59b8781659
Closes every block in docs/TIER1_PLAN.md from the Claude-scope side. The
homelab / cloud setup steps (SES verification, restore drill, lawyer-
drafted ToS) remain operator-owned but are unblocked.
Block A — Authentication
- Migration 0003: password_hash, email_verified, email_verification_tokens,
password_reset_tokens, refresh_tokens (with replaced_by family chain).
- Bcrypt hasher, HS256 JWT signer, single-use refresh tokens with rotation
+ replay-detection (revokes the family on reuse).
- /auth/signup, /login, /refresh, /logout, /verify-email,
/forgot-password, /reset-password — enumeration-safe.
- requireAuth middleware + GET /me.
- Frontend useAuth/useApi with auto-refresh-on-401, login/signup/verify/
forgot/reset pages, route-guard middleware.
Block B — Authorisation
- EventRepo.GetForHost; Update/Delete scoped by host_id.
- All host routes behind requireAuth + ownership; cross-tenant returns
404 (no enumeration). ?host_id removed.
- WS auth via short-lived single-use tickets (POST /auth/ws-ticket).
- Tests: TestCrossTenantIsolation — 9 probes.
Block C — Rate limiting
- Redis sliding-window via Lua (atomic ZADD+ZCARD+PEXPIRE).
- Per-route limits matching the plan (signup IP, login IP+email, RSVP/
access by token, events/guests/tokens by user_id).
- 429 with Retry-After header and JSON body.
- Auth lockout: 5 failed logins → account locked, only password reset
clears it.
- Frontend: useErrMessage normalises 429 + locked messaging.
Block D — Real notifications
- Migration 0004: provider_message_id, bounce_type, complained columns
+ unsubscribes (CITEXT) suppression table.
- Branded HTML + plaintext templates for verification, reset, invitation,
confirmation, reminder. Per-page templates avoid html/template's
contextual-escape collisions.
- Senders: SESv2, Twilio (SMS), SMTP (Mailpit-friendly), Resend HTTP.
- PickEmailSender priority Resend > SMTP > SES > Log — system boots
cleanly in dev with Mailpit; production flips one env var.
- Webhook endpoints (Twilio status + SES SNS) — bounces add to suppression;
signature verification stubbed pending creds.
- Auto-send: POST /tokens publishes invitation.send; notifier renders +
delivers via the configured backend; suppression list honoured.
- Bulk + per-row invitation flow: POST /events/{id}/guests/invitations/bulk
returns per-guest tokens so phone-only guests can be SMS'd manually.
- Unsubscribe: signed HMAC token (no TTL) + /unsubscribe/[token] page.
- WhatsApp Option A+: wa.me click-to-chat wizard with per-guest progress
tracking, isLikelyE164 validation, edit-from-wizard.
- Token rotate (POST /tokens/rotate) invalidates the old URL — used by
the regenerate-link flow.
- Mailpit added to docker-compose for dev inbox.
Block E — CSV import
- Streaming parser: tolerant header detection, UTF-8 BOM + UTF-16 LE/BE
decoding, row-level validation, 5,000-row cap.
- Strict E.164 phone validation with helpful error message.
- POST /preview + /import + GET /template; preview UI on event page;
atomic per-batch with dedup on existing emails.
Phone capture across UI
- PhoneInput component: country picker (~50 ISO codes) + national input +
live E.164 preview + inline length validation.
- Used in Add Guest and Edit Guest modals. Smart paste-handling extracts
country code from full E.164 strings.
Block F — Billing (Stripe)
- Migration 0005: subscriptions table (user_id → tier/status/period_end +
Stripe customer/sub ids). Partial unique index keeps one granting sub
per user.
- internal/billing: Tier + Limits model (Free 1/50, Pro 10/1000, Business
∞/5000), Stripe SDK wrapper with IgnoreAPIVersionMismatch for newer
account API versions.
- /billing/checkout-session, /billing/portal, /billing/status,
/webhooks/stripe (signature-verified, lifecycle events).
- Tier enforcement: 402 on POST /events, /guests, /import with
{error, reason, tier, used, limit, upgrade_url} body.
- Frontend: useBilling composable, /dashboard/billing page (current plan,
usage bars, tier cards), global UpgradeModal triggered by useApi's
402 interceptor.
- Customer portal kept for self-service cancel/payment-method changes.
Block G — Backups & DR (application side)
- Every migration has a tested .down.sql.
- TestMigrationRoundtrip applies all ups → all downs → all ups against a
fresh container; catches asymmetric down migrations.
- cmd/restore-verify: 28-check post-restore invariant tool (schema
presence, no orphans across 10 FK relationships, email uniqueness,
single-active subscription, row-count snapshot).
- docs/RUNBOOK_RESTORE.md: 9-step restore procedure with RTO/RPO
targets, drill instructions, rollback path.
Block H — Privacy compliance (application side)
- Migration 0006: deleted_at + terms_accepted_at + privacy_policy_accepted_at
on users. Partial index on email for live-only uniqueness.
- GET /me/data-export — synchronous JSON dump (user, events, guests,
tokens, rsvps, access_logs, notifications).
- DELETE /me — soft-delete with PII scrub + refresh-token revocation;
re-signup with same email works.
- POST /me/accept-terms — idempotent consent recording.
- Frontend /privacy + /terms placeholder pages with substantive (pending
legal review) copy; footer links; signup terms checkbox; TermsGateModal
for accounts created before the rollout; export + delete buttons on
/dashboard/billing.
Tests
- All migrations verified up/down/up.
- Integration suite: TestE2EHappyPath, TestAuthFlow, TestCrossTenantIsolation,
TestRateLimitSignup, TestLoginLockout, TestUnsubscribeFlow,
TestSESBounceWebhook, TestTwilioStatusWebhook, TestCsvImportFlow,
TestCsvImportAtomicRollback, TestBulkIssueInvitations, TestBulkIssueExplicitSubset,
TestTokenIssuePublishesInvitation, TestTokenIssueWithoutGuestEmailSkipsInvitation,
TestGuestUpdate, TestGuestDelete, TestTokenRotate, TestSMTPSenderAgainstMailpit,
TestFreeTierEventLimit, TestFreeTierGuestLimit, TestBusinessTierBypassesLimits,
TestDataExport, TestDeleteMe, TestAcceptTerms, TestMigrationRoundtrip.
Full suite runs in ~120s against real Postgres + NATS + Redis + Mailpit.
- Unit suite green across internal/auth, internal/csvimport,
internal/notification, internal/ratelimit, internal/domain.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
124 lines
3.3 KiB
Go
124 lines
3.3 KiB
Go
package api
|
||
|
||
import (
|
||
"net/http"
|
||
"sort"
|
||
"time"
|
||
|
||
"github.com/alchemistkay/guestguard/internal/storage"
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
// activityHandler serves the combined RSVP + access-check history for an
|
||
// event. The WebSocket hub only fans out *live* events to currently-
|
||
// connected dashboards; this endpoint is the catch-up channel for hosts
|
||
// who weren't watching when activity happened.
|
||
type activityHandler struct {
|
||
events *storage.EventRepo
|
||
rsvps *storage.RSVPRepo
|
||
accessLogs *storage.AccessLogRepo
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
type activityItem struct {
|
||
Type string `json:"type"` // "rsvp" | "access_check"
|
||
Timestamp time.Time `json:"ts"`
|
||
GuestID string `json:"guest_id"`
|
||
GuestName string `json:"guest_name"`
|
||
|
||
// RSVP-only
|
||
Response string `json:"response,omitempty"`
|
||
PlusOnes int `json:"plus_ones,omitempty"`
|
||
|
||
// Access-check-only
|
||
Score int `json:"score,omitempty"`
|
||
Band string `json:"band,omitempty"`
|
||
Blocked bool `json:"blocked,omitempty"`
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// GET /events/{id}/activity?limit=50
|
||
//
|
||
// Returns the most recent N activity items (RSVPs + scored access checks)
|
||
// for an event, sorted newest first. Frontends use this on dashboard mount
|
||
// to backfill the live monitor with history.
|
||
func (h *activityHandler) list(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||
hostID, ok := hostFromContext(w, r)
|
||
if !ok {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
eventID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "id")
|
||
if !ok {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
if _, ok := requireEventOwner(w, r, h.events, eventID, hostID); !ok {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
limit := atoiOr(r.URL.Query().Get("limit"), 50)
|
||
if limit <= 0 || limit > 200 {
|
||
limit = 50
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Pull from each source. We grab `limit` from each so that after
|
||
// merging we still have at least `limit` of the truly newest items.
|
||
rsvps, err := h.rsvps.ListRecentByEvent(r.Context(), eventID, limit)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to load activity")
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
checks, err := h.accessLogs.ListRecentScoredByEvent(r.Context(), eventID, limit)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to load activity")
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
items := make([]activityItem, 0, len(rsvps)+len(checks))
|
||
for _, a := range rsvps {
|
||
items = append(items, activityItem{
|
||
Type: "rsvp",
|
||
Timestamp: a.SubmittedAt,
|
||
GuestID: a.GuestID.String(),
|
||
GuestName: a.GuestName,
|
||
Response: a.Response,
|
||
PlusOnes: a.PlusOnes,
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
for _, c := range checks {
|
||
items = append(items, activityItem{
|
||
Type: "access_check",
|
||
Timestamp: c.CreatedAt,
|
||
GuestID: c.GuestID.String(),
|
||
GuestName: c.GuestName,
|
||
Score: c.Score,
|
||
Band: bandFromScore(c.Score),
|
||
Blocked: c.Score >= 80,
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
sort.Slice(items, func(i, j int) bool {
|
||
return items[i].Timestamp.After(items[j].Timestamp)
|
||
})
|
||
if len(items) > limit {
|
||
items = items[:limit]
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
|
||
"activity": items,
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// bandFromScore mirrors the friendly buckets used by the live WebSocket
|
||
// pipeline so backfilled items and live items render the same way in the
|
||
// dashboard feed. Thresholds match the fraud engine's intent: 0–29 looks
|
||
// normal, 30–59 worth a glance, 60–79 suspicious, ≥80 blocked.
|
||
func bandFromScore(score int) string {
|
||
switch {
|
||
case score >= 80:
|
||
return "block"
|
||
case score >= 60:
|
||
return "high"
|
||
case score >= 30:
|
||
return "medium"
|
||
default:
|
||
return "low"
|
||
}
|
||
}
|