Files
Kwaku Danso 59b8781659 feat: ship Tier 1 — auth, authz, rate limits, real notifications, CSV import, billing, backups/DR, privacy
Closes every block in docs/TIER1_PLAN.md from the Claude-scope side. The
homelab / cloud setup steps (SES verification, restore drill, lawyer-
drafted ToS) remain operator-owned but are unblocked.

Block A — Authentication
- Migration 0003: password_hash, email_verified, email_verification_tokens,
  password_reset_tokens, refresh_tokens (with replaced_by family chain).
- Bcrypt hasher, HS256 JWT signer, single-use refresh tokens with rotation
  + replay-detection (revokes the family on reuse).
- /auth/signup, /login, /refresh, /logout, /verify-email,
  /forgot-password, /reset-password — enumeration-safe.
- requireAuth middleware + GET /me.
- Frontend useAuth/useApi with auto-refresh-on-401, login/signup/verify/
  forgot/reset pages, route-guard middleware.

Block B — Authorisation
- EventRepo.GetForHost; Update/Delete scoped by host_id.
- All host routes behind requireAuth + ownership; cross-tenant returns
  404 (no enumeration). ?host_id removed.
- WS auth via short-lived single-use tickets (POST /auth/ws-ticket).
- Tests: TestCrossTenantIsolation — 9 probes.

Block C — Rate limiting
- Redis sliding-window via Lua (atomic ZADD+ZCARD+PEXPIRE).
- Per-route limits matching the plan (signup IP, login IP+email, RSVP/
  access by token, events/guests/tokens by user_id).
- 429 with Retry-After header and JSON body.
- Auth lockout: 5 failed logins → account locked, only password reset
  clears it.
- Frontend: useErrMessage normalises 429 + locked messaging.

Block D — Real notifications
- Migration 0004: provider_message_id, bounce_type, complained columns
  + unsubscribes (CITEXT) suppression table.
- Branded HTML + plaintext templates for verification, reset, invitation,
  confirmation, reminder. Per-page templates avoid html/template's
  contextual-escape collisions.
- Senders: SESv2, Twilio (SMS), SMTP (Mailpit-friendly), Resend HTTP.
- PickEmailSender priority Resend > SMTP > SES > Log — system boots
  cleanly in dev with Mailpit; production flips one env var.
- Webhook endpoints (Twilio status + SES SNS) — bounces add to suppression;
  signature verification stubbed pending creds.
- Auto-send: POST /tokens publishes invitation.send; notifier renders +
  delivers via the configured backend; suppression list honoured.
- Bulk + per-row invitation flow: POST /events/{id}/guests/invitations/bulk
  returns per-guest tokens so phone-only guests can be SMS'd manually.
- Unsubscribe: signed HMAC token (no TTL) + /unsubscribe/[token] page.
- WhatsApp Option A+: wa.me click-to-chat wizard with per-guest progress
  tracking, isLikelyE164 validation, edit-from-wizard.
- Token rotate (POST /tokens/rotate) invalidates the old URL — used by
  the regenerate-link flow.
- Mailpit added to docker-compose for dev inbox.

Block E — CSV import
- Streaming parser: tolerant header detection, UTF-8 BOM + UTF-16 LE/BE
  decoding, row-level validation, 5,000-row cap.
- Strict E.164 phone validation with helpful error message.
- POST /preview + /import + GET /template; preview UI on event page;
  atomic per-batch with dedup on existing emails.

Phone capture across UI
- PhoneInput component: country picker (~50 ISO codes) + national input +
  live E.164 preview + inline length validation.
- Used in Add Guest and Edit Guest modals. Smart paste-handling extracts
  country code from full E.164 strings.

Block F — Billing (Stripe)
- Migration 0005: subscriptions table (user_id → tier/status/period_end +
  Stripe customer/sub ids). Partial unique index keeps one granting sub
  per user.
- internal/billing: Tier + Limits model (Free 1/50, Pro 10/1000, Business
  ∞/5000), Stripe SDK wrapper with IgnoreAPIVersionMismatch for newer
  account API versions.
- /billing/checkout-session, /billing/portal, /billing/status,
  /webhooks/stripe (signature-verified, lifecycle events).
- Tier enforcement: 402 on POST /events, /guests, /import with
  {error, reason, tier, used, limit, upgrade_url} body.
- Frontend: useBilling composable, /dashboard/billing page (current plan,
  usage bars, tier cards), global UpgradeModal triggered by useApi's
  402 interceptor.
- Customer portal kept for self-service cancel/payment-method changes.

Block G — Backups & DR (application side)
- Every migration has a tested .down.sql.
- TestMigrationRoundtrip applies all ups → all downs → all ups against a
  fresh container; catches asymmetric down migrations.
- cmd/restore-verify: 28-check post-restore invariant tool (schema
  presence, no orphans across 10 FK relationships, email uniqueness,
  single-active subscription, row-count snapshot).
- docs/RUNBOOK_RESTORE.md: 9-step restore procedure with RTO/RPO
  targets, drill instructions, rollback path.

Block H — Privacy compliance (application side)
- Migration 0006: deleted_at + terms_accepted_at + privacy_policy_accepted_at
  on users. Partial index on email for live-only uniqueness.
- GET /me/data-export — synchronous JSON dump (user, events, guests,
  tokens, rsvps, access_logs, notifications).
- DELETE /me — soft-delete with PII scrub + refresh-token revocation;
  re-signup with same email works.
- POST /me/accept-terms — idempotent consent recording.
- Frontend /privacy + /terms placeholder pages with substantive (pending
  legal review) copy; footer links; signup terms checkbox; TermsGateModal
  for accounts created before the rollout; export + delete buttons on
  /dashboard/billing.

Tests
- All migrations verified up/down/up.
- Integration suite: TestE2EHappyPath, TestAuthFlow, TestCrossTenantIsolation,
  TestRateLimitSignup, TestLoginLockout, TestUnsubscribeFlow,
  TestSESBounceWebhook, TestTwilioStatusWebhook, TestCsvImportFlow,
  TestCsvImportAtomicRollback, TestBulkIssueInvitations, TestBulkIssueExplicitSubset,
  TestTokenIssuePublishesInvitation, TestTokenIssueWithoutGuestEmailSkipsInvitation,
  TestGuestUpdate, TestGuestDelete, TestTokenRotate, TestSMTPSenderAgainstMailpit,
  TestFreeTierEventLimit, TestFreeTierGuestLimit, TestBusinessTierBypassesLimits,
  TestDataExport, TestDeleteMe, TestAcceptTerms, TestMigrationRoundtrip.
  Full suite runs in ~120s against real Postgres + NATS + Redis + Mailpit.
- Unit suite green across internal/auth, internal/csvimport,
  internal/notification, internal/ratelimit, internal/domain.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-16 23:54:22 +01:00

135 lines
3.4 KiB
Go

// Package ratelimit implements a sliding-window rate limiter backed by
// Redis sorted sets. Each call is atomic via a Lua script: it sweeps
// entries older than the window, returns the current count, and (when
// under the limit) records the new hit. Block C's "INCR + EXPIRE or a Lua
// script for atomicity" requirement.
package ratelimit
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"fmt"
"time"
"github.com/redis/go-redis/v9"
)
// Result is the outcome of one Allow check.
type Result struct {
Allowed bool
Count int // current count within the window (post-increment when allowed)
Limit int
RetryAfter time.Duration // populated when Allowed=false
}
// Limiter checks rate-limit budgets against Redis.
type Limiter struct {
client *redis.Client
script *redis.Script
prefix string
now func() time.Time
}
// New builds a Limiter against the given Redis client. The prefix namespaces
// all keys (defaults to "rl").
func New(client *redis.Client, prefix string) *Limiter {
if prefix == "" {
prefix = "rl"
}
return &Limiter{
client: client,
script: redis.NewScript(slidingWindowScript),
prefix: prefix,
now: time.Now,
}
}
// Allow consumes one unit of budget under (name, key) against `limit` events
// per `window`. Returns Allowed=true and the new count, or Allowed=false
// with RetryAfter set to roughly the duration until the oldest hit ages out.
func (l *Limiter) Allow(ctx context.Context, name, key string, limit int, window time.Duration) (Result, error) {
if limit <= 0 {
return Result{}, errors.New("ratelimit: limit must be positive")
}
if window <= 0 {
return Result{}, errors.New("ratelimit: window must be positive")
}
member, err := randomMember()
if err != nil {
return Result{}, err
}
now := l.now().UnixMilli()
windowMS := window.Milliseconds()
redisKey := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s:%s", l.prefix, name, key)
out, err := l.script.Run(ctx, l.client,
[]string{redisKey},
now, windowMS, limit, member,
).Int64Slice()
if err != nil {
return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("ratelimit: redis: %w", err)
}
if len(out) != 3 {
return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("ratelimit: bad lua reply: %v", out)
}
r := Result{
Count: int(out[1]),
Limit: limit,
}
if out[0] == 0 {
r.Allowed = true
} else {
r.RetryAfter = time.Duration(out[2]) * time.Millisecond
if r.RetryAfter <= 0 {
r.RetryAfter = time.Second
}
}
return r, nil
}
func randomMember() (string, error) {
var buf [12]byte
if _, err := rand.Read(buf[:]); err != nil {
return "", err
}
return hex.EncodeToString(buf[:]), nil
}
// Sliding-window check + record, atomic in Redis.
//
// KEYS[1] = bucket key
// ARGV[1] = now (unix ms)
// ARGV[2] = window (ms)
// ARGV[3] = limit
// ARGV[4] = unique member to insert when allowed
// returns { blocked, count, retryAfterMs }
const slidingWindowScript = `
local key = KEYS[1]
local now = tonumber(ARGV[1])
local window = tonumber(ARGV[2])
local limit = tonumber(ARGV[3])
local member = ARGV[4]
local cutoff = now - window
redis.call('ZREMRANGEBYSCORE', key, '-inf', cutoff)
local count = redis.call('ZCARD', key)
if count >= limit then
local oldest = redis.call('ZRANGE', key, 0, 0, 'WITHSCORES')
local retry = window
if oldest[2] then
retry = (tonumber(oldest[2]) + window) - now
if retry < 1 then retry = 1 end
end
return {1, count, retry}
end
redis.call('ZADD', key, now, member)
redis.call('PEXPIRE', key, window)
return {0, count + 1, 0}
`