59b8781659
Closes every block in docs/TIER1_PLAN.md from the Claude-scope side. The
homelab / cloud setup steps (SES verification, restore drill, lawyer-
drafted ToS) remain operator-owned but are unblocked.
Block A — Authentication
- Migration 0003: password_hash, email_verified, email_verification_tokens,
password_reset_tokens, refresh_tokens (with replaced_by family chain).
- Bcrypt hasher, HS256 JWT signer, single-use refresh tokens with rotation
+ replay-detection (revokes the family on reuse).
- /auth/signup, /login, /refresh, /logout, /verify-email,
/forgot-password, /reset-password — enumeration-safe.
- requireAuth middleware + GET /me.
- Frontend useAuth/useApi with auto-refresh-on-401, login/signup/verify/
forgot/reset pages, route-guard middleware.
Block B — Authorisation
- EventRepo.GetForHost; Update/Delete scoped by host_id.
- All host routes behind requireAuth + ownership; cross-tenant returns
404 (no enumeration). ?host_id removed.
- WS auth via short-lived single-use tickets (POST /auth/ws-ticket).
- Tests: TestCrossTenantIsolation — 9 probes.
Block C — Rate limiting
- Redis sliding-window via Lua (atomic ZADD+ZCARD+PEXPIRE).
- Per-route limits matching the plan (signup IP, login IP+email, RSVP/
access by token, events/guests/tokens by user_id).
- 429 with Retry-After header and JSON body.
- Auth lockout: 5 failed logins → account locked, only password reset
clears it.
- Frontend: useErrMessage normalises 429 + locked messaging.
Block D — Real notifications
- Migration 0004: provider_message_id, bounce_type, complained columns
+ unsubscribes (CITEXT) suppression table.
- Branded HTML + plaintext templates for verification, reset, invitation,
confirmation, reminder. Per-page templates avoid html/template's
contextual-escape collisions.
- Senders: SESv2, Twilio (SMS), SMTP (Mailpit-friendly), Resend HTTP.
- PickEmailSender priority Resend > SMTP > SES > Log — system boots
cleanly in dev with Mailpit; production flips one env var.
- Webhook endpoints (Twilio status + SES SNS) — bounces add to suppression;
signature verification stubbed pending creds.
- Auto-send: POST /tokens publishes invitation.send; notifier renders +
delivers via the configured backend; suppression list honoured.
- Bulk + per-row invitation flow: POST /events/{id}/guests/invitations/bulk
returns per-guest tokens so phone-only guests can be SMS'd manually.
- Unsubscribe: signed HMAC token (no TTL) + /unsubscribe/[token] page.
- WhatsApp Option A+: wa.me click-to-chat wizard with per-guest progress
tracking, isLikelyE164 validation, edit-from-wizard.
- Token rotate (POST /tokens/rotate) invalidates the old URL — used by
the regenerate-link flow.
- Mailpit added to docker-compose for dev inbox.
Block E — CSV import
- Streaming parser: tolerant header detection, UTF-8 BOM + UTF-16 LE/BE
decoding, row-level validation, 5,000-row cap.
- Strict E.164 phone validation with helpful error message.
- POST /preview + /import + GET /template; preview UI on event page;
atomic per-batch with dedup on existing emails.
Phone capture across UI
- PhoneInput component: country picker (~50 ISO codes) + national input +
live E.164 preview + inline length validation.
- Used in Add Guest and Edit Guest modals. Smart paste-handling extracts
country code from full E.164 strings.
Block F — Billing (Stripe)
- Migration 0005: subscriptions table (user_id → tier/status/period_end +
Stripe customer/sub ids). Partial unique index keeps one granting sub
per user.
- internal/billing: Tier + Limits model (Free 1/50, Pro 10/1000, Business
∞/5000), Stripe SDK wrapper with IgnoreAPIVersionMismatch for newer
account API versions.
- /billing/checkout-session, /billing/portal, /billing/status,
/webhooks/stripe (signature-verified, lifecycle events).
- Tier enforcement: 402 on POST /events, /guests, /import with
{error, reason, tier, used, limit, upgrade_url} body.
- Frontend: useBilling composable, /dashboard/billing page (current plan,
usage bars, tier cards), global UpgradeModal triggered by useApi's
402 interceptor.
- Customer portal kept for self-service cancel/payment-method changes.
Block G — Backups & DR (application side)
- Every migration has a tested .down.sql.
- TestMigrationRoundtrip applies all ups → all downs → all ups against a
fresh container; catches asymmetric down migrations.
- cmd/restore-verify: 28-check post-restore invariant tool (schema
presence, no orphans across 10 FK relationships, email uniqueness,
single-active subscription, row-count snapshot).
- docs/RUNBOOK_RESTORE.md: 9-step restore procedure with RTO/RPO
targets, drill instructions, rollback path.
Block H — Privacy compliance (application side)
- Migration 0006: deleted_at + terms_accepted_at + privacy_policy_accepted_at
on users. Partial index on email for live-only uniqueness.
- GET /me/data-export — synchronous JSON dump (user, events, guests,
tokens, rsvps, access_logs, notifications).
- DELETE /me — soft-delete with PII scrub + refresh-token revocation;
re-signup with same email works.
- POST /me/accept-terms — idempotent consent recording.
- Frontend /privacy + /terms placeholder pages with substantive (pending
legal review) copy; footer links; signup terms checkbox; TermsGateModal
for accounts created before the rollout; export + delete buttons on
/dashboard/billing.
Tests
- All migrations verified up/down/up.
- Integration suite: TestE2EHappyPath, TestAuthFlow, TestCrossTenantIsolation,
TestRateLimitSignup, TestLoginLockout, TestUnsubscribeFlow,
TestSESBounceWebhook, TestTwilioStatusWebhook, TestCsvImportFlow,
TestCsvImportAtomicRollback, TestBulkIssueInvitations, TestBulkIssueExplicitSubset,
TestTokenIssuePublishesInvitation, TestTokenIssueWithoutGuestEmailSkipsInvitation,
TestGuestUpdate, TestGuestDelete, TestTokenRotate, TestSMTPSenderAgainstMailpit,
TestFreeTierEventLimit, TestFreeTierGuestLimit, TestBusinessTierBypassesLimits,
TestDataExport, TestDeleteMe, TestAcceptTerms, TestMigrationRoundtrip.
Full suite runs in ~120s against real Postgres + NATS + Redis + Mailpit.
- Unit suite green across internal/auth, internal/csvimport,
internal/notification, internal/ratelimit, internal/domain.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
129 lines
3.2 KiB
Go
129 lines
3.2 KiB
Go
package natspub
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"time"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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"github.com/nats-io/nats.go"
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"github.com/nats-io/nats.go/jetstream"
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)
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type Client struct {
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conn *nats.Conn
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js jetstream.JetStream
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logger *slog.Logger
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}
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func Connect(ctx context.Context, url string, logger *slog.Logger) (*Client, error) {
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conn, err := nats.Connect(url,
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nats.Name("guestguard-api"),
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nats.MaxReconnects(-1),
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nats.ReconnectWait(2*time.Second),
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nats.DisconnectErrHandler(func(_ *nats.Conn, err error) {
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if err != nil {
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logger.Warn("nats disconnected", "err", err)
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}
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}),
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nats.ReconnectHandler(func(c *nats.Conn) {
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logger.Info("nats reconnected", "url", c.ConnectedUrl())
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}),
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)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("connect nats: %w", err)
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}
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js, err := jetstream.New(conn)
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if err != nil {
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conn.Close()
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("jetstream: %w", err)
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}
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c := &Client{conn: conn, js: js, logger: logger}
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if err := c.ensureStream(ctx); err != nil {
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conn.Close()
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return nil, err
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}
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return c, nil
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}
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func (c *Client) ensureStream(ctx context.Context) error {
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cfg := jetstream.StreamConfig{
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Name: StreamName,
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Subjects: StreamSubjects(),
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Retention: jetstream.LimitsPolicy,
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Storage: jetstream.FileStorage,
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MaxAge: 14 * 24 * time.Hour,
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Replicas: 1,
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}
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_, err := c.js.CreateOrUpdateStream(ctx, cfg)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("create stream %s: %w", StreamName, err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (c *Client) Close() {
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if c.conn != nil {
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c.conn.Drain() //nolint:errcheck
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}
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}
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func (c *Client) JetStream() jetstream.JetStream {
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return c.js
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}
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func (c *Client) PublishAccessAttempted(ctx context.Context, evt AccessAttempted) error {
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if evt.OccurredAt.IsZero() {
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evt.OccurredAt = time.Now().UTC()
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}
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return c.publishJSON(ctx, SubjectAccessAttempted, evt, evt.GuestID)
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}
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func (c *Client) PublishRSVPConfirmed(ctx context.Context, evt RSVPConfirmed) error {
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if evt.SubmittedAt.IsZero() {
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evt.SubmittedAt = time.Now().UTC()
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}
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return c.publishJSON(ctx, SubjectRSVPConfirmed, evt, evt.RSVPID)
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}
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func (c *Client) PublishInvitationSend(ctx context.Context, evt InvitationSend) error {
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if evt.IssuedAt.IsZero() {
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evt.IssuedAt = time.Now().UTC()
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}
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// Dedup by token id — re-issuing a token (currently disallowed by the
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// unique constraint, but defensive) won't double-send the email.
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return c.publishJSON(ctx, SubjectInvitationSend, evt, evt.TokenID)
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}
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func (c *Client) publishJSON(ctx context.Context, subject string, payload any, dedupeKey uuid.UUID) error {
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body, err := json.Marshal(payload)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("marshal %s: %w", subject, err)
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}
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msg := &nats.Msg{Subject: subject, Data: body}
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msg.Header = nats.Header{}
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msg.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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if dedupeKey != uuid.Nil {
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msg.Header.Set("Nats-Msg-Id", subject+":"+dedupeKey.String()+":"+time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano))
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}
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pubCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 3*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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_, err = c.js.PublishMsg(pubCtx, msg)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
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return fmt.Errorf("publish %s timed out: %w", subject, err)
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}
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return fmt.Errorf("publish %s: %w", subject, err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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