dbddf17e3b
When a guest submitted via their invitation and then forwarded the link
(or someone copied the URL), the recipient was shown the original guest's
response and a "Change my response" button. Two real problems:
- Privacy leak: the original guest's reply was visible
- Integrity: the recipient could silently overwrite the response
The fix is two layered defences plus a recovery path, matching the
industry pattern used by Eventbrite / Partiful / Lu.ma:
Backend
- GET /access/{token} now compares the device fingerprint of the
current request to the fingerprint stored on the existing RSVP.
When they don't match, the rsvp field is omitted from the
response and a new rsvp_submitted_elsewhere flag is set instead.
The original guest's reply stays private.
- PATCH /rsvp/{token} runs the same gate before scoring. A foreign
device gets 403 with a hint to request an edit link.
- The fingerprint check is intentionally narrow (user_agent only),
so a guest jumping between Wi-Fi and mobile data on the same
phone still sails through.
Recovery path
- New POST /access/{token}/request-edit-link mints a short-lived
edit nonce (Redis, 30-min TTL, SHA-256-hashed), then emails it
to the guest's address on file via the existing EmailSender.
Rate-limited to 3 per token per hour.
- GET /access/{token}?edit=<nonce> and PATCH /rsvp with edit_nonce
in the body both accept the nonce as a bypass for the
same-device check. Lets the real guest edit from a new phone
when their original device is gone.
- New SendRSVPEditLink method on auth.EmailSender, implemented by
every concrete sender (log stub / Resend / SMTP / SES), with a
branded HTML+text template that explains the "we sent this
because we didn't recognise the device" framing.
Frontend
- rsvp/[token].vue learns the new "responded elsewhere" state.
Renders "This invitation has already been used" + a
"Send me an edit link" CTA when the access response says we
have somewhere to deliver it. Empty-state copy reads "If you
forwarded the link, please ask the original guest to reach
out to the host".
- When the URL carries ?edit=<nonce>, the page passes it on the
/access call (so the backend unhides the RSVP), opens the edit
form pre-populated, and forwards the nonce on PATCH.
- Removed two leftover leaks from earlier — the page no longer
shows internal "Risk score N · band" to confirmed or blocked
guests; the blocked-attempt copy now reads "Something about
this attempt looked off" rather than "suspicious access
attempt".
Defensive nil-guard
- The access handler's NATS publish goroutine now skips when
deps.AccessPublisher is nil (matches the rsvp publisher's
existing guard); without it the handler nil-panicked in tests
that don't wire NATS.
Tests
- TestFingerprintsSimilar (unit) covers the same-UA / different-UA
/ missing-UA matrix.
- TestForwardedInvitationLinkDefence (integration) walks the full
flow: submit from UA-A, hide on UA-B, request link, follow nonce
from UA-B and edit, then verify a UA-C with a forged nonce is
still refused.
- Full integration suite passes (183.5s).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
391 lines
11 KiB
Go
391 lines
11 KiB
Go
//go:build integration
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package integration_test
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"io"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/cookiejar"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"net/url"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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"github.com/alchemistkay/guestguard/internal/api"
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"github.com/alchemistkay/guestguard/internal/storage"
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)
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const authTestPassword = "correct-horse-battery-staple"
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// recordingEmailSender captures the most recent verification / reset link so
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// tests can finish the signup flow without a real inbox.
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type recordingEmailSender struct {
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verifyLink string
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resetLink string
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inviteLink string
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}
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func (s *recordingEmailSender) SendVerification(_ context.Context, _, _, link string) error {
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s.verifyLink = link
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return nil
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}
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func (s *recordingEmailSender) SendPasswordReset(_ context.Context, _, _, link string) error {
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s.resetLink = link
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return nil
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}
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func (s *recordingEmailSender) SendCollaboratorInvite(_ context.Context, _, _, _, _, link string) error {
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s.inviteLink = link
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return nil
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}
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func (s *recordingEmailSender) SendRSVPEditLink(_ context.Context, _, _, _, _ string) error {
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// Block G follow-up — recording-only stub; we don't track the URL here
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// because the dedicated forwarded-link test has its own capture sender.
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return nil
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}
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func TestAuthFlow(t *testing.T) {
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if testing.Short() {
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t.Skip("skipping integration test in -short mode")
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}
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Minute)
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t.Cleanup(cancel)
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logger := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil))
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dsn := startPostgres(t, ctx)
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db, err := storage.NewDB(ctx, dsn)
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must(t, err, "connect db")
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t.Cleanup(db.Close)
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must(t, db.Migrate(ctx), "migrate")
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emails := &recordingEmailSender{}
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apiSrv, err := api.NewServer(api.ServerDeps{
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Logger: logger,
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DB: db,
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TokenTTL: 24 * time.Hour,
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JWTSecret: "test-secret-must-be-at-least-32-bytes-long-xx",
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JWTIssuer: "guestguard-test",
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AccessTokenTTL: 5 * time.Minute,
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RefreshTokenTTL: 24 * time.Hour,
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EmailVerificationTTL: 1 * time.Hour,
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PasswordResetTTL: 1 * time.Hour,
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PublicBaseURL: "http://localhost",
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EmailSender: emails,
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})
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must(t, err, "build api server")
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srv := httptest.NewServer(apiSrv.Handler())
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t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
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jar, _ := cookiejar.New(nil)
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client := &http.Client{Jar: jar}
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email := uniqueEmail(t)
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t.Run("signup", func(t *testing.T) {
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resp := post(t, client, srv.URL+"/auth/signup", map[string]string{
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"email": email,
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"name": "Auth Test",
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"password": authTestPassword,
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})
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
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t.Fatalf("signup status: %d", resp.StatusCode)
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}
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resp.Body.Close()
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if emails.verifyLink == "" {
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t.Fatal("verification email not captured")
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}
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})
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t.Run("login before verify is forbidden", func(t *testing.T) {
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resp := post(t, client, srv.URL+"/auth/login", map[string]string{
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"email": email,
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"password": authTestPassword,
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})
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden {
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body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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t.Fatalf("expected 403, got %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, body)
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}
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})
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t.Run("verify email", func(t *testing.T) {
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token := tokenFromQuery(t, emails.verifyLink, "token")
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resp := post(t, client, srv.URL+"/auth/verify-email", map[string]string{"token": token})
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
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body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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t.Fatalf("verify status: %d %s", resp.StatusCode, body)
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}
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})
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t.Run("verify token replay rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
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token := tokenFromQuery(t, emails.verifyLink, "token")
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resp := post(t, client, srv.URL+"/auth/verify-email", map[string]string{"token": token})
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resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest {
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t.Fatalf("replay should be 400, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
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}
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})
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var firstAccess string
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t.Run("login returns access + refresh cookie", func(t *testing.T) {
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resp := post(t, client, srv.URL+"/auth/login", map[string]string{
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"email": email,
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"password": authTestPassword,
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})
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
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body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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t.Fatalf("login status: %d %s", resp.StatusCode, body)
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}
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var body struct {
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AccessToken string `json:"access_token"`
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}
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must(t, json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&body), "decode login")
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if body.AccessToken == "" {
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t.Fatal("missing access token")
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}
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firstAccess = body.AccessToken
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assertRefreshCookieSet(t, srv.URL, jar)
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})
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t.Run("access token authorises /me", func(t *testing.T) {
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req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, srv.URL+"/me", nil)
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+firstAccess)
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resp, err := client.Do(req)
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must(t, err, "GET /me")
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
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body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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t.Fatalf("/me status: %d %s", resp.StatusCode, body)
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}
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})
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t.Run("refresh rotates tokens", func(t *testing.T) {
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oldCookie := refreshCookieValue(t, srv.URL, jar)
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resp := post(t, client, srv.URL+"/auth/refresh", nil)
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
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body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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t.Fatalf("refresh status: %d %s", resp.StatusCode, body)
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}
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var body struct {
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AccessToken string `json:"access_token"`
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}
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must(t, json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&body), "decode refresh")
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if body.AccessToken == "" {
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t.Fatal("missing new access token")
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}
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newCookie := refreshCookieValue(t, srv.URL, jar)
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if newCookie == oldCookie {
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t.Fatal("refresh did not rotate cookie")
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}
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// Replay of the old refresh token must be rejected and revoke the family.
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jar2, _ := cookiejar.New(nil)
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client2 := &http.Client{Jar: jar2}
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setRefreshCookie(t, srv.URL, jar2, oldCookie)
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replay := post(t, client2, srv.URL+"/auth/refresh", nil)
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replay.Body.Close()
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if replay.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Fatalf("old refresh replay should be 401, got %d", replay.StatusCode)
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}
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// And the family should be revoked: even the new (just-rotated) cookie
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// no longer works.
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familyReplay := post(t, client, srv.URL+"/auth/refresh", nil)
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familyReplay.Body.Close()
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if familyReplay.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Fatalf("family-revoked refresh should be 401, got %d", familyReplay.StatusCode)
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}
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})
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// After family revocation, log back in to keep going.
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resp := post(t, client, srv.URL+"/auth/login", map[string]string{
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"email": email,
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"password": authTestPassword,
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})
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resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("second login: %d", resp.StatusCode)
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}
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t.Run("forgot-password emits link without leaking existence", func(t *testing.T) {
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// Unknown email — still 202, no link sent.
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emails.resetLink = ""
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unknown := post(t, client, srv.URL+"/auth/forgot-password", map[string]string{
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"email": "nobody-" + uuid.NewString() + "@guestguard.test",
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})
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unknown.Body.Close()
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if unknown.StatusCode != http.StatusAccepted {
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t.Fatalf("unknown forgot-password: %d", unknown.StatusCode)
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}
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if emails.resetLink != "" {
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t.Fatal("reset link sent for unknown email")
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}
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known := post(t, client, srv.URL+"/auth/forgot-password", map[string]string{
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"email": email,
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})
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known.Body.Close()
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if known.StatusCode != http.StatusAccepted {
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t.Fatalf("known forgot-password: %d", known.StatusCode)
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}
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if emails.resetLink == "" {
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t.Fatal("reset link not captured")
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}
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})
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t.Run("reset password invalidates sessions", func(t *testing.T) {
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token := tokenFromPath(t, emails.resetLink, "/reset-password/")
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newPw := "new-correct-horse-battery-staple"
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resp := post(t, client, srv.URL+"/auth/reset-password", map[string]string{
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"token": token,
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"new_password": newPw,
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})
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resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("reset status: %d", resp.StatusCode)
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}
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// Old password fails.
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bad := post(t, client, srv.URL+"/auth/login", map[string]string{
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"email": email,
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"password": authTestPassword,
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})
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bad.Body.Close()
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if bad.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Fatalf("old password should 401, got %d", bad.StatusCode)
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}
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// Existing refresh cookie should no longer work.
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refresh := post(t, client, srv.URL+"/auth/refresh", nil)
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refresh.Body.Close()
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if refresh.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Fatalf("refresh after reset should 401, got %d", refresh.StatusCode)
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}
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// New password works.
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ok := post(t, client, srv.URL+"/auth/login", map[string]string{
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"email": email,
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"password": newPw,
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})
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ok.Body.Close()
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if ok.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("new password login: %d", ok.StatusCode)
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}
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})
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t.Run("logout revokes refresh", func(t *testing.T) {
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resp := post(t, client, srv.URL+"/auth/logout", nil)
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resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusNoContent {
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t.Fatalf("logout status: %d", resp.StatusCode)
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}
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refresh := post(t, client, srv.URL+"/auth/refresh", nil)
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refresh.Body.Close()
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if refresh.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Fatalf("refresh after logout should 401, got %d", refresh.StatusCode)
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}
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})
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t.Run("requireAuth rejects invalid bearer", func(t *testing.T) {
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req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, srv.URL+"/me", nil)
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer not-a-real-jwt")
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resp, err := client.Do(req)
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must(t, err, "GET /me bad token")
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resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Fatalf("bad bearer should 401, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
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}
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})
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}
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// --- helpers ---
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func uniqueEmail(t *testing.T) string {
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t.Helper()
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return "auth-" + uuid.NewString() + "@guestguard.test"
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}
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func post(t *testing.T, client *http.Client, url string, body any) *http.Response {
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t.Helper()
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var r io.Reader
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if body != nil {
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b, err := json.Marshal(body)
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must(t, err, "marshal post body")
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r = bytes.NewReader(b)
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}
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req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, url, r)
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must(t, err, "build post request")
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if body != nil {
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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}
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resp, err := client.Do(req)
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must(t, err, "do post "+url)
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return resp
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}
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func tokenFromQuery(t *testing.T, link, key string) string {
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t.Helper()
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idx := strings.Index(link, key+"=")
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if idx < 0 {
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t.Fatalf("link missing %s: %s", key, link)
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}
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return link[idx+len(key)+1:]
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}
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func tokenFromPath(t *testing.T, link, prefix string) string {
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t.Helper()
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idx := strings.LastIndex(link, prefix)
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if idx < 0 {
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t.Fatalf("link missing prefix %s: %s", prefix, link)
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}
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return link[idx+len(prefix):]
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}
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func assertRefreshCookieSet(t *testing.T, baseURL string, jar http.CookieJar) {
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t.Helper()
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if refreshCookieValue(t, baseURL, jar) == "" {
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t.Fatal("refresh cookie not set")
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}
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}
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func refreshCookieValue(t *testing.T, baseURL string, jar http.CookieJar) string {
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t.Helper()
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// jar.Cookies needs a URL whose path matches the cookie's Path (/auth).
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u := baseURL + "/auth/refresh"
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parsed, err := url.Parse(u)
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must(t, err, "parse url")
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for _, c := range jar.Cookies(parsed) {
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if c.Name == "gg_refresh" {
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return c.Value
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}
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}
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return ""
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}
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func setRefreshCookie(t *testing.T, baseURL string, jar http.CookieJar, value string) {
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t.Helper()
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parsed, err := url.Parse(baseURL + "/auth/refresh")
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must(t, err, "parse url")
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jar.SetCookies(parsed, []*http.Cookie{{
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Name: "gg_refresh",
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Value: value,
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Path: "/auth",
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}})
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}
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