59b8781659
Closes every block in docs/TIER1_PLAN.md from the Claude-scope side. The
homelab / cloud setup steps (SES verification, restore drill, lawyer-
drafted ToS) remain operator-owned but are unblocked.
Block A — Authentication
- Migration 0003: password_hash, email_verified, email_verification_tokens,
password_reset_tokens, refresh_tokens (with replaced_by family chain).
- Bcrypt hasher, HS256 JWT signer, single-use refresh tokens with rotation
+ replay-detection (revokes the family on reuse).
- /auth/signup, /login, /refresh, /logout, /verify-email,
/forgot-password, /reset-password — enumeration-safe.
- requireAuth middleware + GET /me.
- Frontend useAuth/useApi with auto-refresh-on-401, login/signup/verify/
forgot/reset pages, route-guard middleware.
Block B — Authorisation
- EventRepo.GetForHost; Update/Delete scoped by host_id.
- All host routes behind requireAuth + ownership; cross-tenant returns
404 (no enumeration). ?host_id removed.
- WS auth via short-lived single-use tickets (POST /auth/ws-ticket).
- Tests: TestCrossTenantIsolation — 9 probes.
Block C — Rate limiting
- Redis sliding-window via Lua (atomic ZADD+ZCARD+PEXPIRE).
- Per-route limits matching the plan (signup IP, login IP+email, RSVP/
access by token, events/guests/tokens by user_id).
- 429 with Retry-After header and JSON body.
- Auth lockout: 5 failed logins → account locked, only password reset
clears it.
- Frontend: useErrMessage normalises 429 + locked messaging.
Block D — Real notifications
- Migration 0004: provider_message_id, bounce_type, complained columns
+ unsubscribes (CITEXT) suppression table.
- Branded HTML + plaintext templates for verification, reset, invitation,
confirmation, reminder. Per-page templates avoid html/template's
contextual-escape collisions.
- Senders: SESv2, Twilio (SMS), SMTP (Mailpit-friendly), Resend HTTP.
- PickEmailSender priority Resend > SMTP > SES > Log — system boots
cleanly in dev with Mailpit; production flips one env var.
- Webhook endpoints (Twilio status + SES SNS) — bounces add to suppression;
signature verification stubbed pending creds.
- Auto-send: POST /tokens publishes invitation.send; notifier renders +
delivers via the configured backend; suppression list honoured.
- Bulk + per-row invitation flow: POST /events/{id}/guests/invitations/bulk
returns per-guest tokens so phone-only guests can be SMS'd manually.
- Unsubscribe: signed HMAC token (no TTL) + /unsubscribe/[token] page.
- WhatsApp Option A+: wa.me click-to-chat wizard with per-guest progress
tracking, isLikelyE164 validation, edit-from-wizard.
- Token rotate (POST /tokens/rotate) invalidates the old URL — used by
the regenerate-link flow.
- Mailpit added to docker-compose for dev inbox.
Block E — CSV import
- Streaming parser: tolerant header detection, UTF-8 BOM + UTF-16 LE/BE
decoding, row-level validation, 5,000-row cap.
- Strict E.164 phone validation with helpful error message.
- POST /preview + /import + GET /template; preview UI on event page;
atomic per-batch with dedup on existing emails.
Phone capture across UI
- PhoneInput component: country picker (~50 ISO codes) + national input +
live E.164 preview + inline length validation.
- Used in Add Guest and Edit Guest modals. Smart paste-handling extracts
country code from full E.164 strings.
Block F — Billing (Stripe)
- Migration 0005: subscriptions table (user_id → tier/status/period_end +
Stripe customer/sub ids). Partial unique index keeps one granting sub
per user.
- internal/billing: Tier + Limits model (Free 1/50, Pro 10/1000, Business
∞/5000), Stripe SDK wrapper with IgnoreAPIVersionMismatch for newer
account API versions.
- /billing/checkout-session, /billing/portal, /billing/status,
/webhooks/stripe (signature-verified, lifecycle events).
- Tier enforcement: 402 on POST /events, /guests, /import with
{error, reason, tier, used, limit, upgrade_url} body.
- Frontend: useBilling composable, /dashboard/billing page (current plan,
usage bars, tier cards), global UpgradeModal triggered by useApi's
402 interceptor.
- Customer portal kept for self-service cancel/payment-method changes.
Block G — Backups & DR (application side)
- Every migration has a tested .down.sql.
- TestMigrationRoundtrip applies all ups → all downs → all ups against a
fresh container; catches asymmetric down migrations.
- cmd/restore-verify: 28-check post-restore invariant tool (schema
presence, no orphans across 10 FK relationships, email uniqueness,
single-active subscription, row-count snapshot).
- docs/RUNBOOK_RESTORE.md: 9-step restore procedure with RTO/RPO
targets, drill instructions, rollback path.
Block H — Privacy compliance (application side)
- Migration 0006: deleted_at + terms_accepted_at + privacy_policy_accepted_at
on users. Partial index on email for live-only uniqueness.
- GET /me/data-export — synchronous JSON dump (user, events, guests,
tokens, rsvps, access_logs, notifications).
- DELETE /me — soft-delete with PII scrub + refresh-token revocation;
re-signup with same email works.
- POST /me/accept-terms — idempotent consent recording.
- Frontend /privacy + /terms placeholder pages with substantive (pending
legal review) copy; footer links; signup terms checkbox; TermsGateModal
for accounts created before the rollout; export + delete buttons on
/dashboard/billing.
Tests
- All migrations verified up/down/up.
- Integration suite: TestE2EHappyPath, TestAuthFlow, TestCrossTenantIsolation,
TestRateLimitSignup, TestLoginLockout, TestUnsubscribeFlow,
TestSESBounceWebhook, TestTwilioStatusWebhook, TestCsvImportFlow,
TestCsvImportAtomicRollback, TestBulkIssueInvitations, TestBulkIssueExplicitSubset,
TestTokenIssuePublishesInvitation, TestTokenIssueWithoutGuestEmailSkipsInvitation,
TestGuestUpdate, TestGuestDelete, TestTokenRotate, TestSMTPSenderAgainstMailpit,
TestFreeTierEventLimit, TestFreeTierGuestLimit, TestBusinessTierBypassesLimits,
TestDataExport, TestDeleteMe, TestAcceptTerms, TestMigrationRoundtrip.
Full suite runs in ~120s against real Postgres + NATS + Redis + Mailpit.
- Unit suite green across internal/auth, internal/csvimport,
internal/notification, internal/ratelimit, internal/domain.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
169 lines
4.0 KiB
Go
169 lines
4.0 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"github.com/coder/websocket"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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)
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// WSEvent is the envelope pushed over WebSocket to dashboard clients.
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type WSEvent struct {
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Type string `json:"type"`
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EventID uuid.UUID `json:"event_id"`
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Payload json.RawMessage `json:"payload"`
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Timestamp time.Time `json:"timestamp"`
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}
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type subscriber struct {
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conn *websocket.Conn
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send chan []byte
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closed chan struct{}
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}
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// Hub fans out per-event WebSocket events to subscribers. Connections are
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// keyed by event_id; a single dashboard page subscribes to one event at a
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// time. Backpressure: if a slow client falls behind, we drop the message
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// for that subscriber rather than block the broadcaster.
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type Hub struct {
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logger *slog.Logger
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mu sync.RWMutex
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subs map[uuid.UUID]map[*subscriber]struct{}
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}
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func NewHub(logger *slog.Logger) *Hub {
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return &Hub{
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logger: logger,
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subs: make(map[uuid.UUID]map[*subscriber]struct{}),
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}
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}
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// Broadcast publishes evt to all subscribers of evt.EventID.
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func (h *Hub) Broadcast(evt WSEvent) {
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if evt.Timestamp.IsZero() {
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evt.Timestamp = time.Now().UTC()
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}
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body, err := json.Marshal(evt)
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if err != nil {
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h.logger.Error("ws marshal", "err", err)
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return
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}
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h.mu.RLock()
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defer h.mu.RUnlock()
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for s := range h.subs[evt.EventID] {
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select {
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case s.send <- body:
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default:
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// drop on slow client; the connection will be closed when its
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// reader goroutine notices the closed channel.
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h.logger.Warn("ws subscriber slow, dropping message", "event_id", evt.EventID)
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}
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}
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}
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func (h *Hub) add(eventID uuid.UUID, s *subscriber) {
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h.mu.Lock()
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defer h.mu.Unlock()
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if h.subs[eventID] == nil {
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h.subs[eventID] = make(map[*subscriber]struct{})
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}
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h.subs[eventID][s] = struct{}{}
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}
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func (h *Hub) remove(eventID uuid.UUID, s *subscriber) {
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h.mu.Lock()
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defer h.mu.Unlock()
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if subs, ok := h.subs[eventID]; ok {
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delete(subs, s)
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if len(subs) == 0 {
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delete(h.subs, eventID)
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}
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}
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}
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type wsHandler struct {
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logger *slog.Logger
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hub *Hub
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tickets *wsTicketStore
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}
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// GET /ws/events/{id}?ticket=... — dashboard live feed for one event.
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//
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// The handshake is authorised by a single-use ticket minted via
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// POST /auth/ws-ticket (option 3 from the Block B plan). The ticket binds
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// the connecting user to a specific event_id; we reject if either is
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// missing or doesn't match the URL path.
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func (h *wsHandler) handle(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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eventID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "id")
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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rawTicket := r.URL.Query().Get("ticket")
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if rawTicket == "" {
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "missing ticket")
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return
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}
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_, ticketEventID, valid := h.tickets.Consume(rawTicket)
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if !valid {
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid or expired ticket")
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return
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}
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if ticketEventID != eventID {
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writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "ticket does not match event")
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return
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}
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conn, err := websocket.Accept(w, r, &websocket.AcceptOptions{
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// In dev the frontend runs on a different origin (localhost:3000 → localhost:8080).
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// We're not relying on cookies, so it's safe to skip the same-origin check.
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InsecureSkipVerify: true,
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})
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if err != nil {
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h.logger.Warn("ws accept", "err", err)
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return
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}
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sub := &subscriber{
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conn: conn,
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send: make(chan []byte, 32),
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closed: make(chan struct{}),
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}
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h.hub.add(eventID, sub)
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defer h.hub.remove(eventID, sub)
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ctx := conn.CloseRead(r.Context())
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pingTicker := time.NewTicker(20 * time.Second)
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defer pingTicker.Stop()
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for {
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select {
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case <-ctx.Done():
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conn.Close(websocket.StatusNormalClosure, "")
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return
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case msg := <-sub.send:
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writeCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 5*time.Second)
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err := conn.Write(writeCtx, websocket.MessageText, msg)
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cancel()
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if err != nil {
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conn.Close(websocket.StatusInternalError, "write failed")
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return
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}
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case <-pingTicker.C:
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pingCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 5*time.Second)
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err := conn.Ping(pingCtx)
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cancel()
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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}
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}
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}
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