59b8781659
Closes every block in docs/TIER1_PLAN.md from the Claude-scope side. The
homelab / cloud setup steps (SES verification, restore drill, lawyer-
drafted ToS) remain operator-owned but are unblocked.
Block A — Authentication
- Migration 0003: password_hash, email_verified, email_verification_tokens,
password_reset_tokens, refresh_tokens (with replaced_by family chain).
- Bcrypt hasher, HS256 JWT signer, single-use refresh tokens with rotation
+ replay-detection (revokes the family on reuse).
- /auth/signup, /login, /refresh, /logout, /verify-email,
/forgot-password, /reset-password — enumeration-safe.
- requireAuth middleware + GET /me.
- Frontend useAuth/useApi with auto-refresh-on-401, login/signup/verify/
forgot/reset pages, route-guard middleware.
Block B — Authorisation
- EventRepo.GetForHost; Update/Delete scoped by host_id.
- All host routes behind requireAuth + ownership; cross-tenant returns
404 (no enumeration). ?host_id removed.
- WS auth via short-lived single-use tickets (POST /auth/ws-ticket).
- Tests: TestCrossTenantIsolation — 9 probes.
Block C — Rate limiting
- Redis sliding-window via Lua (atomic ZADD+ZCARD+PEXPIRE).
- Per-route limits matching the plan (signup IP, login IP+email, RSVP/
access by token, events/guests/tokens by user_id).
- 429 with Retry-After header and JSON body.
- Auth lockout: 5 failed logins → account locked, only password reset
clears it.
- Frontend: useErrMessage normalises 429 + locked messaging.
Block D — Real notifications
- Migration 0004: provider_message_id, bounce_type, complained columns
+ unsubscribes (CITEXT) suppression table.
- Branded HTML + plaintext templates for verification, reset, invitation,
confirmation, reminder. Per-page templates avoid html/template's
contextual-escape collisions.
- Senders: SESv2, Twilio (SMS), SMTP (Mailpit-friendly), Resend HTTP.
- PickEmailSender priority Resend > SMTP > SES > Log — system boots
cleanly in dev with Mailpit; production flips one env var.
- Webhook endpoints (Twilio status + SES SNS) — bounces add to suppression;
signature verification stubbed pending creds.
- Auto-send: POST /tokens publishes invitation.send; notifier renders +
delivers via the configured backend; suppression list honoured.
- Bulk + per-row invitation flow: POST /events/{id}/guests/invitations/bulk
returns per-guest tokens so phone-only guests can be SMS'd manually.
- Unsubscribe: signed HMAC token (no TTL) + /unsubscribe/[token] page.
- WhatsApp Option A+: wa.me click-to-chat wizard with per-guest progress
tracking, isLikelyE164 validation, edit-from-wizard.
- Token rotate (POST /tokens/rotate) invalidates the old URL — used by
the regenerate-link flow.
- Mailpit added to docker-compose for dev inbox.
Block E — CSV import
- Streaming parser: tolerant header detection, UTF-8 BOM + UTF-16 LE/BE
decoding, row-level validation, 5,000-row cap.
- Strict E.164 phone validation with helpful error message.
- POST /preview + /import + GET /template; preview UI on event page;
atomic per-batch with dedup on existing emails.
Phone capture across UI
- PhoneInput component: country picker (~50 ISO codes) + national input +
live E.164 preview + inline length validation.
- Used in Add Guest and Edit Guest modals. Smart paste-handling extracts
country code from full E.164 strings.
Block F — Billing (Stripe)
- Migration 0005: subscriptions table (user_id → tier/status/period_end +
Stripe customer/sub ids). Partial unique index keeps one granting sub
per user.
- internal/billing: Tier + Limits model (Free 1/50, Pro 10/1000, Business
∞/5000), Stripe SDK wrapper with IgnoreAPIVersionMismatch for newer
account API versions.
- /billing/checkout-session, /billing/portal, /billing/status,
/webhooks/stripe (signature-verified, lifecycle events).
- Tier enforcement: 402 on POST /events, /guests, /import with
{error, reason, tier, used, limit, upgrade_url} body.
- Frontend: useBilling composable, /dashboard/billing page (current plan,
usage bars, tier cards), global UpgradeModal triggered by useApi's
402 interceptor.
- Customer portal kept for self-service cancel/payment-method changes.
Block G — Backups & DR (application side)
- Every migration has a tested .down.sql.
- TestMigrationRoundtrip applies all ups → all downs → all ups against a
fresh container; catches asymmetric down migrations.
- cmd/restore-verify: 28-check post-restore invariant tool (schema
presence, no orphans across 10 FK relationships, email uniqueness,
single-active subscription, row-count snapshot).
- docs/RUNBOOK_RESTORE.md: 9-step restore procedure with RTO/RPO
targets, drill instructions, rollback path.
Block H — Privacy compliance (application side)
- Migration 0006: deleted_at + terms_accepted_at + privacy_policy_accepted_at
on users. Partial index on email for live-only uniqueness.
- GET /me/data-export — synchronous JSON dump (user, events, guests,
tokens, rsvps, access_logs, notifications).
- DELETE /me — soft-delete with PII scrub + refresh-token revocation;
re-signup with same email works.
- POST /me/accept-terms — idempotent consent recording.
- Frontend /privacy + /terms placeholder pages with substantive (pending
legal review) copy; footer links; signup terms checkbox; TermsGateModal
for accounts created before the rollout; export + delete buttons on
/dashboard/billing.
Tests
- All migrations verified up/down/up.
- Integration suite: TestE2EHappyPath, TestAuthFlow, TestCrossTenantIsolation,
TestRateLimitSignup, TestLoginLockout, TestUnsubscribeFlow,
TestSESBounceWebhook, TestTwilioStatusWebhook, TestCsvImportFlow,
TestCsvImportAtomicRollback, TestBulkIssueInvitations, TestBulkIssueExplicitSubset,
TestTokenIssuePublishesInvitation, TestTokenIssueWithoutGuestEmailSkipsInvitation,
TestGuestUpdate, TestGuestDelete, TestTokenRotate, TestSMTPSenderAgainstMailpit,
TestFreeTierEventLimit, TestFreeTierGuestLimit, TestBusinessTierBypassesLimits,
TestDataExport, TestDeleteMe, TestAcceptTerms, TestMigrationRoundtrip.
Full suite runs in ~120s against real Postgres + NATS + Redis + Mailpit.
- Unit suite green across internal/auth, internal/csvimport,
internal/notification, internal/ratelimit, internal/domain.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
108 lines
3.3 KiB
Go
108 lines
3.3 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/hex"
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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"github.com/redis/go-redis/v9"
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)
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// LockoutTracker counts consecutive failed logins per email and trips a
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// lockout flag after a threshold. The lock is keyed by user_id (once we
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// know it from the email) so that resetting the password — which we do via
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// /auth/reset-password — can clear it cleanly.
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//
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// Why two keys? The failure counter must work even when the email maps to
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// no user (otherwise an attacker probing addresses just gets unlimited
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// tries). The lock flag only exists once we've matched an actual account.
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type LockoutTracker struct {
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client *redis.Client
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threshold int
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window time.Duration // how long failures linger before counters reset
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prefix string
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}
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func NewLockoutTracker(client *redis.Client, threshold int, window time.Duration) *LockoutTracker {
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return &LockoutTracker{
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client: client,
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threshold: threshold,
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window: window,
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prefix: "auth",
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}
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}
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func (t *LockoutTracker) failKey(email string) string {
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h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(email))))
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return fmt.Sprintf("%s:login_fail:%s", t.prefix, hex.EncodeToString(h[:]))
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}
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func (t *LockoutTracker) lockKey(uid uuid.UUID) string {
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return fmt.Sprintf("%s:locked:%s", t.prefix, uid.String())
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}
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// IsLocked reports whether the given user's account is currently locked.
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func (t *LockoutTracker) IsLocked(ctx context.Context, uid uuid.UUID) (bool, error) {
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if t == nil || t.client == nil {
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return false, nil
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}
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v, err := t.client.Exists(ctx, t.lockKey(uid)).Result()
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if err != nil {
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return false, err
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}
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return v > 0, nil
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}
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// RecordFailure increments the failure counter for the email and, if it
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// crosses the threshold, sets the lock flag for the given user id.
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// Returns (locked, error). A nil userID is fine — the counter still ticks
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// up so probing nonexistent accounts is also rate-limited.
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func (t *LockoutTracker) RecordFailure(ctx context.Context, email string, userID *uuid.UUID) (bool, error) {
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if t == nil || t.client == nil {
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return false, nil
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}
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key := t.failKey(email)
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n, err := t.client.Incr(ctx, key).Result()
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if err != nil {
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return false, err
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}
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if n == 1 {
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_ = t.client.Expire(ctx, key, t.window).Err()
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}
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if int(n) >= t.threshold && userID != nil {
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// Keep the lock until password reset clears it. 7-day fallback TTL
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// so a permanently abandoned account doesn't pile up forever.
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if err := t.client.Set(ctx, t.lockKey(*userID), "1", 7*24*time.Hour).Err(); err != nil {
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return false, err
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}
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return true, nil
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}
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return false, nil
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}
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// ClearForUser drops both the lock flag and any in-flight failure counter
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// for the user's email. Called from /auth/reset-password.
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func (t *LockoutTracker) ClearForUser(ctx context.Context, uid uuid.UUID, email string) error {
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if t == nil || t.client == nil {
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return nil
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}
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pipe := t.client.Pipeline()
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pipe.Del(ctx, t.lockKey(uid))
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pipe.Del(ctx, t.failKey(email))
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_, err := pipe.Exec(ctx)
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return err
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}
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// ClearOnSuccess drops only the failure counter — used after a successful
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// login to forgive prior typos.
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func (t *LockoutTracker) ClearOnSuccess(ctx context.Context, email string) {
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if t == nil || t.client == nil {
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return
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}
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_ = t.client.Del(ctx, t.failKey(email)).Err()
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}
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