59b8781659
Closes every block in docs/TIER1_PLAN.md from the Claude-scope side. The
homelab / cloud setup steps (SES verification, restore drill, lawyer-
drafted ToS) remain operator-owned but are unblocked.
Block A — Authentication
- Migration 0003: password_hash, email_verified, email_verification_tokens,
password_reset_tokens, refresh_tokens (with replaced_by family chain).
- Bcrypt hasher, HS256 JWT signer, single-use refresh tokens with rotation
+ replay-detection (revokes the family on reuse).
- /auth/signup, /login, /refresh, /logout, /verify-email,
/forgot-password, /reset-password — enumeration-safe.
- requireAuth middleware + GET /me.
- Frontend useAuth/useApi with auto-refresh-on-401, login/signup/verify/
forgot/reset pages, route-guard middleware.
Block B — Authorisation
- EventRepo.GetForHost; Update/Delete scoped by host_id.
- All host routes behind requireAuth + ownership; cross-tenant returns
404 (no enumeration). ?host_id removed.
- WS auth via short-lived single-use tickets (POST /auth/ws-ticket).
- Tests: TestCrossTenantIsolation — 9 probes.
Block C — Rate limiting
- Redis sliding-window via Lua (atomic ZADD+ZCARD+PEXPIRE).
- Per-route limits matching the plan (signup IP, login IP+email, RSVP/
access by token, events/guests/tokens by user_id).
- 429 with Retry-After header and JSON body.
- Auth lockout: 5 failed logins → account locked, only password reset
clears it.
- Frontend: useErrMessage normalises 429 + locked messaging.
Block D — Real notifications
- Migration 0004: provider_message_id, bounce_type, complained columns
+ unsubscribes (CITEXT) suppression table.
- Branded HTML + plaintext templates for verification, reset, invitation,
confirmation, reminder. Per-page templates avoid html/template's
contextual-escape collisions.
- Senders: SESv2, Twilio (SMS), SMTP (Mailpit-friendly), Resend HTTP.
- PickEmailSender priority Resend > SMTP > SES > Log — system boots
cleanly in dev with Mailpit; production flips one env var.
- Webhook endpoints (Twilio status + SES SNS) — bounces add to suppression;
signature verification stubbed pending creds.
- Auto-send: POST /tokens publishes invitation.send; notifier renders +
delivers via the configured backend; suppression list honoured.
- Bulk + per-row invitation flow: POST /events/{id}/guests/invitations/bulk
returns per-guest tokens so phone-only guests can be SMS'd manually.
- Unsubscribe: signed HMAC token (no TTL) + /unsubscribe/[token] page.
- WhatsApp Option A+: wa.me click-to-chat wizard with per-guest progress
tracking, isLikelyE164 validation, edit-from-wizard.
- Token rotate (POST /tokens/rotate) invalidates the old URL — used by
the regenerate-link flow.
- Mailpit added to docker-compose for dev inbox.
Block E — CSV import
- Streaming parser: tolerant header detection, UTF-8 BOM + UTF-16 LE/BE
decoding, row-level validation, 5,000-row cap.
- Strict E.164 phone validation with helpful error message.
- POST /preview + /import + GET /template; preview UI on event page;
atomic per-batch with dedup on existing emails.
Phone capture across UI
- PhoneInput component: country picker (~50 ISO codes) + national input +
live E.164 preview + inline length validation.
- Used in Add Guest and Edit Guest modals. Smart paste-handling extracts
country code from full E.164 strings.
Block F — Billing (Stripe)
- Migration 0005: subscriptions table (user_id → tier/status/period_end +
Stripe customer/sub ids). Partial unique index keeps one granting sub
per user.
- internal/billing: Tier + Limits model (Free 1/50, Pro 10/1000, Business
∞/5000), Stripe SDK wrapper with IgnoreAPIVersionMismatch for newer
account API versions.
- /billing/checkout-session, /billing/portal, /billing/status,
/webhooks/stripe (signature-verified, lifecycle events).
- Tier enforcement: 402 on POST /events, /guests, /import with
{error, reason, tier, used, limit, upgrade_url} body.
- Frontend: useBilling composable, /dashboard/billing page (current plan,
usage bars, tier cards), global UpgradeModal triggered by useApi's
402 interceptor.
- Customer portal kept for self-service cancel/payment-method changes.
Block G — Backups & DR (application side)
- Every migration has a tested .down.sql.
- TestMigrationRoundtrip applies all ups → all downs → all ups against a
fresh container; catches asymmetric down migrations.
- cmd/restore-verify: 28-check post-restore invariant tool (schema
presence, no orphans across 10 FK relationships, email uniqueness,
single-active subscription, row-count snapshot).
- docs/RUNBOOK_RESTORE.md: 9-step restore procedure with RTO/RPO
targets, drill instructions, rollback path.
Block H — Privacy compliance (application side)
- Migration 0006: deleted_at + terms_accepted_at + privacy_policy_accepted_at
on users. Partial index on email for live-only uniqueness.
- GET /me/data-export — synchronous JSON dump (user, events, guests,
tokens, rsvps, access_logs, notifications).
- DELETE /me — soft-delete with PII scrub + refresh-token revocation;
re-signup with same email works.
- POST /me/accept-terms — idempotent consent recording.
- Frontend /privacy + /terms placeholder pages with substantive (pending
legal review) copy; footer links; signup terms checkbox; TermsGateModal
for accounts created before the rollout; export + delete buttons on
/dashboard/billing.
Tests
- All migrations verified up/down/up.
- Integration suite: TestE2EHappyPath, TestAuthFlow, TestCrossTenantIsolation,
TestRateLimitSignup, TestLoginLockout, TestUnsubscribeFlow,
TestSESBounceWebhook, TestTwilioStatusWebhook, TestCsvImportFlow,
TestCsvImportAtomicRollback, TestBulkIssueInvitations, TestBulkIssueExplicitSubset,
TestTokenIssuePublishesInvitation, TestTokenIssueWithoutGuestEmailSkipsInvitation,
TestGuestUpdate, TestGuestDelete, TestTokenRotate, TestSMTPSenderAgainstMailpit,
TestFreeTierEventLimit, TestFreeTierGuestLimit, TestBusinessTierBypassesLimits,
TestDataExport, TestDeleteMe, TestAcceptTerms, TestMigrationRoundtrip.
Full suite runs in ~120s against real Postgres + NATS + Redis + Mailpit.
- Unit suite green across internal/auth, internal/csvimport,
internal/notification, internal/ratelimit, internal/domain.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
268 lines
7.5 KiB
Go
268 lines
7.5 KiB
Go
package storage
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"net/netip"
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"time"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
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"github.com/alchemistkay/guestguard/internal/domain"
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)
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// EmailVerificationRepo manages single-use email verification tokens.
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type EmailVerificationRepo struct {
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pool *pgxpool.Pool
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}
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func NewEmailVerificationRepo(db *DB) *EmailVerificationRepo {
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return &EmailVerificationRepo{pool: db.Pool}
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}
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func (r *EmailVerificationRepo) Create(ctx context.Context, userID uuid.UUID, hash string, expiresAt time.Time) error {
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_, err := r.pool.Exec(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO email_verification_tokens (token_hash, user_id, expires_at)
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VALUES ($1, $2, $3)
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`, hash, userID, expiresAt)
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return err
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}
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// Consume atomically marks the token as used and returns the owning user_id.
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// Returns ErrAuthTokenNotFound / ErrAuthTokenConsumed / ErrAuthTokenExpired.
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func (r *EmailVerificationRepo) Consume(ctx context.Context, hash string) (uuid.UUID, error) {
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const q = `
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UPDATE email_verification_tokens
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SET consumed_at = now()
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WHERE token_hash = $1
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AND consumed_at IS NULL
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AND expires_at > now()
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RETURNING user_id
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`
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var uid uuid.UUID
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if err := r.pool.QueryRow(ctx, q, hash).Scan(&uid); err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
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return uuid.Nil, classifyAuthTokenLookup(ctx, r.pool,
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"SELECT consumed_at, expires_at FROM email_verification_tokens WHERE token_hash=$1",
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hash)
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}
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return uuid.Nil, err
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}
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return uid, nil
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}
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// PasswordResetRepo manages single-use password-reset tokens.
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type PasswordResetRepo struct {
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pool *pgxpool.Pool
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}
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func NewPasswordResetRepo(db *DB) *PasswordResetRepo {
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return &PasswordResetRepo{pool: db.Pool}
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}
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func (r *PasswordResetRepo) Create(ctx context.Context, userID uuid.UUID, hash string, expiresAt time.Time) error {
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_, err := r.pool.Exec(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO password_reset_tokens (token_hash, user_id, expires_at)
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VALUES ($1, $2, $3)
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`, hash, userID, expiresAt)
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return err
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}
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func (r *PasswordResetRepo) Consume(ctx context.Context, hash string) (uuid.UUID, error) {
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const q = `
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UPDATE password_reset_tokens
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SET consumed_at = now()
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WHERE token_hash = $1
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AND consumed_at IS NULL
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AND expires_at > now()
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RETURNING user_id
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`
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var uid uuid.UUID
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if err := r.pool.QueryRow(ctx, q, hash).Scan(&uid); err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
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return uuid.Nil, classifyAuthTokenLookup(ctx, r.pool,
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"SELECT consumed_at, expires_at FROM password_reset_tokens WHERE token_hash=$1",
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hash)
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}
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return uuid.Nil, err
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}
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return uid, nil
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}
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// RefreshTokenRepo manages refresh-token rows. Refresh tokens are rotated:
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// every refresh issues a new token and revokes the old one, recording the
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// chain in `replaced_by` so we can detect replay (a revoked token being
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// presented again triggers a family-wide revocation).
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type RefreshTokenRepo struct {
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pool *pgxpool.Pool
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}
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func NewRefreshTokenRepo(db *DB) *RefreshTokenRepo {
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return &RefreshTokenRepo{pool: db.Pool}
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}
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type RefreshToken struct {
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Hash string
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UserID uuid.UUID
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ExpiresAt time.Time
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RevokedAt *time.Time
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ReplacedBy *string
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UserAgent string
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IPAddress *netip.Addr
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CreatedAt time.Time
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}
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type CreateRefreshTokenParams struct {
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Hash string
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UserID uuid.UUID
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ExpiresAt time.Time
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UserAgent string
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IPAddress string
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}
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func (r *RefreshTokenRepo) Create(ctx context.Context, p CreateRefreshTokenParams) error {
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ip := parseIP(p.IPAddress)
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_, err := r.pool.Exec(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO refresh_tokens (token_hash, user_id, expires_at, user_agent, ip_address)
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VALUES ($1, $2, $3, NULLIF($4, ''), $5)
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`, p.Hash, p.UserID, p.ExpiresAt, p.UserAgent, ip)
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return err
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}
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func (r *RefreshTokenRepo) Get(ctx context.Context, hash string) (*RefreshToken, error) {
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const q = `
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SELECT token_hash, user_id, expires_at, revoked_at, replaced_by,
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COALESCE(user_agent, ''), host(ip_address), created_at
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FROM refresh_tokens WHERE token_hash = $1
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`
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var rt RefreshToken
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var ipText *string
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if err := r.pool.QueryRow(ctx, q, hash).Scan(
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&rt.Hash, &rt.UserID, &rt.ExpiresAt, &rt.RevokedAt, &rt.ReplacedBy,
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&rt.UserAgent, &ipText, &rt.CreatedAt,
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); err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
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return nil, domain.ErrAuthTokenNotFound
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}
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return nil, err
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}
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if ipText != nil && *ipText != "" {
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if addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(*ipText); err == nil {
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rt.IPAddress = &addr
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}
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}
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return &rt, nil
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}
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// Rotate atomically (in a transaction) marks the old token revoked and
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// inserts the new one with replaced_by set. Returns ErrAuthTokenNotFound or
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// ErrRefreshTokenRevoked if the old token is missing or already revoked.
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func (r *RefreshTokenRepo) Rotate(ctx context.Context, oldHash string, next CreateRefreshTokenParams) error {
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tx, err := r.pool.Begin(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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defer tx.Rollback(ctx)
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var revokedAt *time.Time
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var userID uuid.UUID
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var expiresAt time.Time
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err = tx.QueryRow(ctx, `
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SELECT user_id, expires_at, revoked_at
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FROM refresh_tokens WHERE token_hash = $1 FOR UPDATE
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`, oldHash).Scan(&userID, &expiresAt, &revokedAt)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
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return domain.ErrAuthTokenNotFound
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}
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return err
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}
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if revokedAt != nil {
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// Replay of a revoked refresh token — revoke the entire family.
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if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `
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UPDATE refresh_tokens SET revoked_at = now()
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WHERE user_id = $1 AND revoked_at IS NULL
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`, userID); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return domain.ErrRefreshTokenRevoked
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}
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if time.Now().After(expiresAt) {
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return domain.ErrAuthTokenExpired
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}
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if next.UserID != userID {
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return errors.New("refresh token user mismatch")
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}
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ip := parseIP(next.IPAddress)
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if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO refresh_tokens (token_hash, user_id, expires_at, user_agent, ip_address)
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VALUES ($1, $2, $3, NULLIF($4, ''), $5)
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`, next.Hash, next.UserID, next.ExpiresAt, next.UserAgent, ip); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `
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UPDATE refresh_tokens SET revoked_at = now(), replaced_by = $2
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WHERE token_hash = $1
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`, oldHash, next.Hash); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return tx.Commit(ctx)
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}
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func (r *RefreshTokenRepo) Revoke(ctx context.Context, hash string) error {
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tag, err := r.pool.Exec(ctx, `
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UPDATE refresh_tokens SET revoked_at = now()
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WHERE token_hash = $1 AND revoked_at IS NULL
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`, hash)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if tag.RowsAffected() == 0 {
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return domain.ErrAuthTokenNotFound
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (r *RefreshTokenRepo) RevokeAllForUser(ctx context.Context, userID uuid.UUID) error {
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_, err := r.pool.Exec(ctx, `
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UPDATE refresh_tokens SET revoked_at = now()
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WHERE user_id = $1 AND revoked_at IS NULL
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`, userID)
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return err
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}
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func parseIP(s string) any {
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if s == "" {
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return nil
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}
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addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(s)
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if err != nil {
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return nil
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}
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return addr.String()
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}
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func classifyAuthTokenLookup(ctx context.Context, pool *pgxpool.Pool, q, hash string) error {
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var consumedAt *time.Time
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var expiresAt time.Time
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if err := pool.QueryRow(ctx, q, hash).Scan(&consumedAt, &expiresAt); err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
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return domain.ErrAuthTokenNotFound
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}
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return err
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}
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if consumedAt != nil {
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return domain.ErrAuthTokenConsumed
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}
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if time.Now().After(expiresAt) {
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return domain.ErrAuthTokenExpired
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}
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return domain.ErrAuthTokenNotFound
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}
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