59b8781659
Closes every block in docs/TIER1_PLAN.md from the Claude-scope side. The
homelab / cloud setup steps (SES verification, restore drill, lawyer-
drafted ToS) remain operator-owned but are unblocked.
Block A — Authentication
- Migration 0003: password_hash, email_verified, email_verification_tokens,
password_reset_tokens, refresh_tokens (with replaced_by family chain).
- Bcrypt hasher, HS256 JWT signer, single-use refresh tokens with rotation
+ replay-detection (revokes the family on reuse).
- /auth/signup, /login, /refresh, /logout, /verify-email,
/forgot-password, /reset-password — enumeration-safe.
- requireAuth middleware + GET /me.
- Frontend useAuth/useApi with auto-refresh-on-401, login/signup/verify/
forgot/reset pages, route-guard middleware.
Block B — Authorisation
- EventRepo.GetForHost; Update/Delete scoped by host_id.
- All host routes behind requireAuth + ownership; cross-tenant returns
404 (no enumeration). ?host_id removed.
- WS auth via short-lived single-use tickets (POST /auth/ws-ticket).
- Tests: TestCrossTenantIsolation — 9 probes.
Block C — Rate limiting
- Redis sliding-window via Lua (atomic ZADD+ZCARD+PEXPIRE).
- Per-route limits matching the plan (signup IP, login IP+email, RSVP/
access by token, events/guests/tokens by user_id).
- 429 with Retry-After header and JSON body.
- Auth lockout: 5 failed logins → account locked, only password reset
clears it.
- Frontend: useErrMessage normalises 429 + locked messaging.
Block D — Real notifications
- Migration 0004: provider_message_id, bounce_type, complained columns
+ unsubscribes (CITEXT) suppression table.
- Branded HTML + plaintext templates for verification, reset, invitation,
confirmation, reminder. Per-page templates avoid html/template's
contextual-escape collisions.
- Senders: SESv2, Twilio (SMS), SMTP (Mailpit-friendly), Resend HTTP.
- PickEmailSender priority Resend > SMTP > SES > Log — system boots
cleanly in dev with Mailpit; production flips one env var.
- Webhook endpoints (Twilio status + SES SNS) — bounces add to suppression;
signature verification stubbed pending creds.
- Auto-send: POST /tokens publishes invitation.send; notifier renders +
delivers via the configured backend; suppression list honoured.
- Bulk + per-row invitation flow: POST /events/{id}/guests/invitations/bulk
returns per-guest tokens so phone-only guests can be SMS'd manually.
- Unsubscribe: signed HMAC token (no TTL) + /unsubscribe/[token] page.
- WhatsApp Option A+: wa.me click-to-chat wizard with per-guest progress
tracking, isLikelyE164 validation, edit-from-wizard.
- Token rotate (POST /tokens/rotate) invalidates the old URL — used by
the regenerate-link flow.
- Mailpit added to docker-compose for dev inbox.
Block E — CSV import
- Streaming parser: tolerant header detection, UTF-8 BOM + UTF-16 LE/BE
decoding, row-level validation, 5,000-row cap.
- Strict E.164 phone validation with helpful error message.
- POST /preview + /import + GET /template; preview UI on event page;
atomic per-batch with dedup on existing emails.
Phone capture across UI
- PhoneInput component: country picker (~50 ISO codes) + national input +
live E.164 preview + inline length validation.
- Used in Add Guest and Edit Guest modals. Smart paste-handling extracts
country code from full E.164 strings.
Block F — Billing (Stripe)
- Migration 0005: subscriptions table (user_id → tier/status/period_end +
Stripe customer/sub ids). Partial unique index keeps one granting sub
per user.
- internal/billing: Tier + Limits model (Free 1/50, Pro 10/1000, Business
∞/5000), Stripe SDK wrapper with IgnoreAPIVersionMismatch for newer
account API versions.
- /billing/checkout-session, /billing/portal, /billing/status,
/webhooks/stripe (signature-verified, lifecycle events).
- Tier enforcement: 402 on POST /events, /guests, /import with
{error, reason, tier, used, limit, upgrade_url} body.
- Frontend: useBilling composable, /dashboard/billing page (current plan,
usage bars, tier cards), global UpgradeModal triggered by useApi's
402 interceptor.
- Customer portal kept for self-service cancel/payment-method changes.
Block G — Backups & DR (application side)
- Every migration has a tested .down.sql.
- TestMigrationRoundtrip applies all ups → all downs → all ups against a
fresh container; catches asymmetric down migrations.
- cmd/restore-verify: 28-check post-restore invariant tool (schema
presence, no orphans across 10 FK relationships, email uniqueness,
single-active subscription, row-count snapshot).
- docs/RUNBOOK_RESTORE.md: 9-step restore procedure with RTO/RPO
targets, drill instructions, rollback path.
Block H — Privacy compliance (application side)
- Migration 0006: deleted_at + terms_accepted_at + privacy_policy_accepted_at
on users. Partial index on email for live-only uniqueness.
- GET /me/data-export — synchronous JSON dump (user, events, guests,
tokens, rsvps, access_logs, notifications).
- DELETE /me — soft-delete with PII scrub + refresh-token revocation;
re-signup with same email works.
- POST /me/accept-terms — idempotent consent recording.
- Frontend /privacy + /terms placeholder pages with substantive (pending
legal review) copy; footer links; signup terms checkbox; TermsGateModal
for accounts created before the rollout; export + delete buttons on
/dashboard/billing.
Tests
- All migrations verified up/down/up.
- Integration suite: TestE2EHappyPath, TestAuthFlow, TestCrossTenantIsolation,
TestRateLimitSignup, TestLoginLockout, TestUnsubscribeFlow,
TestSESBounceWebhook, TestTwilioStatusWebhook, TestCsvImportFlow,
TestCsvImportAtomicRollback, TestBulkIssueInvitations, TestBulkIssueExplicitSubset,
TestTokenIssuePublishesInvitation, TestTokenIssueWithoutGuestEmailSkipsInvitation,
TestGuestUpdate, TestGuestDelete, TestTokenRotate, TestSMTPSenderAgainstMailpit,
TestFreeTierEventLimit, TestFreeTierGuestLimit, TestBusinessTierBypassesLimits,
TestDataExport, TestDeleteMe, TestAcceptTerms, TestMigrationRoundtrip.
Full suite runs in ~120s against real Postgres + NATS + Redis + Mailpit.
- Unit suite green across internal/auth, internal/csvimport,
internal/notification, internal/ratelimit, internal/domain.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
540 lines
16 KiB
Go
540 lines
16 KiB
Go
//go:build integration
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package integration_test
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"log/slog"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"sync/atomic"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
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"github.com/nats-io/nats.go/jetstream"
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"github.com/testcontainers/testcontainers-go"
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tcpostgres "github.com/testcontainers/testcontainers-go/modules/postgres"
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"github.com/testcontainers/testcontainers-go/wait"
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"google.golang.org/grpc"
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"github.com/alchemistkay/guestguard/internal/api"
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"github.com/alchemistkay/guestguard/internal/auth"
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"github.com/alchemistkay/guestguard/internal/fraud"
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pb "github.com/alchemistkay/guestguard/internal/fraudpb"
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"github.com/alchemistkay/guestguard/internal/natspub"
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"github.com/alchemistkay/guestguard/internal/storage"
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)
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// TestE2EHappyPath spins up real Postgres + NATS containers and an in-process
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// stub fraud gRPC server, then walks both the async (access → fraud.scored
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// → access_logs.flagged) and sync (RSVP submit) flows we manually verified
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// with `docker compose up`. This is the regression net for that walkthrough.
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func TestE2EHappyPath(t *testing.T) {
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if testing.Short() {
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t.Skip("skipping integration test in -short mode")
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}
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Minute)
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t.Cleanup(cancel)
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logger := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil))
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dsn := startPostgres(t, ctx)
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natsURL := startNATS(t, ctx)
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db, err := storage.NewDB(ctx, dsn)
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must(t, err, "connect db")
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t.Cleanup(db.Close)
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must(t, db.Migrate(ctx), "migrate")
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natsClient, err := natspub.Connect(ctx, natsURL, logger)
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must(t, err, "connect nats")
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t.Cleanup(natsClient.Close)
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stub := startStubFraudGRPC(t)
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fraudClient, err := fraud.Dial(ctx, stub.Addr, 2*time.Second, logger)
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must(t, err, "dial fraud")
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t.Cleanup(func() { _ = fraudClient.Close() })
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accessLogs := storage.NewAccessLogRepo(db)
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sub, err := natspub.NewFraudScoredSubscriber(ctx, natsClient, "test-fraud-scored",
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func(ctx context.Context, evt natspub.FraudScored) error {
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return accessLogs.ApplyScore(ctx, storage.ApplyScoreParams{
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AccessLogID: evt.AccessLogID,
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Score: evt.Score,
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Reasons: evt.Reasons,
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Flagged: evt.Score >= 60,
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})
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}, logger)
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must(t, err, "create fraud subscriber")
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consumeCtx, err := sub.Start(ctx)
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must(t, err, "start fraud subscriber")
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t.Cleanup(consumeCtx.Stop)
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rsvpCounter := subscribeRSVPConfirmed(t, ctx, natsClient)
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apiSrv, err := api.NewServer(api.ServerDeps{
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Logger: logger,
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DB: db,
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AccessPublisher: natsClient,
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RSVPPublisher: natsClient,
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FraudScorer: fraudClient,
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TokenTTL: 24 * time.Hour,
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JWTSecret: "test-secret-must-be-at-least-32-bytes-long-xx",
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JWTIssuer: "guestguard-test",
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AccessTokenTTL: 15 * time.Minute,
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RefreshTokenTTL: 24 * time.Hour,
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EmailVerificationTTL: 1 * time.Hour,
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PasswordResetTTL: 1 * time.Hour,
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PublicBaseURL: "http://localhost",
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})
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must(t, err, "build api server")
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srv := httptest.NewServer(apiSrv.Handler())
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t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
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hostID := insertHost(t, ctx, db.Pool)
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hostToken := issueHostToken(t, hostID)
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t.Run("async access flow flags access_logs", func(t *testing.T) {
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eventID := createEvent(t, srv.URL, hostToken, "Async Test", "async-test")
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guestID := createGuest(t, srv.URL, hostToken, eventID, "Async Guest")
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token := issueToken(t, srv.URL, hostToken, eventID, guestID)
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accessResp := getAccess(t, srv.URL, token)
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stub.SetNext(72, "high", []string{"fingerprint differs from baseline"})
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// Simulate the fraud-engine side of the pipeline: the engine consumes
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// access.attempted from NATS and publishes fraud.scored back. We do
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// the same publish directly so we don't need the Python service in the
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// test.
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mustPublishFraudScored(t, ctx, natsClient, natspub.FraudScored{
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EventID: eventID,
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GuestID: guestID,
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TokenID: accessResp.Token.ID,
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AccessLogID: accessResp.AccessLog,
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Score: 72,
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Risk: "high",
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Reasons: []string{"fingerprint differs from baseline"},
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ScoredAt: time.Now().UTC(),
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})
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waitForFlagged(t, ctx, db.Pool, accessResp.AccessLog, 72, true)
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})
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t.Run("sync rsvp flow records rsvp and marks token used", func(t *testing.T) {
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eventID := createEvent(t, srv.URL, hostToken, "Sync Test", "sync-test")
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guestID := createGuest(t, srv.URL, hostToken, eventID, "Sync Guest")
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token := issueToken(t, srv.URL, hostToken, eventID, guestID)
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stub.SetNext(15, "low", nil)
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rsvpResp := submitRSVP(t, srv.URL, token, map[string]any{
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"response": "attending",
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"plus_ones": 0,
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})
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if rsvpResp.Blocked {
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t.Fatalf("expected blocked=false, got %+v", rsvpResp)
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}
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if rsvpResp.Decision.Score != 15 || rsvpResp.Decision.Risk != "low" || !rsvpResp.Decision.Used {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected decision: %+v", rsvpResp.Decision)
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}
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if rsvpResp.RSVP == nil || rsvpResp.RSVP.RiskScore == nil || *rsvpResp.RSVP.RiskScore != 15 {
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t.Fatalf("rsvp missing risk_score=15: %+v", rsvpResp.RSVP)
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}
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assertTokenUsed(t, ctx, db.Pool, guestID)
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waitForRSVPConfirmed(t, rsvpCounter, 1)
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})
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t.Run("sync rsvp flow blocks when fraud score is BLOCK", func(t *testing.T) {
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eventID := createEvent(t, srv.URL, hostToken, "Block Test", "block-test")
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guestID := createGuest(t, srv.URL, hostToken, eventID, "Block Guest")
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token := issueToken(t, srv.URL, hostToken, eventID, guestID)
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stub.SetNext(95, "block", []string{"fingerprint differs from baseline", "ip address changed"})
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req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost,
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srv.URL+"/rsvp/"+token,
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bytes.NewReader([]byte(`{"response":"attending","plus_ones":0}`)))
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
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must(t, err, "POST /rsvp")
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden {
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body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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t.Fatalf("expected 403 for BLOCK, got %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, body)
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}
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assertNoRSVP(t, ctx, db.Pool, guestID)
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assertTokenStatus(t, ctx, db.Pool, guestID, "active")
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})
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}
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// --- container helpers ---
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func startPostgres(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context) string {
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t.Helper()
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c, err := tcpostgres.Run(ctx,
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"postgres:16-alpine",
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tcpostgres.WithDatabase("guestguard"),
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tcpostgres.WithUsername("guestguard"),
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tcpostgres.WithPassword("guestguard"),
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testcontainers.WithWaitStrategy(
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wait.ForLog("database system is ready to accept connections").
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WithOccurrence(2).
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WithStartupTimeout(60*time.Second),
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),
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)
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must(t, err, "start postgres container")
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t.Cleanup(func() { _ = c.Terminate(context.Background()) })
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dsn, err := c.ConnectionString(ctx, "sslmode=disable")
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must(t, err, "postgres connection string")
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return dsn
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}
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func startNATS(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context) string {
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t.Helper()
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req := testcontainers.ContainerRequest{
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Image: "nats:2.10-alpine",
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ExposedPorts: []string{"4222/tcp"},
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Cmd: []string{"-js"},
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WaitingFor: wait.ForLog("Server is ready").WithStartupTimeout(60 * time.Second),
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}
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c, err := testcontainers.GenericContainer(ctx, testcontainers.GenericContainerRequest{
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ContainerRequest: req,
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Started: true,
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})
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must(t, err, "start nats container")
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t.Cleanup(func() { _ = c.Terminate(context.Background()) })
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host, err := c.Host(ctx)
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must(t, err, "nats host")
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port, err := c.MappedPort(ctx, "4222/tcp")
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must(t, err, "nats port")
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return fmt.Sprintf("nats://%s:%s", host, port.Port())
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}
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// --- stub fraud gRPC server ---
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type stubFraud struct {
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pb.UnimplementedFraudServiceServer
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Addr string
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server *grpc.Server
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score atomic.Int32
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risk atomic.Value // string
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reasons atomic.Value // []string
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}
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func (s *stubFraud) Score(ctx context.Context, req *pb.ScoreRequest) (*pb.ScoreResponse, error) {
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risk := pb.Risk_RISK_LOW
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switch s.risk.Load().(string) {
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case "low":
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risk = pb.Risk_RISK_LOW
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case "medium":
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risk = pb.Risk_RISK_MEDIUM
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case "high":
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risk = pb.Risk_RISK_HIGH
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case "block":
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risk = pb.Risk_RISK_BLOCK
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}
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var reasons []string
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if r, _ := s.reasons.Load().([]string); r != nil {
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reasons = r
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}
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return &pb.ScoreResponse{
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Score: s.score.Load(),
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Risk: risk,
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Reasons: reasons,
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}, nil
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}
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func (s *stubFraud) SetNext(score int, risk string, reasons []string) {
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s.score.Store(int32(score))
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s.risk.Store(risk)
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s.reasons.Store(reasons)
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}
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func startStubFraudGRPC(t *testing.T) *stubFraud {
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t.Helper()
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lis, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
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must(t, err, "listen for stub fraud")
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s := &stubFraud{Addr: lis.Addr().String()}
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s.risk.Store("low")
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s.reasons.Store([]string(nil))
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s.server = grpc.NewServer()
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pb.RegisterFraudServiceServer(s.server, s)
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go func() { _ = s.server.Serve(lis) }()
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t.Cleanup(s.server.Stop)
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return s
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}
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// --- HTTP helpers ---
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func createEvent(t *testing.T, base, accessToken string, name, slug string) uuid.UUID {
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t.Helper()
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body := map[string]any{
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"name": name,
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"slug": slug,
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"event_date": time.Now().Add(30 * 24 * time.Hour).UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
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"venue": "Integration Hall",
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}
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var out struct{ ID uuid.UUID `json:"id"` }
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postJSONAuthed(t, base+"/events", accessToken, body, http.StatusCreated, &out)
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return out.ID
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}
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func createGuest(t *testing.T, base, accessToken string, eventID uuid.UUID, name string) uuid.UUID {
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t.Helper()
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var out struct{ ID uuid.UUID `json:"id"` }
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postJSONAuthed(t, fmt.Sprintf("%s/events/%s/guests", base, eventID), accessToken,
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map[string]any{"name": name}, http.StatusCreated, &out)
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return out.ID
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}
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func issueToken(t *testing.T, base, accessToken string, eventID, guestID uuid.UUID) string {
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t.Helper()
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var out struct{ Token string `json:"token"` }
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postJSONAuthed(t, fmt.Sprintf("%s/events/%s/guests/%s/tokens", base, eventID, guestID),
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accessToken, nil, http.StatusCreated, &out)
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return out.Token
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}
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type accessResponse struct {
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Token *struct{ ID uuid.UUID `json:"id"` } `json:"token"`
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AccessLog uuid.UUID `json:"access_log_id"`
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}
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func getAccess(t *testing.T, base, token string) accessResponse {
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t.Helper()
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resp, err := http.Get(base + "/access/" + token)
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must(t, err, "GET /access")
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
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body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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t.Fatalf("GET /access status=%d body=%s", resp.StatusCode, body)
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}
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var out accessResponse
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must(t, json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&out), "decode access")
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return out
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}
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type submitRSVPResponse struct {
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RSVP *struct {
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ID uuid.UUID `json:"id"`
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RiskScore *int `json:"risk_score"`
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} `json:"rsvp"`
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Decision fraud.Decision `json:"fraud"`
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Blocked bool `json:"blocked"`
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}
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func submitRSVP(t *testing.T, base, token string, body map[string]any) submitRSVPResponse {
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t.Helper()
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var out submitRSVPResponse
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postJSON(t, base+"/rsvp/"+token, body, http.StatusCreated, &out)
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return out
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}
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func postJSON(t *testing.T, url string, body any, wantStatus int, out any) {
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t.Helper()
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postJSONAuthed(t, url, "", body, wantStatus, out)
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}
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func postJSONAuthed(t *testing.T, url, bearer string, body any, wantStatus int, out any) {
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t.Helper()
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var rdr io.Reader
|
|
if body != nil {
|
|
b, _ := json.Marshal(body)
|
|
rdr = bytes.NewReader(b)
|
|
}
|
|
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, url, rdr)
|
|
must(t, err, "build request "+url)
|
|
if rdr != nil {
|
|
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
|
}
|
|
if bearer != "" {
|
|
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+bearer)
|
|
}
|
|
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
|
|
must(t, err, "do request "+url)
|
|
defer resp.Body.Close()
|
|
|
|
if resp.StatusCode != wantStatus {
|
|
body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
|
|
t.Fatalf("%s status=%d want=%d body=%s", url, resp.StatusCode, wantStatus, body)
|
|
}
|
|
if out != nil {
|
|
must(t, json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(out), "decode response from "+url)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// --- DB helpers ---
|
|
|
|
func insertHost(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, pool *pgxpool.Pool) uuid.UUID {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
var id uuid.UUID
|
|
err := pool.QueryRow(ctx,
|
|
`INSERT INTO users (email, name, email_verified, email_verified_at)
|
|
VALUES ($1, $2, TRUE, now()) RETURNING id`,
|
|
fmt.Sprintf("test-%d@guestguard.test", time.Now().UnixNano()),
|
|
"Integration Host",
|
|
).Scan(&id)
|
|
must(t, err, "insert host")
|
|
// Default test hosts to the Business tier so existing tests that
|
|
// create multiple events for one host aren't tripped up by the
|
|
// free-tier limit (1 event / month). Tests that specifically exercise
|
|
// the free-tier path skip this helper.
|
|
grantBusinessTier(t, ctx, pool, id)
|
|
return id
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// grantBusinessTier inserts an active Business subscription row for the
|
|
// given user so tier-enforcement middleware grants unlimited events.
|
|
func grantBusinessTier(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, pool *pgxpool.Pool, userID uuid.UUID) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
_, err := pool.Exec(ctx, `
|
|
INSERT INTO subscriptions (user_id, stripe_customer_id, tier, status)
|
|
VALUES ($1::uuid, 'cus_test_' || replace($1::uuid::text, '-', ''), 'business', 'active')
|
|
`, userID.String())
|
|
must(t, err, "grant business tier")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// issueHostToken mints a Bearer access token for an existing host using the
|
|
// same JWT secret/issuer the test API server was constructed with. This
|
|
// lets integration tests skip the signup/verify/login dance.
|
|
func issueHostToken(t *testing.T, hostID uuid.UUID) string {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
signer, err := auth.NewJWTSigner(testJWTSecret, 5*time.Minute, testJWTIssuer)
|
|
must(t, err, "build jwt signer")
|
|
tok, _, err := signer.Issue(hostID, time.Now())
|
|
must(t, err, "issue jwt")
|
|
return tok
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const (
|
|
testJWTSecret = "test-secret-must-be-at-least-32-bytes-long-xx"
|
|
testJWTIssuer = "guestguard-test"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func waitForFlagged(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, pool *pgxpool.Pool, accessLogID uuid.UUID, wantScore int, wantFlagged bool) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
deadline := time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second)
|
|
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
|
|
var (
|
|
score *int
|
|
flagged bool
|
|
)
|
|
err := pool.QueryRow(ctx,
|
|
`SELECT risk_score, flagged FROM access_logs WHERE id = $1`,
|
|
accessLogID,
|
|
).Scan(&score, &flagged)
|
|
if err == nil && score != nil && *score == wantScore && flagged == wantFlagged {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
|
|
}
|
|
t.Fatalf("access_log %s did not reach score=%d flagged=%v within 10s", accessLogID, wantScore, wantFlagged)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func assertTokenUsed(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, pool *pgxpool.Pool, guestID uuid.UUID) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
var status string
|
|
err := pool.QueryRow(ctx,
|
|
`SELECT status FROM tokens WHERE guest_id = $1`, guestID,
|
|
).Scan(&status)
|
|
must(t, err, "load token status")
|
|
if status != "used" {
|
|
t.Fatalf("expected token status=used for guest %s, got %s", guestID, status)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func assertTokenStatus(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, pool *pgxpool.Pool, guestID uuid.UUID, want string) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
var status string
|
|
err := pool.QueryRow(ctx,
|
|
`SELECT status FROM tokens WHERE guest_id = $1`, guestID,
|
|
).Scan(&status)
|
|
must(t, err, "load token status")
|
|
if status != want {
|
|
t.Fatalf("expected token status=%s for guest %s, got %s", want, guestID, status)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func assertNoRSVP(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, pool *pgxpool.Pool, guestID uuid.UUID) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
var n int
|
|
err := pool.QueryRow(ctx,
|
|
`SELECT count(*) FROM rsvps WHERE guest_id = $1`, guestID,
|
|
).Scan(&n)
|
|
must(t, err, "count rsvps")
|
|
if n != 0 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("expected 0 rsvps for blocked guest %s, got %d", guestID, n)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// --- NATS helpers ---
|
|
|
|
func mustPublishFraudScored(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, c *natspub.Client, evt natspub.FraudScored) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
body, _ := json.Marshal(evt)
|
|
_, err := c.JetStream().Publish(ctx, natspub.SubjectFraudScored, body)
|
|
must(t, err, "publish fraud.scored")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func subscribeRSVPConfirmed(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, c *natspub.Client) *atomic.Int32 {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
cons, err := c.JetStream().CreateOrUpdateConsumer(ctx, natspub.StreamName, jetstream.ConsumerConfig{
|
|
Durable: "test-rsvp-confirmed",
|
|
Name: "test-rsvp-confirmed",
|
|
FilterSubject: natspub.SubjectRSVPConfirmed,
|
|
AckPolicy: jetstream.AckExplicitPolicy,
|
|
DeliverPolicy: jetstream.DeliverAllPolicy,
|
|
})
|
|
must(t, err, "create rsvp consumer")
|
|
|
|
var counter atomic.Int32
|
|
cc, err := cons.Consume(func(msg jetstream.Msg) {
|
|
counter.Add(1)
|
|
_ = msg.Ack()
|
|
})
|
|
must(t, err, "consume rsvp.confirmed")
|
|
t.Cleanup(cc.Stop)
|
|
return &counter
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func waitForRSVPConfirmed(t *testing.T, counter *atomic.Int32, want int32) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
|
|
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
|
|
if counter.Load() >= want {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
|
|
}
|
|
t.Fatalf("expected %d rsvp.confirmed events, saw %d", want, counter.Load())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// --- misc ---
|
|
|
|
func must(t *testing.T, err error, op string) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("%s: %v", op, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|