59b8781659
Closes every block in docs/TIER1_PLAN.md from the Claude-scope side. The
homelab / cloud setup steps (SES verification, restore drill, lawyer-
drafted ToS) remain operator-owned but are unblocked.
Block A — Authentication
- Migration 0003: password_hash, email_verified, email_verification_tokens,
password_reset_tokens, refresh_tokens (with replaced_by family chain).
- Bcrypt hasher, HS256 JWT signer, single-use refresh tokens with rotation
+ replay-detection (revokes the family on reuse).
- /auth/signup, /login, /refresh, /logout, /verify-email,
/forgot-password, /reset-password — enumeration-safe.
- requireAuth middleware + GET /me.
- Frontend useAuth/useApi with auto-refresh-on-401, login/signup/verify/
forgot/reset pages, route-guard middleware.
Block B — Authorisation
- EventRepo.GetForHost; Update/Delete scoped by host_id.
- All host routes behind requireAuth + ownership; cross-tenant returns
404 (no enumeration). ?host_id removed.
- WS auth via short-lived single-use tickets (POST /auth/ws-ticket).
- Tests: TestCrossTenantIsolation — 9 probes.
Block C — Rate limiting
- Redis sliding-window via Lua (atomic ZADD+ZCARD+PEXPIRE).
- Per-route limits matching the plan (signup IP, login IP+email, RSVP/
access by token, events/guests/tokens by user_id).
- 429 with Retry-After header and JSON body.
- Auth lockout: 5 failed logins → account locked, only password reset
clears it.
- Frontend: useErrMessage normalises 429 + locked messaging.
Block D — Real notifications
- Migration 0004: provider_message_id, bounce_type, complained columns
+ unsubscribes (CITEXT) suppression table.
- Branded HTML + plaintext templates for verification, reset, invitation,
confirmation, reminder. Per-page templates avoid html/template's
contextual-escape collisions.
- Senders: SESv2, Twilio (SMS), SMTP (Mailpit-friendly), Resend HTTP.
- PickEmailSender priority Resend > SMTP > SES > Log — system boots
cleanly in dev with Mailpit; production flips one env var.
- Webhook endpoints (Twilio status + SES SNS) — bounces add to suppression;
signature verification stubbed pending creds.
- Auto-send: POST /tokens publishes invitation.send; notifier renders +
delivers via the configured backend; suppression list honoured.
- Bulk + per-row invitation flow: POST /events/{id}/guests/invitations/bulk
returns per-guest tokens so phone-only guests can be SMS'd manually.
- Unsubscribe: signed HMAC token (no TTL) + /unsubscribe/[token] page.
- WhatsApp Option A+: wa.me click-to-chat wizard with per-guest progress
tracking, isLikelyE164 validation, edit-from-wizard.
- Token rotate (POST /tokens/rotate) invalidates the old URL — used by
the regenerate-link flow.
- Mailpit added to docker-compose for dev inbox.
Block E — CSV import
- Streaming parser: tolerant header detection, UTF-8 BOM + UTF-16 LE/BE
decoding, row-level validation, 5,000-row cap.
- Strict E.164 phone validation with helpful error message.
- POST /preview + /import + GET /template; preview UI on event page;
atomic per-batch with dedup on existing emails.
Phone capture across UI
- PhoneInput component: country picker (~50 ISO codes) + national input +
live E.164 preview + inline length validation.
- Used in Add Guest and Edit Guest modals. Smart paste-handling extracts
country code from full E.164 strings.
Block F — Billing (Stripe)
- Migration 0005: subscriptions table (user_id → tier/status/period_end +
Stripe customer/sub ids). Partial unique index keeps one granting sub
per user.
- internal/billing: Tier + Limits model (Free 1/50, Pro 10/1000, Business
∞/5000), Stripe SDK wrapper with IgnoreAPIVersionMismatch for newer
account API versions.
- /billing/checkout-session, /billing/portal, /billing/status,
/webhooks/stripe (signature-verified, lifecycle events).
- Tier enforcement: 402 on POST /events, /guests, /import with
{error, reason, tier, used, limit, upgrade_url} body.
- Frontend: useBilling composable, /dashboard/billing page (current plan,
usage bars, tier cards), global UpgradeModal triggered by useApi's
402 interceptor.
- Customer portal kept for self-service cancel/payment-method changes.
Block G — Backups & DR (application side)
- Every migration has a tested .down.sql.
- TestMigrationRoundtrip applies all ups → all downs → all ups against a
fresh container; catches asymmetric down migrations.
- cmd/restore-verify: 28-check post-restore invariant tool (schema
presence, no orphans across 10 FK relationships, email uniqueness,
single-active subscription, row-count snapshot).
- docs/RUNBOOK_RESTORE.md: 9-step restore procedure with RTO/RPO
targets, drill instructions, rollback path.
Block H — Privacy compliance (application side)
- Migration 0006: deleted_at + terms_accepted_at + privacy_policy_accepted_at
on users. Partial index on email for live-only uniqueness.
- GET /me/data-export — synchronous JSON dump (user, events, guests,
tokens, rsvps, access_logs, notifications).
- DELETE /me — soft-delete with PII scrub + refresh-token revocation;
re-signup with same email works.
- POST /me/accept-terms — idempotent consent recording.
- Frontend /privacy + /terms placeholder pages with substantive (pending
legal review) copy; footer links; signup terms checkbox; TermsGateModal
for accounts created before the rollout; export + delete buttons on
/dashboard/billing.
Tests
- All migrations verified up/down/up.
- Integration suite: TestE2EHappyPath, TestAuthFlow, TestCrossTenantIsolation,
TestRateLimitSignup, TestLoginLockout, TestUnsubscribeFlow,
TestSESBounceWebhook, TestTwilioStatusWebhook, TestCsvImportFlow,
TestCsvImportAtomicRollback, TestBulkIssueInvitations, TestBulkIssueExplicitSubset,
TestTokenIssuePublishesInvitation, TestTokenIssueWithoutGuestEmailSkipsInvitation,
TestGuestUpdate, TestGuestDelete, TestTokenRotate, TestSMTPSenderAgainstMailpit,
TestFreeTierEventLimit, TestFreeTierGuestLimit, TestBusinessTierBypassesLimits,
TestDataExport, TestDeleteMe, TestAcceptTerms, TestMigrationRoundtrip.
Full suite runs in ~120s against real Postgres + NATS + Redis + Mailpit.
- Unit suite green across internal/auth, internal/csvimport,
internal/notification, internal/ratelimit, internal/domain.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
221 lines
6.9 KiB
Go
221 lines
6.9 KiB
Go
//go:build integration
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package integration_test
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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"github.com/alchemistkay/guestguard/internal/api"
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"github.com/alchemistkay/guestguard/internal/storage"
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)
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// TestCrossTenantIsolation confirms that one authenticated host cannot
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// read, modify, or extend another host's event. All cross-tenant attempts
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// should return 404 — never 403 — so a probe can't tell whether a given
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// UUID exists at all.
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func TestCrossTenantIsolation(t *testing.T) {
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if testing.Short() {
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t.Skip("skipping integration test in -short mode")
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}
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Minute)
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t.Cleanup(cancel)
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logger := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil))
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dsn := startPostgres(t, ctx)
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db, err := storage.NewDB(ctx, dsn)
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must(t, err, "connect db")
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t.Cleanup(db.Close)
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must(t, db.Migrate(ctx), "migrate")
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apiSrv, err := api.NewServer(api.ServerDeps{
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Logger: logger,
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DB: db,
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TokenTTL: 24 * time.Hour,
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JWTSecret: testJWTSecret,
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JWTIssuer: testJWTIssuer,
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AccessTokenTTL: 5 * time.Minute,
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RefreshTokenTTL: 24 * time.Hour,
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EmailVerificationTTL: 1 * time.Hour,
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PasswordResetTTL: 1 * time.Hour,
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PublicBaseURL: "http://localhost",
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})
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must(t, err, "build api server")
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srv := httptest.NewServer(apiSrv.Handler())
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t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
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hostA := insertHost(t, ctx, db.Pool)
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hostB := insertHost(t, ctx, db.Pool)
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tokenA := issueHostToken(t, hostA)
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tokenB := issueHostToken(t, hostB)
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eventA := createEvent(t, srv.URL, tokenA, "Host A's Event", "host-a-event")
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t.Run("list returns only own events", func(t *testing.T) {
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out := struct {
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Events []struct {
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ID uuid.UUID `json:"id"`
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} `json:"events"`
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}{}
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getJSONAuthed(t, srv.URL+"/events", tokenB, http.StatusOK, &out)
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for _, e := range out.Events {
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if e.ID == eventA {
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t.Fatalf("host B saw host A's event in /events list")
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}
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}
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})
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t.Run("GET other host's event is 404", func(t *testing.T) {
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assertStatus(t, http.MethodGet, fmt.Sprintf("%s/events/%s", srv.URL, eventA),
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tokenB, nil, http.StatusNotFound)
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})
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t.Run("PATCH other host's event is 404", func(t *testing.T) {
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body := map[string]any{"name": "hijacked"}
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assertStatus(t, http.MethodPatch, fmt.Sprintf("%s/events/%s", srv.URL, eventA),
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tokenB, body, http.StatusNotFound)
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})
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t.Run("DELETE other host's event is 404", func(t *testing.T) {
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assertStatus(t, http.MethodDelete, fmt.Sprintf("%s/events/%s", srv.URL, eventA),
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tokenB, nil, http.StatusNotFound)
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})
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t.Run("POST guest on other host's event is 404", func(t *testing.T) {
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body := map[string]any{"name": "Mallory"}
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assertStatus(t, http.MethodPost, fmt.Sprintf("%s/events/%s/guests", srv.URL, eventA),
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tokenB, body, http.StatusNotFound)
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})
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t.Run("GET guests on other host's event is 404", func(t *testing.T) {
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assertStatus(t, http.MethodGet, fmt.Sprintf("%s/events/%s/guests", srv.URL, eventA),
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tokenB, nil, http.StatusNotFound)
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})
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t.Run("GET activity on other host's event is 404", func(t *testing.T) {
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assertStatus(t, http.MethodGet, fmt.Sprintf("%s/events/%s/activity", srv.URL, eventA),
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tokenB, nil, http.StatusNotFound)
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})
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t.Run("no bearer is 401", func(t *testing.T) {
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assertStatus(t, http.MethodGet, srv.URL+"/events", "", nil, http.StatusUnauthorized)
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})
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t.Run("ws-ticket for other host's event is 404", func(t *testing.T) {
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body := map[string]any{"event_id": eventA.String()}
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assertStatus(t, http.MethodPost, srv.URL+"/auth/ws-ticket",
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tokenB, body, http.StatusNotFound)
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})
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t.Run("ws-ticket then WS handshake requires matching path", func(t *testing.T) {
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// Host A mints a ticket for their own event.
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var ticketResp struct {
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Ticket string `json:"ticket"`
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}
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postJSONAuthed(t, srv.URL+"/auth/ws-ticket", tokenA,
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map[string]any{"event_id": eventA.String()},
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http.StatusOK, &ticketResp)
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if ticketResp.Ticket == "" {
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t.Fatal("empty ticket")
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}
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// Trying to use that ticket on a *different* event id must fail.
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bogus := uuid.New()
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req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet,
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fmt.Sprintf("%s/ws/events/%s?ticket=%s", srv.URL, bogus, ticketResp.Ticket), nil)
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req.Header.Set("Upgrade", "websocket")
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req.Header.Set("Connection", "Upgrade")
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resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
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must(t, err, "WS handshake")
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resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden && resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Fatalf("expected 403 or 401, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
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}
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})
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t.Run("replaying a consumed ticket fails", func(t *testing.T) {
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var ticketResp struct {
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Ticket string `json:"ticket"`
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}
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postJSONAuthed(t, srv.URL+"/auth/ws-ticket", tokenA,
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map[string]any{"event_id": eventA.String()},
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http.StatusOK, &ticketResp)
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// First handshake against the correct event id — consumes the ticket.
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req1, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet,
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fmt.Sprintf("%s/ws/events/%s?ticket=%s", srv.URL, eventA, ticketResp.Ticket), nil)
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req1.Header.Set("Upgrade", "websocket")
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req1.Header.Set("Connection", "Upgrade")
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resp1, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req1)
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must(t, err, "WS handshake 1")
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resp1.Body.Close()
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// Replay — ticket is already consumed.
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req2, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet,
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fmt.Sprintf("%s/ws/events/%s?ticket=%s", srv.URL, eventA, ticketResp.Ticket), nil)
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req2.Header.Set("Upgrade", "websocket")
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req2.Header.Set("Connection", "Upgrade")
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resp2, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req2)
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must(t, err, "WS handshake 2")
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resp2.Body.Close()
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if resp2.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Fatalf("expected 401 on replay, got %d", resp2.StatusCode)
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}
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})
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}
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func getJSONAuthed(t *testing.T, url, bearer string, wantStatus int, out any) {
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t.Helper()
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req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, url, nil)
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must(t, err, "build get")
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if bearer != "" {
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+bearer)
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}
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resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
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must(t, err, "do get "+url)
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != wantStatus {
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body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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t.Fatalf("%s status=%d want=%d body=%s", url, resp.StatusCode, wantStatus, body)
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}
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if out != nil {
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must(t, json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(out), "decode response from "+url)
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}
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}
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func assertStatus(t *testing.T, method, url, bearer string, body any, wantStatus int) {
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t.Helper()
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var rdr io.Reader
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if body != nil {
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b, _ := json.Marshal(body)
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rdr = bytes.NewReader(b)
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}
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req, err := http.NewRequest(method, url, rdr)
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must(t, err, "build "+method+" "+url)
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if rdr != nil {
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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}
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if bearer != "" {
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+bearer)
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}
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resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
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must(t, err, "do "+method+" "+url)
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != wantStatus {
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b, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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t.Fatalf("%s %s status=%d want=%d body=%s", method, url, resp.StatusCode, wantStatus, b)
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}
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}
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