003a320690
QR codes on RSVP confirmations, a phone-friendly door scanner, walk-in
support, and a live arrivals widget that updates over WebSocket. Closes
the final Tier 2 block.
Schema (migration 0013)
- check_ins (id, guest_id UNIQUE, checked_in_at, checked_in_by,
arrival_count, notes, walk_in). UNIQUE on guest_id is the
double-check-in guard at the DB layer; signature validation lives
in the QR JWT.
QR JWT
- internal/auth/checkin_qr.go: CheckInQRSigner mints {event_id,
guest_id, exp} payloads with the platform's existing HMAC secret.
Issue() extends expiry to eventDate+24h so a QR minted weeks in
advance still scans on the day. Parse() distinguishes
ErrExpiredJWT from generic ErrInvalidJWT so the API can render a
friendlier 410.
- Unit tests cover round-trip, wrong-secret rejection, expiry
detection, and short-secret refusal at construction time.
Domain + storage
- domain.CheckIn + CheckInSummary
- storage.CheckInRepo: Record (returns ErrAlreadyCheckedIn on the
unique violation), ListByEvent, Summary (arrived headcount,
expected headcount, guests-checked-in count), GuestBelongsToEvent
(belt-and-braces guard against a forged JWT pointing at a
different event's guest).
API
- GET /access/{token} now embeds a check_in payload (raw JWT + a
base64-encoded PNG via skip2/go-qrcode) for attending RSVPs, so
the confirmation page can render the code straight into an <img>.
- POST /events/{id}/check-in — editor+. Validates the QR JWT,
refuses cross-event payloads (400), refuses expired ones (410),
records the row, broadcasts check_in.recorded over the existing
WS hub so the live dashboard updates.
- POST /events/{id}/walk-ins — editor+. Creates the guest + check-in
in one logical op for a door-add who wasn't on the original list.
- GET /events/{id}/check-ins — viewer+. Returns the list and the
summary together so the dashboard widget hydrates in one call.
Frontend
- New CheckInCard.vue: live arrivals widget ("47 of 60 · 78%" plus
a progress bar), recent-arrivals list, Walk-in button, and a
"Start scanning" button that opens a full-screen camera modal.
jsQR loaded from CDN on first open (no bundler dep). Scan
throttling + dedupe prevents the 30fps camera loop from POSTing
N times per paper QR. Successful scan vibrates the phone.
Duplicate (409) → "Already checked in" toast; expired (410) →
"This code has expired"; foreign-event (400) → "doesn't look
like one of your guests".
- New "Check-in" tab on the event-detail page, between
Communications and Branding.
- RSVP confirmation card + revisit card both surface a "Save for
the day" / "Your door code" QR block for attending guests. The
PNG ships pre-rendered from the API so the frontend doesn't need
its own QR library.
- The submit flow now refetches /access after a successful POST so
the QR appears immediately on first submit, not just on revisit.
Tests
- Backend unit tests for the QR signer (round-trip, wrong-secret,
expired, short-secret rejection).
- Integration: TestCheckInHappyPath (scan -> 200, double-scan ->
409, summary reflects arrival), TestCheckInRejectsForeignQR
(event A's JWT can't be used on event B), TestWalkInCreatesGuest
AndCheckIn (door-add creates both rows).
- Full integration suite passes (188.3s, 41 tests / 80+ subtests).
Tier 2 is complete: Blocks A through H all shipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
807 lines
26 KiB
Go
807 lines
26 KiB
Go
package api
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"context"
|
|
"encoding/json"
|
|
"errors"
|
|
"log/slog"
|
|
"net/http"
|
|
"strings"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/google/uuid"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/alchemistkay/guestguard/internal/auth"
|
|
"github.com/alchemistkay/guestguard/internal/calendar"
|
|
"github.com/alchemistkay/guestguard/internal/domain"
|
|
"github.com/alchemistkay/guestguard/internal/natspub"
|
|
"github.com/alchemistkay/guestguard/internal/storage"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
type accessPublisher interface {
|
|
PublishAccessAttempted(ctx context.Context, evt natspub.AccessAttempted) error
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type invitationPublisher interface {
|
|
PublishInvitationSend(ctx context.Context, evt natspub.InvitationSend) error
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type tokenHandler struct {
|
|
logger *slog.Logger
|
|
guests *storage.GuestRepo
|
|
tokens *storage.TokenRepo
|
|
events *storage.EventRepo
|
|
users *storage.UserRepo
|
|
accessLogs *storage.AccessLogRepo
|
|
rsvps *storage.RSVPRepo
|
|
collabs *storage.CollaboratorRepo
|
|
branding *storage.BrandingRepo
|
|
editNonces *editNonceStore
|
|
emails auth.EmailSender
|
|
checkInQR *auth.CheckInQRSigner
|
|
gen *auth.Generator
|
|
ttl time.Duration
|
|
pub accessPublisher
|
|
invitations invitationPublisher
|
|
publicBaseURL string
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type issueTokenResponse struct {
|
|
Token string `json:"token"`
|
|
TokenID uuid.UUID `json:"token_id"`
|
|
Meta *domain.Token `json:"meta"`
|
|
InvitationQueued bool `json:"invitation_queued"`
|
|
InvitationLink string `json:"invitation_link"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// POST /events/{id}/guests/{guest_id}/tokens — issue a token for the guest.
|
|
func (h *tokenHandler) issue(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
hostID, ok := hostFromContext(w, r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
eventID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "id")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
guestID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "guest_id")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
event, _, ok := requireRole(w, r, h.events, h.collabs, eventID, hostID, domain.RoleEditor)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
guest, err := h.guests.Get(r.Context(), guestID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
if errors.Is(err, domain.ErrGuestNotFound) {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "guest not found")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to load guest")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if guest.EventID != eventID {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "guest not found in event")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
raw, hash, err := h.gen.Generate()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to generate token")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tk, err := h.tokens.Create(r.Context(), storage.CreateTokenParams{
|
|
GuestID: guestID,
|
|
TokenHash: hash,
|
|
ExpiresAt: time.Now().UTC().Add(h.ttl),
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusConflict, err.Error())
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
link := h.invitationLink(raw)
|
|
invitationQueued := h.queueInvitation(r.Context(), event, guest, tk, hostID, raw)
|
|
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, issueTokenResponse{
|
|
Token: raw,
|
|
TokenID: tk.ID,
|
|
Meta: tk,
|
|
InvitationQueued: invitationQueued,
|
|
InvitationLink: link,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// queueInvitation publishes an invitation.send event so the notifier can
|
|
// dispatch a branded email. Best-effort: if any step fails we log and
|
|
// return false rather than failing the whole token-issue request — the
|
|
// host still has the raw URL in the response and can re-trigger sending.
|
|
func (h *tokenHandler) queueInvitation(
|
|
ctx context.Context,
|
|
event *domain.Event,
|
|
guest *domain.Guest,
|
|
tk *domain.Token,
|
|
hostID uuid.UUID,
|
|
rawToken string,
|
|
) bool {
|
|
if h.invitations == nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
if guest.Email == nil || *guest.Email == "" {
|
|
// Phone-only / nameless guests get no email — host shares the link
|
|
// manually. Show that on the UI so it's not a silent surprise.
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
hostName := ""
|
|
if h.users != nil {
|
|
if host, err := h.users.GetByID(ctx, hostID); err == nil && host != nil {
|
|
hostName = host.Name
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
evt := natspub.InvitationSend{
|
|
EventID: event.ID,
|
|
GuestID: guest.ID,
|
|
TokenID: tk.ID,
|
|
GuestName: guest.Name,
|
|
GuestEmail: *guest.Email,
|
|
HostName: hostName,
|
|
EventName: event.Name,
|
|
Venue: event.Venue,
|
|
EventDate: event.EventDate,
|
|
Link: h.invitationLink(rawToken),
|
|
IssuedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
|
|
}
|
|
if err := h.invitations.PublishInvitationSend(ctx, evt); err != nil {
|
|
h.logger.Warn("publish invitation.send (continuing)", "err", err, "guest_id", guest.ID)
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// invitationLink renders the public RSVP URL the guest clicks from their
|
|
// inbox. publicBaseURL is the externally-reachable host (set via
|
|
// GG_PUBLIC_BASE_URL); access via /rsvp/<token> is intentional — the
|
|
// frontend page rsvp/[token].vue catches the raw token.
|
|
func (h *tokenHandler) invitationLink(raw string) string {
|
|
base := h.publicBaseURL
|
|
if base == "" {
|
|
base = "http://localhost:3000"
|
|
}
|
|
return base + "/rsvp/" + raw
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// bulkIssueRequest is the optional JSON body for the bulk-invite call.
|
|
// An empty body (or missing GuestIDs) means "every guest on the event
|
|
// who doesn't already have a token".
|
|
type bulkIssueRequest struct {
|
|
GuestIDs []string `json:"guest_ids"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type bulkIssueItemError struct {
|
|
GuestID string `json:"guest_id"`
|
|
Reason string `json:"reason"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// bulkIssueToken is one minted invitation. The raw token is returned so
|
|
// the host's UI can offer a "copy link" affordance after a bulk send
|
|
// (especially for guests with no email on file) without making another
|
|
// round-trip. Same data the per-guest issue endpoint already exposes,
|
|
// scoped to the host who owns the event.
|
|
type bulkIssueToken struct {
|
|
GuestID string `json:"guest_id"`
|
|
Token string `json:"token"`
|
|
InvitationQueued bool `json:"invitation_queued"`
|
|
InvitationLink string `json:"invitation_link"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type bulkIssueResponse struct {
|
|
Issued int `json:"issued"`
|
|
Queued int `json:"queued"`
|
|
SkippedExisting int `json:"skipped_existing"`
|
|
SkippedNoEmail int `json:"skipped_no_email"`
|
|
Tokens []bulkIssueToken `json:"tokens,omitempty"`
|
|
Errors []bulkIssueItemError `json:"errors,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// POST /events/{id}/guests/invitations/bulk — generate tokens for every
|
|
// eligible guest (or the explicit subset) on the event and queue an
|
|
// invitation email for those with an address. Best-effort: any per-guest
|
|
// error is reported in the response and doesn't abort the rest.
|
|
func (h *tokenHandler) bulkIssue(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
hostID, ok := hostFromContext(w, r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
eventID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "id")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
event, _, ok := requireRole(w, r, h.events, h.collabs, eventID, hostID, domain.RoleEditor)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var req bulkIssueRequest
|
|
if r.ContentLength > 0 {
|
|
// Body is optional; only decode when something was actually sent.
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid json")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var onlyIDs []uuid.UUID
|
|
if len(req.GuestIDs) > 0 {
|
|
onlyIDs = make([]uuid.UUID, 0, len(req.GuestIDs))
|
|
for _, raw := range req.GuestIDs {
|
|
id, err := uuid.Parse(raw)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid guest id: "+raw)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
onlyIDs = append(onlyIDs, id)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
guests, err := h.guests.ListGuestsForInvitation(r.Context(), eventID, onlyIDs)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to load guests")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hostName := ""
|
|
if h.users != nil {
|
|
if host, err := h.users.GetByID(r.Context(), hostID); err == nil && host != nil {
|
|
hostName = host.Name
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
resp := bulkIssueResponse{}
|
|
for _, g := range guests {
|
|
if g.HasToken {
|
|
resp.SkippedExisting++
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
raw, hash, err := h.gen.Generate()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
resp.Errors = append(resp.Errors, bulkIssueItemError{GuestID: g.ID.String(), Reason: "mint token failed"})
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
tk, err := h.tokens.Create(r.Context(), storage.CreateTokenParams{
|
|
GuestID: g.ID,
|
|
TokenHash: hash,
|
|
ExpiresAt: time.Now().UTC().Add(h.ttl),
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// Likely a race against the unique constraint (someone else
|
|
// issued in parallel) — surface but don't fail the batch.
|
|
resp.Errors = append(resp.Errors, bulkIssueItemError{GuestID: g.ID.String(), Reason: err.Error()})
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
resp.Issued++
|
|
link := h.invitationLink(raw)
|
|
tokenInfo := bulkIssueToken{
|
|
GuestID: g.ID.String(),
|
|
Token: raw,
|
|
InvitationLink: link,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if g.Email == "" {
|
|
resp.SkippedNoEmail++
|
|
resp.Tokens = append(resp.Tokens, tokenInfo)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
evt := natspub.InvitationSend{
|
|
EventID: event.ID,
|
|
GuestID: g.ID,
|
|
TokenID: tk.ID,
|
|
GuestName: g.Name,
|
|
GuestEmail: g.Email,
|
|
HostName: hostName,
|
|
EventName: event.Name,
|
|
Venue: event.Venue,
|
|
EventDate: event.EventDate,
|
|
Link: h.invitationLink(raw),
|
|
IssuedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
|
|
}
|
|
if h.invitations == nil {
|
|
resp.Tokens = append(resp.Tokens, tokenInfo)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if err := h.invitations.PublishInvitationSend(r.Context(), evt); err != nil {
|
|
h.logger.Warn("publish invitation.send (bulk, continuing)", "err", err, "guest_id", g.ID)
|
|
resp.Errors = append(resp.Errors, bulkIssueItemError{GuestID: g.ID.String(), Reason: "publish failed"})
|
|
resp.Tokens = append(resp.Tokens, tokenInfo)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
resp.Queued++
|
|
tokenInfo.InvitationQueued = true
|
|
resp.Tokens = append(resp.Tokens, tokenInfo)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type rotateTokenRequest struct {
|
|
// SendEmail asks the notifier to re-deliver the invitation. False
|
|
// means "just give me a fresh link" — typical for phone-only guests
|
|
// where the host shares the new URL via SMS.
|
|
SendEmail bool `json:"send_email"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// POST /events/{id}/guests/{guest_id}/tokens/rotate — invalidate the
|
|
// guest's existing invitation link and mint a fresh one. Optionally
|
|
// re-publishes invitation.send so the notifier re-delivers via email.
|
|
// The old URL stops working immediately.
|
|
func (h *tokenHandler) rotate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
hostID, ok := hostFromContext(w, r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
eventID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "id")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
guestID, ok := parseIDParam(w, r, "guest_id")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
event, _, ok := requireRole(w, r, h.events, h.collabs, eventID, hostID, domain.RoleEditor)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
guest, err := h.guests.Get(r.Context(), guestID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
if errors.Is(err, domain.ErrGuestNotFound) {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "guest not found")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to load guest")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if guest.EventID != eventID {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "guest not found in event")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var req rotateTokenRequest
|
|
if r.ContentLength > 0 {
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid json")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
raw, hash, err := h.gen.Generate()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to generate token")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
tk, err := h.tokens.RotateForGuest(r.Context(), storage.CreateTokenParams{
|
|
GuestID: guestID,
|
|
TokenHash: hash,
|
|
ExpiresAt: time.Now().UTC().Add(h.ttl),
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
h.logger.Error("rotate token", "err", err, "guest_id", guestID)
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to rotate token")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
link := h.invitationLink(raw)
|
|
invitationQueued := false
|
|
if req.SendEmail {
|
|
invitationQueued = h.queueInvitation(r.Context(), event, guest, tk, hostID, raw)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, issueTokenResponse{
|
|
Token: raw,
|
|
TokenID: tk.ID,
|
|
Meta: tk,
|
|
InvitationQueued: invitationQueued,
|
|
InvitationLink: link,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type accessResponse struct {
|
|
Guest *domain.Guest `json:"guest"`
|
|
Event *domain.Event `json:"event"`
|
|
Token *domain.Token `json:"token"`
|
|
AccessLog uuid.UUID `json:"access_log_id"`
|
|
// RSVP is the guest's current submission, if any. Populated so the RSVP
|
|
// page can show an edit form instead of a fresh submit form when the
|
|
// guest revisits their invitation link (Tier 2 Block A).
|
|
//
|
|
// As of the forwarded-link defence (Tier 2 Block G follow-up): this is
|
|
// only populated when the current device looks like the device that
|
|
// originally submitted, OR when the caller presented a valid edit nonce.
|
|
// A forwarded-link recipient sees a nil RSVP + RSVPSubmittedElsewhere=true
|
|
// instead, so the original guest's response stays private and unmodifiable.
|
|
RSVP *domain.RSVP `json:"rsvp,omitempty"`
|
|
// RSVPSubmittedElsewhere signals "there's an RSVP on file but we're
|
|
// hiding it because this looks like a different device". The frontend
|
|
// renders a "this invitation has already been responded to" view +
|
|
// (when CanRequestEditLink) a "send me an edit link" CTA.
|
|
RSVPSubmittedElsewhere bool `json:"rsvp_submitted_elsewhere,omitempty"`
|
|
// CanRequestEditLink reports whether we have a way to deliver an edit
|
|
// link to the guest (email or phone on file). When false the only
|
|
// path is for the guest to contact the host directly.
|
|
CanRequestEditLink bool `json:"can_request_edit_link,omitempty"`
|
|
// Calendar holds the add-to-calendar deep-links and the .ics download
|
|
// path so the frontend renders four ready-to-click buttons after a
|
|
// successful RSVP. (Tier 2 Block B.)
|
|
Calendar calendar.ProviderLinks `json:"calendar"`
|
|
// Branding lets the RSVP page render in the host's colour scheme /
|
|
// logo / cover image. Nil when the host hasn't customised yet — the
|
|
// frontend falls back to defaults. (Tier 2 Block D.)
|
|
Branding *domain.Branding `json:"branding,omitempty"`
|
|
// CheckIn carries the per-guest QR code data when the RSVP is
|
|
// "attending". The frontend renders the PNG straight into an
|
|
// <img src>; the guest screenshots it or saves the confirmation
|
|
// email for door scanning on the day. (Tier 2 Block H.)
|
|
CheckIn *checkInQRPayload `json:"check_in,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// checkInQRPayload bundles the QR JWT + the rendered PNG so the
|
|
// frontend doesn't need a QR library of its own.
|
|
type checkInQRPayload struct {
|
|
QR string `json:"qr"` // raw JWT — what the scanner POSTs back
|
|
QRImage string `json:"qr_image"` // data:image/png;base64,... ready for <img>
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GET /access/{token} — validate token, log the access attempt, publish to NATS.
|
|
func (h *tokenHandler) access(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
raw := r.PathValue("token")
|
|
if err := auth.ValidateFormat(raw); err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "malformed token")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tk, err := h.tokens.GetByHash(r.Context(), auth.HashToken(raw))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
if errors.Is(err, domain.ErrTokenNotFound) {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "token not found")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to load token")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if err := tk.IsValid(time.Now().UTC()); err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusGone, err.Error())
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
guest, err := h.guests.Get(r.Context(), tk.GuestID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to load guest")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
event, err := h.events.Get(r.Context(), guest.EventID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to load event")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fingerprint := collectFingerprint(r)
|
|
ip := clientIP(r)
|
|
|
|
accessLogID, err := h.accessLogs.Create(r.Context(), storage.CreateAccessLogParams{
|
|
GuestID: guest.ID,
|
|
TokenID: tk.ID,
|
|
Fingerprint: fingerprint,
|
|
IPAddress: ip,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
h.logger.Error("create access log", "err", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if h.pub != nil {
|
|
go func(evt natspub.AccessAttempted) {
|
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
if err := h.pub.PublishAccessAttempted(ctx, evt); err != nil {
|
|
h.logger.Error("publish access.attempted", "err", err, "guest_id", evt.GuestID)
|
|
}
|
|
}(natspub.AccessAttempted{
|
|
EventID: event.ID,
|
|
GuestID: guest.ID,
|
|
TokenID: tk.ID,
|
|
AccessLogID: accessLogID,
|
|
Fingerprint: fingerprint,
|
|
IPAddress: ip,
|
|
UserAgent: r.UserAgent(),
|
|
Referrer: r.Referer(),
|
|
OccurredAt: time.Now().UTC(),
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var brandingPayload *domain.Branding
|
|
if h.branding != nil {
|
|
// Same best-effort treatment as the RSVP lookup below — missing
|
|
// branding row is the common case, not a failure.
|
|
br, err := h.branding.Get(r.Context(), event.ID)
|
|
switch {
|
|
case err == nil:
|
|
brandingPayload = br
|
|
case errors.Is(err, domain.ErrBrandingNotFound):
|
|
// expected when the host hasn't customised yet
|
|
default:
|
|
h.logger.Warn("load branding for access", "err", err, "event_id", event.ID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var existingRSVP *domain.RSVP
|
|
if h.rsvps != nil {
|
|
// Best-effort: a missing RSVP just means the guest hasn't submitted
|
|
// yet. Any other error is logged but doesn't fail the access call —
|
|
// we'd rather the guest see the form than a 500.
|
|
rs, err := h.rsvps.GetByGuest(r.Context(), guest.ID)
|
|
switch {
|
|
case err == nil:
|
|
existingRSVP = rs
|
|
case errors.Is(err, domain.ErrRSVPNotFound):
|
|
// expected first-visit case
|
|
default:
|
|
h.logger.Warn("load rsvp for access", "err", err, "guest_id", guest.ID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Forwarded-link defence (Tier 2 Block G follow-up). If a previous
|
|
// submission exists, only surface its details when the current
|
|
// device looks like the one that submitted, OR when the caller
|
|
// presented a valid edit nonce in ?edit=<nonce>. Anything else gets
|
|
// the "responded elsewhere" view — no leak, no edit.
|
|
rsvpPayload := existingRSVP
|
|
var rsvpSubmittedElsewhere, canRequestEditLink bool
|
|
if existingRSVP != nil && !fingerprintsSimilar(existingRSVP.DeviceFingerprint, fingerprint) {
|
|
bypassed := false
|
|
if nonce := r.URL.Query().Get("edit"); nonce != "" && h.editNonces != nil {
|
|
if ok, _ := h.editNonces.Verify(r.Context(), nonce, guest.ID); ok {
|
|
bypassed = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if !bypassed {
|
|
rsvpPayload = nil
|
|
rsvpSubmittedElsewhere = true
|
|
canRequestEditLink =
|
|
h.editNonces != nil &&
|
|
((guest.Email != nil && *guest.Email != "") ||
|
|
(guest.Phone != nil && *guest.Phone != ""))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// QR code for the door (Tier 2 Block H). We only mint the JWT when
|
|
// the visible RSVP is "attending" — there's no point handing a
|
|
// check-in code to someone who replied no. The QR is bound to
|
|
// (event_id, guest_id) and only valid through the event window.
|
|
var checkInPayload *checkInQRPayload
|
|
if rsvpPayload != nil && rsvpPayload.Response == domain.RSVPAttending && h.checkInQR != nil {
|
|
now := time.Now().UTC()
|
|
qrJWT, _, err := h.checkInQR.Issue(event.ID, guest.ID, event.EventDate, now)
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
if png, err2 := renderQRPNG(qrJWT); err2 == nil {
|
|
checkInPayload = &checkInQRPayload{QR: qrJWT, QRImage: png}
|
|
} else {
|
|
h.logger.Warn("render qr png", "err", err2, "guest_id", guest.ID)
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
h.logger.Warn("issue qr jwt", "err", err, "guest_id", guest.ID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, accessResponse{
|
|
Guest: guest,
|
|
Event: event,
|
|
Token: tk,
|
|
AccessLog: accessLogID,
|
|
RSVP: rsvpPayload,
|
|
RSVPSubmittedElsewhere: rsvpSubmittedElsewhere,
|
|
CanRequestEditLink: canRequestEditLink,
|
|
Calendar: h.calendarLinks(event, raw),
|
|
Branding: brandingPayload,
|
|
CheckIn: checkInPayload,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// requestEditLinkResponse is the wire shape of POST /access/{token}/request-edit-link.
|
|
type requestEditLinkResponse struct {
|
|
// Channel hints at where the link went so the frontend can render
|
|
// "Sent to your email" vs. "Sent by SMS" feedback. Empty when the
|
|
// store/sender wasn't configured (dev environments without email
|
|
// wired up — the frontend should still treat that as success).
|
|
Channel string `json:"channel,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// POST /access/{token}/request-edit-link — public, token-scoped. When a
|
|
// guest opens their invitation from an unfamiliar device the regular
|
|
// access response hides their RSVP. This endpoint lets them prove email
|
|
// or phone ownership instead: we mint a short-lived edit nonce and
|
|
// deliver it to the address on file.
|
|
//
|
|
// Rate limit lives on the route registration (3 per hour per token).
|
|
// The endpoint itself stays generous about the response — we never
|
|
// reveal whether a token has an RSVP attached, just whether the request
|
|
// itself was acceptable.
|
|
func (h *tokenHandler) requestEditLink(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
raw := r.PathValue("token")
|
|
if err := auth.ValidateFormat(raw); err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "malformed token")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
tk, err := h.tokens.GetByHash(r.Context(), auth.HashToken(raw))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
if errors.Is(err, domain.ErrTokenNotFound) {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "token not found")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to load token")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if err := tk.IsValid(time.Now().UTC()); err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusGone, err.Error())
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
guest, err := h.guests.Get(r.Context(), tk.GuestID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to load guest")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if h.editNonces == nil {
|
|
// Redis isn't wired up; the feature is disabled. Tell the caller
|
|
// honestly rather than pretending we sent something.
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "edit-link delivery isn't configured for this environment")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Only attempt delivery when there's somewhere to deliver to. Without
|
|
// email or phone on file the request is a 404 — we don't have a
|
|
// secure channel for the nonce.
|
|
hasEmail := guest.Email != nil && *guest.Email != ""
|
|
if !hasEmail {
|
|
// Phone-only delivery is a future enhancement (Twilio path is
|
|
// wired for the broader notifier; not for synchronous edit links
|
|
// yet). For now treat as no-channel.
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "no email on file for this guest")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nonce, err := h.editNonces.Mint(r.Context(), guest.ID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
h.logger.Error("mint edit nonce", "err", err, "guest_id", guest.ID)
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to issue edit link")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Resolve the event name for the email. Best-effort: if the lookup
|
|
// fails we still send a link, just with a generic fallback.
|
|
eventName := "your event"
|
|
if event, err := h.events.Get(r.Context(), guest.EventID); err == nil {
|
|
eventName = event.Name
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
link := h.editLink(raw, nonce)
|
|
if h.emails != nil {
|
|
if err := h.emails.SendRSVPEditLink(r.Context(), *guest.Email, guest.Name, eventName, link); err != nil {
|
|
h.logger.Warn("send rsvp edit link", "err", err, "guest_id", guest.ID)
|
|
// Don't 500 — the nonce already exists in Redis, and we've
|
|
// logged the link in the dev stub. A 202-ish behaviour:
|
|
// "accepted; delivery might be best-effort".
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, requestEditLinkResponse{Channel: "email"})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (h *tokenHandler) editLink(rawToken, nonce string) string {
|
|
base := h.publicBaseURL
|
|
if base == "" {
|
|
base = "http://localhost:3000"
|
|
}
|
|
return base + "/rsvp/" + rawToken + "?edit=" + nonce
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// calendarLinks renders the three provider URLs + .ics path for the event.
|
|
// The raw access token is embedded in the .ics path so the download endpoint
|
|
// stays public (no auth) while still scoped to a single invitation.
|
|
func (h *tokenHandler) calendarLinks(event *domain.Event, rawToken string) calendar.ProviderLinks {
|
|
return calendar.BuildLinks(eventForCalendar(event), h.calendarICSURL(rawToken))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (h *tokenHandler) calendarICSURL(rawToken string) string {
|
|
base := h.publicBaseURL
|
|
if base == "" {
|
|
base = "http://localhost:8080"
|
|
}
|
|
return base + "/access/" + rawToken + "/calendar.ics"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func eventForCalendar(e *domain.Event) calendar.Event {
|
|
// We deliberately don't surface event Settings into the calendar entry —
|
|
// settings holds host-private config; the guest only needs the
|
|
// human-facing fields.
|
|
return calendar.Event{
|
|
ID: e.ID,
|
|
Name: e.Name,
|
|
Venue: e.Venue,
|
|
StartsAt: e.EventDate,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GET /access/{token}/calendar.ics — public, token-scoped download. Same
|
|
// token-validity rules as /access/{token}, but the response is the .ics
|
|
// file rather than JSON.
|
|
func (h *tokenHandler) calendar(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
raw := r.PathValue("token")
|
|
if err := auth.ValidateFormat(raw); err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "malformed token")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
tk, err := h.tokens.GetByHash(r.Context(), auth.HashToken(raw))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
if errors.Is(err, domain.ErrTokenNotFound) {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "token not found")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to load token")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if err := tk.IsValid(time.Now().UTC()); err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusGone, err.Error())
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
guest, err := h.guests.Get(r.Context(), tk.GuestID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to load guest")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
event, err := h.events.Get(r.Context(), guest.EventID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to load event")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ics := calendar.BuildICS(eventForCalendar(event), time.Now().UTC())
|
|
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/calendar; charset=utf-8")
|
|
w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition",
|
|
`attachment; filename="`+calendar.FileName(event.Name)+`"`)
|
|
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "private, no-store")
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(ics))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func collectFingerprint(r *http.Request) map[string]any {
|
|
fp := map[string]any{
|
|
"user_agent": r.UserAgent(),
|
|
"accept_language": r.Header.Get("Accept-Language"),
|
|
"accept_encoding": r.Header.Get("Accept-Encoding"),
|
|
}
|
|
if v := r.Header.Get("Sec-CH-UA-Platform"); v != "" {
|
|
fp["platform"] = v
|
|
}
|
|
if v := r.Header.Get("X-Device-Fingerprint"); v != "" {
|
|
fp["client_fingerprint"] = v
|
|
}
|
|
return fp
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func clientIP(r *http.Request) string {
|
|
if xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); xff != "" {
|
|
if i := strings.IndexByte(xff, ','); i > 0 {
|
|
return strings.TrimSpace(xff[:i])
|
|
}
|
|
return strings.TrimSpace(xff)
|
|
}
|
|
if xr := r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"); xr != "" {
|
|
return strings.TrimSpace(xr)
|
|
}
|
|
host := r.RemoteAddr
|
|
if i := strings.LastIndexByte(host, ':'); i > 0 {
|
|
host = host[:i]
|
|
}
|
|
return host
|
|
}
|