay 410
- email mismatch on accept returns 403
- expired invite returns 410
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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59b8781659 |
feat: ship Tier 1 — auth, authz, rate limits, real notifications, CSV import, billing, backups/DR, privacy
Closes every block in docs/TIER1_PLAN.md from the Claude-scope side. The
homelab / cloud setup steps (SES verification, restore drill, lawyer-
drafted ToS) remain operator-owned but are unblocked.
Block A — Authentication
- Migration 0003: password_hash, email_verified, email_verification_tokens,
password_reset_tokens, refresh_tokens (with replaced_by family chain).
- Bcrypt hasher, HS256 JWT signer, single-use refresh tokens with rotation
+ replay-detection (revokes the family on reuse).
- /auth/signup, /login, /refresh, /logout, /verify-email,
/forgot-password, /reset-password — enumeration-safe.
- requireAuth middleware + GET /me.
- Frontend useAuth/useApi with auto-refresh-on-401, login/signup/verify/
forgot/reset pages, route-guard middleware.
Block B — Authorisation
- EventRepo.GetForHost; Update/Delete scoped by host_id.
- All host routes behind requireAuth + ownership; cross-tenant returns
404 (no enumeration). ?host_id removed.
- WS auth via short-lived single-use tickets (POST /auth/ws-ticket).
- Tests: TestCrossTenantIsolation — 9 probes.
Block C — Rate limiting
- Redis sliding-window via Lua (atomic ZADD+ZCARD+PEXPIRE).
- Per-route limits matching the plan (signup IP, login IP+email, RSVP/
access by token, events/guests/tokens by user_id).
- 429 with Retry-After header and JSON body.
- Auth lockout: 5 failed logins → account locked, only password reset
clears it.
- Frontend: useErrMessage normalises 429 + locked messaging.
Block D — Real notifications
- Migration 0004: provider_message_id, bounce_type, complained columns
+ unsubscribes (CITEXT) suppression table.
- Branded HTML + plaintext templates for verification, reset, invitation,
confirmation, reminder. Per-page templates avoid html/template's
contextual-escape collisions.
- Senders: SESv2, Twilio (SMS), SMTP (Mailpit-friendly), Resend HTTP.
- PickEmailSender priority Resend > SMTP > SES > Log — system boots
cleanly in dev with Mailpit; production flips one env var.
- Webhook endpoints (Twilio status + SES SNS) — bounces add to suppression;
signature verification stubbed pending creds.
- Auto-send: POST /tokens publishes invitation.send; notifier renders +
delivers via the configured backend; suppression list honoured.
- Bulk + per-row invitation flow: POST /events/{id}/guests/invitations/bulk
returns per-guest tokens so phone-only guests can be SMS'd manually.
- Unsubscribe: signed HMAC token (no TTL) + /unsubscribe/[token] page.
- WhatsApp Option A+: wa.me click-to-chat wizard with per-guest progress
tracking, isLikelyE164 validation, edit-from-wizard.
- Token rotate (POST /tokens/rotate) invalidates the old URL — used by
the regenerate-link flow.
- Mailpit added to docker-compose for dev inbox.
Block E — CSV import
- Streaming parser: tolerant header detection, UTF-8 BOM + UTF-16 LE/BE
decoding, row-level validation, 5,000-row cap.
- Strict E.164 phone validation with helpful error message.
- POST /preview + /import + GET /template; preview UI on event page;
atomic per-batch with dedup on existing emails.
Phone capture across UI
- PhoneInput component: country picker (~50 ISO codes) + national input +
live E.164 preview + inline length validation.
- Used in Add Guest and Edit Guest modals. Smart paste-handling extracts
country code from full E.164 strings.
Block F — Billing (Stripe)
- Migration 0005: subscriptions table (user_id → tier/status/period_end +
Stripe customer/sub ids). Partial unique index keeps one granting sub
per user.
- internal/billing: Tier + Limits model (Free 1/50, Pro 10/1000, Business
∞/5000), Stripe SDK wrapper with IgnoreAPIVersionMismatch for newer
account API versions.
- /billing/checkout-session, /billing/portal, /billing/status,
/webhooks/stripe (signature-verified, lifecycle events).
- Tier enforcement: 402 on POST /events, /guests, /import with
{error, reason, tier, used, limit, upgrade_url} body.
- Frontend: useBilling composable, /dashboard/billing page (current plan,
usage bars, tier cards), global UpgradeModal triggered by useApi's
402 interceptor.
- Customer portal kept for self-service cancel/payment-method changes.
Block G — Backups & DR (application side)
- Every migration has a tested .down.sql.
- TestMigrationRoundtrip applies all ups → all downs → all ups against a
fresh container; catches asymmetric down migrations.
- cmd/restore-verify: 28-check post-restore invariant tool (schema
presence, no orphans across 10 FK relationships, email uniqueness,
single-active subscription, row-count snapshot).
- docs/RUNBOOK_RESTORE.md: 9-step restore procedure with RTO/RPO
targets, drill instructions, rollback path.
Block H — Privacy compliance (application side)
- Migration 0006: deleted_at + terms_accepted_at + privacy_policy_accepted_at
on users. Partial index on email for live-only uniqueness.
- GET /me/data-export — synchronous JSON dump (user, events, guests,
tokens, rsvps, access_logs, notifications).
- DELETE /me — soft-delete with PII scrub + refresh-token revocation;
re-signup with same email works.
- POST /me/accept-terms — idempotent consent recording.
- Frontend /privacy + /terms placeholder pages with substantive (pending
legal review) copy; footer links; signup terms checkbox; TermsGateModal
for accounts created before the rollout; export + delete buttons on
/dashboard/billing.
Tests
- All migrations verified up/down/up.
- Integration suite: TestE2EHappyPath, TestAuthFlow, TestCrossTenantIsolation,
TestRateLimitSignup, TestLoginLockout, TestUnsubscribeFlow,
TestSESBounceWebhook, TestTwilioStatusWebhook, TestCsvImportFlow,
TestCsvImportAtomicRollback, TestBulkIssueInvitations, TestBulkIssueExplicitSubset,
TestTokenIssuePublishesInvitation, TestTokenIssueWithoutGuestEmailSkipsInvitation,
TestGuestUpdate, TestGuestDelete, TestTokenRotate, TestSMTPSenderAgainstMailpit,
TestFreeTierEventLimit, TestFreeTierGuestLimit, TestBusinessTierBypassesLimits,
TestDataExport, TestDeleteMe, TestAcceptTerms, TestMigrationRoundtrip.
Full suite runs in ~120s against real Postgres + NATS + Redis + Mailpit.
- Unit suite green across internal/auth, internal/csvimport,
internal/notification, internal/ratelimit, internal/domain.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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3f8bc58ca9 |
feat: build core API, fraud engine, notifier, and frontend
Phase 1 — Core API (Go): - Events, guests, tokens, RSVPs CRUD on PostgreSQL via pgx/v5 - HMAC-signed per-guest tokens with format validation - Health endpoint with DB ping, slog JSON logging, graceful shutdown Phase 2 — NATS + Fraud Engine: - NATS JetStream pub/sub with explicit-ack consumers - Python/FastAPI fraud engine with heuristic risk scoring (fingerprint mismatch, IP change, missing signals, repeated access) - gRPC sync scoring with 250ms fail-open timeout - Per-guest baseline tracking; risk bands low/medium/high/block Phase 3 — Notifications + Frontend: - Notification worker scaffolding (Twilio/SES stubs, retry/backoff) - Nuxt 3 frontend with Tailwind dark theme + brand green - Live monitor via WebSocket with auto-reconnect - Activity history endpoint backfills monitor with RSVPs + scored access checks (including blocked attempts) UX polish: - Marketing-friendly landing page (hero mockup, how-it-works, features, use cases, testimonials, FAQ, final CTA) - Animated layered card mockups on landing + new-event page - Plus-ones stepper, RSVP status badges, filter buttons - Friendly access-check labels (Verified/Review/Suspicious/Blocked) - Dashboard hydration fix via ClientOnly wrapper Infrastructure: - docker-compose for full local dev (postgres, nats, api, fraud-engine, notifier, frontend) - Multi-stage Dockerfiles, non-root UID 1000 - Integration tests with testcontainers-go Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> |