b873012191
Per-event fraud tuning. Hosts can now dial the medium / high / block
boundaries, allowlist trusted networks, and feed verdicts back on
flagged accesses — the seed corpus for a future ML model.
Schema (migration 0011)
- events.fraud_{medium,high,block}_threshold default 30/60/85 so
existing events behave identically until a host changes them
- access_logs.geo_{country,city,lat,lon} for future enrichment
- fraud_feedback table — verdict ('legitimate' | 'suspicious') + note,
PK on access_log_id so re-mark is an upsert
- event_allowlists table — (event_id, ip_cidr) primary key, inet column
so containment checks use the native >>= operator (indexed lookup)
Domain
- FraudThresholds with Valid() + Band() helpers; Default trio echoed
through GET responses so the frontend doesn't duplicate constants
- ParseAllowlistCIDR accepts bare IPs (auto-widens to /32 or /128) and
canonicalises the output (203.0.113.42 → 203.0.113.42/32)
- Event.Thresholds() falls back to defaults if columns weren't
populated yet, so the API never wedges every score into "low"
Storage
- AllowlistRepo: List / Add / Remove + Matches() — the latter pushes
CIDR containment into Postgres rather than streaming rows back
- FeedbackRepo: Record (upserts) + ListForEvent (joined through guests)
- EventRepo.GetThresholds + UpdateThresholds, plus the threshold
columns baked into scanEvent so every event load carries them
- AccessLogRepo.BelongsToEvent — stops a hostile editor on event A
from marking event B's access logs
API
- GET/PUT /events/{id}/security/thresholds (viewer/editor)
- GET/POST/DELETE /events/{id}/security/allowlist
- POST /events/{id}/access-logs/{log_id}/feedback (editor)
- GET /events/{id}/security/feedback
- RSVP scoring path: allowlist short-circuit fires before the fraud
engine; the engine's score is then re-banded against the event's
thresholds (engine.Risk becomes advisory — API is the source of
truth for "what counts as block here")
- CORS Allow-Methods already includes PUT (Block D fix)
Fraud engine
- Single-signal cap: it now takes ≥2 sub-scores of ≥70 to push the
final into HIGH. Fixes the well-known "second visit with a slightly
shifted fingerprint scores 60+" false positive
- Engine band remains advisory; API re-bands using per-event
thresholds before deciding to block
Frontend
- SecurityCard.vue: visual band ribbon (proportional to thresholds),
three sliders with mutual clamping so dragging medium past high
pushes high (not an invalid ordering), reset-to-defaults button,
CIDR allowlist with inline add + per-row remove, verdict-history
inbox. Toast feedback on save/add/remove
- "Security" tab added to the event-detail tab nav (5th tab,
right of Analytics)
- Viewer role hides write affordances; server enforces too
Tests
- Domain: ThresholdsBand, ThresholdsValid, ParseAllowlistCIDR (bare
IP widening + traversal/typo rejection), FraudFeedbackValid
- Integration: thresholds round-trip + invalid ordering rejection,
allowlist CRUD + duplicate 409 + invalid CIDR 400 + IP auto-widen,
feedback record + upsert + cross-tenant 404 + invalid verdict 400,
viewer can read / editor can write / outsider gets 404
- Full integration suite green (315.8s, all 36 top-level tests pass)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
143 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
143 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
package storage
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"time"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
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)
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type AccessLogRepo struct {
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pool *pgxpool.Pool
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}
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func NewAccessLogRepo(db *DB) *AccessLogRepo {
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return &AccessLogRepo{pool: db.Pool}
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}
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type CreateAccessLogParams struct {
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GuestID uuid.UUID
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TokenID uuid.UUID
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Fingerprint map[string]any
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IPAddress string
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}
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func (r *AccessLogRepo) Create(ctx context.Context, p CreateAccessLogParams) (uuid.UUID, error) {
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var fpJSON []byte
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if p.Fingerprint != nil {
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b, err := json.Marshal(p.Fingerprint)
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if err != nil {
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return uuid.Nil, fmt.Errorf("marshal fingerprint: %w", err)
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}
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fpJSON = b
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}
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var ip *string
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if p.IPAddress != "" {
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ip = &p.IPAddress
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}
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const q = `
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INSERT INTO access_logs (guest_id, token_id, fingerprint, ip_address)
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VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4::inet)
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RETURNING id
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`
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var id uuid.UUID
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err := r.pool.QueryRow(ctx, q, p.GuestID, p.TokenID, fpJSON, ip).Scan(&id)
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return id, err
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}
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type ApplyScoreParams struct {
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AccessLogID uuid.UUID
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Score int
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Reasons []string
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Flagged bool
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}
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// AccessCheckActivity is a scored access-log entry joined with the guest's
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// name. Used by the activity-history endpoint so dashboards can show
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// historical security checks (including blocked attempts) even when nobody
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// was watching the live monitor at the time.
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type AccessCheckActivity struct {
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GuestID uuid.UUID
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GuestName string
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Score int
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Reasons []string
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Flagged bool
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CreatedAt time.Time
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}
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// ListRecentScoredByEvent returns scored access-log entries for an event,
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// newest first. Unscored entries (someone opened the page but the fraud
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// engine hasn't replied yet) are excluded — they'd be noise on the feed.
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func (r *AccessLogRepo) ListRecentScoredByEvent(ctx context.Context, eventID uuid.UUID, limit int) ([]AccessCheckActivity, error) {
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if limit <= 0 || limit > 200 {
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limit = 50
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}
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const q = `
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SELECT a.guest_id, g.name, a.risk_score, a.risk_reasons, a.flagged, a.created_at
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FROM access_logs a
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JOIN guests g ON g.id = a.guest_id
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WHERE g.event_id = $1 AND a.risk_score IS NOT NULL
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ORDER BY a.created_at DESC
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LIMIT $2
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`
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rows, err := r.pool.Query(ctx, q, eventID, limit)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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defer rows.Close()
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var out []AccessCheckActivity
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for rows.Next() {
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var (
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a AccessCheckActivity
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reasons []string
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score int16
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)
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if err := rows.Scan(&a.GuestID, &a.GuestName, &score, &reasons, &a.Flagged, &a.CreatedAt); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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a.Score = int(score)
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a.Reasons = reasons
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out = append(out, a)
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}
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return out, rows.Err()
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}
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// BelongsToEvent reports whether the access log identified by `id` is
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// attached (via guest) to `eventID`. Used by the feedback endpoint to
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// stop a hostile editor on event A from marking event B's logs.
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func (r *AccessLogRepo) BelongsToEvent(ctx context.Context, id, eventID uuid.UUID) (bool, error) {
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var ok bool
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err := r.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `
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SELECT EXISTS (
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SELECT 1 FROM access_logs a
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JOIN guests g ON g.id = a.guest_id
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WHERE a.id = $1 AND g.event_id = $2
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)
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`, id, eventID).Scan(&ok)
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return ok, err
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}
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func (r *AccessLogRepo) ApplyScore(ctx context.Context, p ApplyScoreParams) error {
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const q = `
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UPDATE access_logs
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SET risk_score = $2, risk_reasons = $3, flagged = $4
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WHERE id = $1
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`
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tag, err := r.pool.Exec(ctx, q, p.AccessLogID, p.Score, p.Reasons, p.Flagged)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if tag.RowsAffected() == 0 {
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return errors.New("access_log not found")
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}
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return nil
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}
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