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Kwaku Danso 59b8781659 feat: ship Tier 1 — auth, authz, rate limits, real notifications, CSV import, billing, backups/DR, privacy
Closes every block in docs/TIER1_PLAN.md from the Claude-scope side. The
homelab / cloud setup steps (SES verification, restore drill, lawyer-
drafted ToS) remain operator-owned but are unblocked.

Block A — Authentication
- Migration 0003: password_hash, email_verified, email_verification_tokens,
  password_reset_tokens, refresh_tokens (with replaced_by family chain).
- Bcrypt hasher, HS256 JWT signer, single-use refresh tokens with rotation
  + replay-detection (revokes the family on reuse).
- /auth/signup, /login, /refresh, /logout, /verify-email,
  /forgot-password, /reset-password — enumeration-safe.
- requireAuth middleware + GET /me.
- Frontend useAuth/useApi with auto-refresh-on-401, login/signup/verify/
  forgot/reset pages, route-guard middleware.

Block B — Authorisation
- EventRepo.GetForHost; Update/Delete scoped by host_id.
- All host routes behind requireAuth + ownership; cross-tenant returns
  404 (no enumeration). ?host_id removed.
- WS auth via short-lived single-use tickets (POST /auth/ws-ticket).
- Tests: TestCrossTenantIsolation — 9 probes.

Block C — Rate limiting
- Redis sliding-window via Lua (atomic ZADD+ZCARD+PEXPIRE).
- Per-route limits matching the plan (signup IP, login IP+email, RSVP/
  access by token, events/guests/tokens by user_id).
- 429 with Retry-After header and JSON body.
- Auth lockout: 5 failed logins → account locked, only password reset
  clears it.
- Frontend: useErrMessage normalises 429 + locked messaging.

Block D — Real notifications
- Migration 0004: provider_message_id, bounce_type, complained columns
  + unsubscribes (CITEXT) suppression table.
- Branded HTML + plaintext templates for verification, reset, invitation,
  confirmation, reminder. Per-page templates avoid html/template's
  contextual-escape collisions.
- Senders: SESv2, Twilio (SMS), SMTP (Mailpit-friendly), Resend HTTP.
- PickEmailSender priority Resend > SMTP > SES > Log — system boots
  cleanly in dev with Mailpit; production flips one env var.
- Webhook endpoints (Twilio status + SES SNS) — bounces add to suppression;
  signature verification stubbed pending creds.
- Auto-send: POST /tokens publishes invitation.send; notifier renders +
  delivers via the configured backend; suppression list honoured.
- Bulk + per-row invitation flow: POST /events/{id}/guests/invitations/bulk
  returns per-guest tokens so phone-only guests can be SMS'd manually.
- Unsubscribe: signed HMAC token (no TTL) + /unsubscribe/[token] page.
- WhatsApp Option A+: wa.me click-to-chat wizard with per-guest progress
  tracking, isLikelyE164 validation, edit-from-wizard.
- Token rotate (POST /tokens/rotate) invalidates the old URL — used by
  the regenerate-link flow.
- Mailpit added to docker-compose for dev inbox.

Block E — CSV import
- Streaming parser: tolerant header detection, UTF-8 BOM + UTF-16 LE/BE
  decoding, row-level validation, 5,000-row cap.
- Strict E.164 phone validation with helpful error message.
- POST /preview + /import + GET /template; preview UI on event page;
  atomic per-batch with dedup on existing emails.

Phone capture across UI
- PhoneInput component: country picker (~50 ISO codes) + national input +
  live E.164 preview + inline length validation.
- Used in Add Guest and Edit Guest modals. Smart paste-handling extracts
  country code from full E.164 strings.

Block F — Billing (Stripe)
- Migration 0005: subscriptions table (user_id → tier/status/period_end +
  Stripe customer/sub ids). Partial unique index keeps one granting sub
  per user.
- internal/billing: Tier + Limits model (Free 1/50, Pro 10/1000, Business
  ∞/5000), Stripe SDK wrapper with IgnoreAPIVersionMismatch for newer
  account API versions.
- /billing/checkout-session, /billing/portal, /billing/status,
  /webhooks/stripe (signature-verified, lifecycle events).
- Tier enforcement: 402 on POST /events, /guests, /import with
  {error, reason, tier, used, limit, upgrade_url} body.
- Frontend: useBilling composable, /dashboard/billing page (current plan,
  usage bars, tier cards), global UpgradeModal triggered by useApi's
  402 interceptor.
- Customer portal kept for self-service cancel/payment-method changes.

Block G — Backups & DR (application side)
- Every migration has a tested .down.sql.
- TestMigrationRoundtrip applies all ups → all downs → all ups against a
  fresh container; catches asymmetric down migrations.
- cmd/restore-verify: 28-check post-restore invariant tool (schema
  presence, no orphans across 10 FK relationships, email uniqueness,
  single-active subscription, row-count snapshot).
- docs/RUNBOOK_RESTORE.md: 9-step restore procedure with RTO/RPO
  targets, drill instructions, rollback path.

Block H — Privacy compliance (application side)
- Migration 0006: deleted_at + terms_accepted_at + privacy_policy_accepted_at
  on users. Partial index on email for live-only uniqueness.
- GET /me/data-export — synchronous JSON dump (user, events, guests,
  tokens, rsvps, access_logs, notifications).
- DELETE /me — soft-delete with PII scrub + refresh-token revocation;
  re-signup with same email works.
- POST /me/accept-terms — idempotent consent recording.
- Frontend /privacy + /terms placeholder pages with substantive (pending
  legal review) copy; footer links; signup terms checkbox; TermsGateModal
  for accounts created before the rollout; export + delete buttons on
  /dashboard/billing.

Tests
- All migrations verified up/down/up.
- Integration suite: TestE2EHappyPath, TestAuthFlow, TestCrossTenantIsolation,
  TestRateLimitSignup, TestLoginLockout, TestUnsubscribeFlow,
  TestSESBounceWebhook, TestTwilioStatusWebhook, TestCsvImportFlow,
  TestCsvImportAtomicRollback, TestBulkIssueInvitations, TestBulkIssueExplicitSubset,
  TestTokenIssuePublishesInvitation, TestTokenIssueWithoutGuestEmailSkipsInvitation,
  TestGuestUpdate, TestGuestDelete, TestTokenRotate, TestSMTPSenderAgainstMailpit,
  TestFreeTierEventLimit, TestFreeTierGuestLimit, TestBusinessTierBypassesLimits,
  TestDataExport, TestDeleteMe, TestAcceptTerms, TestMigrationRoundtrip.
  Full suite runs in ~120s against real Postgres + NATS + Redis + Mailpit.
- Unit suite green across internal/auth, internal/csvimport,
  internal/notification, internal/ratelimit, internal/domain.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-16 23:54:22 +01:00

256 lines
8.1 KiB
Go

package api
import (
"context"
"errors"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/alchemistkay/guestguard/internal/domain"
"github.com/alchemistkay/guestguard/internal/storage"
)
// privacyHandler holds the GDPR-style "your data, your choice" endpoints:
// data export, account deletion, and terms-acceptance recording.
type privacyHandler struct {
logger *slog.Logger
users *storage.UserRepo
events *storage.EventRepo
guests *storage.GuestRepo
tokens *storage.TokenRepo
rsvps *storage.RSVPRepo
access *storage.AccessLogRepo
notifs *storage.DB // raw pool access for the export queries
refresh *storage.RefreshTokenRepo
}
// DataExport is the shape of the JSON the host downloads from
// GET /me/data-export. We don't paginate or stream — for the scale
// GuestGuard hosts have, a single response is reasonable. If a host
// ever has 100k+ access logs we'll switch to async + email-a-link.
type DataExport struct {
ExportedAt time.Time `json:"exported_at"`
Format string `json:"format"`
User *domain.User `json:"user"`
Events []*domain.Event `json:"events"`
Guests []*domain.Guest `json:"guests"`
Tokens []exportedToken `json:"tokens"`
RSVPs []exportedRSVP `json:"rsvps"`
AccessLogs []exportedAccess `json:"access_logs"`
Notifs []exportedNotif `json:"notifications"`
}
type exportedToken struct {
ID uuid.UUID `json:"id"`
GuestID uuid.UUID `json:"guest_id"`
ExpiresAt time.Time `json:"expires_at"`
Status string `json:"status"`
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"`
}
type exportedRSVP struct {
ID uuid.UUID `json:"id"`
GuestID uuid.UUID `json:"guest_id"`
Response string `json:"response"`
PlusOnes int `json:"plus_ones"`
SubmittedAt time.Time `json:"submitted_at"`
}
type exportedAccess struct {
ID uuid.UUID `json:"id"`
GuestID uuid.UUID `json:"guest_id"`
RiskScore *int `json:"risk_score,omitempty"`
Flagged bool `json:"flagged"`
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"`
}
type exportedNotif struct {
ID uuid.UUID `json:"id"`
GuestID uuid.UUID `json:"guest_id"`
Channel string `json:"channel"`
Type string `json:"type"`
Status string `json:"status"`
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"`
}
// GET /me/data-export — returns every record the system holds about the
// authenticated user. The Content-Disposition header makes browsers
// offer a download rather than rendering inline.
func (h *privacyHandler) dataExport(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
hostID, ok := hostFromContext(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
user, err := h.users.GetByID(r.Context(), hostID)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to load user")
return
}
export := DataExport{
ExportedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
Format: "guestguard.v1",
User: user,
}
// Events the user hosts.
events, err := h.events.List(r.Context(), hostID, 1000, 0)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to load events")
return
}
export.Events = events
// For each event, pull guests + tokens + rsvps + access_logs + notifications.
for _, ev := range events {
guests, err := h.guests.ListByEvent(r.Context(), ev.ID, 5000, 0)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to load guests")
return
}
export.Guests = append(export.Guests, guests...)
for _, g := range guests {
// Token (at most one per guest, but query as a list for symmetry).
if err := h.appendTokens(r.Context(), g.ID, &export); err != nil {
h.logger.Warn("export: tokens", "err", err)
}
if err := h.appendRSVPs(r.Context(), g.ID, &export); err != nil {
h.logger.Warn("export: rsvps", "err", err)
}
if err := h.appendAccess(r.Context(), g.ID, &export); err != nil {
h.logger.Warn("export: access", "err", err)
}
if err := h.appendNotifs(r.Context(), g.ID, &export); err != nil {
h.logger.Warn("export: notifs", "err", err)
}
}
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", `attachment; filename="guestguard-data-export.json"`)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, export)
}
func (h *privacyHandler) appendTokens(ctx context.Context, guestID uuid.UUID, out *DataExport) error {
rows, err := h.notifs.Pool.Query(ctx, `
SELECT id, guest_id, expires_at, status, created_at
FROM tokens WHERE guest_id = $1
`, guestID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer rows.Close()
for rows.Next() {
var t exportedToken
if err := rows.Scan(&t.ID, &t.GuestID, &t.ExpiresAt, &t.Status, &t.CreatedAt); err != nil {
return err
}
out.Tokens = append(out.Tokens, t)
}
return rows.Err()
}
func (h *privacyHandler) appendRSVPs(ctx context.Context, guestID uuid.UUID, out *DataExport) error {
rows, err := h.notifs.Pool.Query(ctx, `
SELECT id, guest_id, response::text, plus_ones, submitted_at
FROM rsvps WHERE guest_id = $1
`, guestID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer rows.Close()
for rows.Next() {
var r exportedRSVP
if err := rows.Scan(&r.ID, &r.GuestID, &r.Response, &r.PlusOnes, &r.SubmittedAt); err != nil {
return err
}
out.RSVPs = append(out.RSVPs, r)
}
return rows.Err()
}
func (h *privacyHandler) appendAccess(ctx context.Context, guestID uuid.UUID, out *DataExport) error {
rows, err := h.notifs.Pool.Query(ctx, `
SELECT id, guest_id, risk_score, flagged, created_at
FROM access_logs WHERE guest_id = $1
`, guestID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer rows.Close()
for rows.Next() {
var a exportedAccess
var rs *int
if err := rows.Scan(&a.ID, &a.GuestID, &rs, &a.Flagged, &a.CreatedAt); err != nil {
return err
}
a.RiskScore = rs
out.AccessLogs = append(out.AccessLogs, a)
}
return rows.Err()
}
func (h *privacyHandler) appendNotifs(ctx context.Context, guestID uuid.UUID, out *DataExport) error {
rows, err := h.notifs.Pool.Query(ctx, `
SELECT id, guest_id, channel::text, type::text, status::text, created_at
FROM notifications WHERE guest_id = $1
`, guestID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer rows.Close()
for rows.Next() {
var n exportedNotif
if err := rows.Scan(&n.ID, &n.GuestID, &n.Channel, &n.Type, &n.Status, &n.CreatedAt); err != nil {
return err
}
out.Notifs = append(out.Notifs, n)
}
return rows.Err()
}
// DELETE /me — soft-deletes the host's account. All sessions are
// revoked immediately. A hard delete happens via a separate cron 30
// days later (TBD ops work). The user is logged out from all devices
// as a side effect of revoking the refresh tokens.
func (h *privacyHandler) deleteMe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
hostID, ok := hostFromContext(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
if err := h.users.SoftDelete(r.Context(), hostID); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, domain.ErrUserNotFound) {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "user not found")
return
}
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to delete account")
return
}
// Best-effort: revoke refresh tokens so other sessions log out too.
// Failure here is logged but doesn't roll back the soft-delete — the
// access tokens (JWT) will still expire on their own ~15 minute TTL.
if err := h.refresh.RevokeAllForUser(r.Context(), hostID); err != nil {
h.logger.Warn("delete-me: revoke refresh tokens", "err", err, "user_id", hostID)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// POST /me/accept-terms — records that the authenticated user accepts
// the current ToS + privacy policy. Idempotent. Used by both the
// onboarding gate (existing accounts created before T&C were enforced)
// and any future "we updated our terms" re-acceptance flow.
func (h *privacyHandler) acceptTerms(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
hostID, ok := hostFromContext(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
if err := h.users.AcceptTerms(r.Context(), hostID); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, domain.ErrUserNotFound) {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "user not found")
return
}
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to record acceptance")
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "accepted"})
}