59b8781659
Closes every block in docs/TIER1_PLAN.md from the Claude-scope side. The
homelab / cloud setup steps (SES verification, restore drill, lawyer-
drafted ToS) remain operator-owned but are unblocked.
Block A — Authentication
- Migration 0003: password_hash, email_verified, email_verification_tokens,
password_reset_tokens, refresh_tokens (with replaced_by family chain).
- Bcrypt hasher, HS256 JWT signer, single-use refresh tokens with rotation
+ replay-detection (revokes the family on reuse).
- /auth/signup, /login, /refresh, /logout, /verify-email,
/forgot-password, /reset-password — enumeration-safe.
- requireAuth middleware + GET /me.
- Frontend useAuth/useApi with auto-refresh-on-401, login/signup/verify/
forgot/reset pages, route-guard middleware.
Block B — Authorisation
- EventRepo.GetForHost; Update/Delete scoped by host_id.
- All host routes behind requireAuth + ownership; cross-tenant returns
404 (no enumeration). ?host_id removed.
- WS auth via short-lived single-use tickets (POST /auth/ws-ticket).
- Tests: TestCrossTenantIsolation — 9 probes.
Block C — Rate limiting
- Redis sliding-window via Lua (atomic ZADD+ZCARD+PEXPIRE).
- Per-route limits matching the plan (signup IP, login IP+email, RSVP/
access by token, events/guests/tokens by user_id).
- 429 with Retry-After header and JSON body.
- Auth lockout: 5 failed logins → account locked, only password reset
clears it.
- Frontend: useErrMessage normalises 429 + locked messaging.
Block D — Real notifications
- Migration 0004: provider_message_id, bounce_type, complained columns
+ unsubscribes (CITEXT) suppression table.
- Branded HTML + plaintext templates for verification, reset, invitation,
confirmation, reminder. Per-page templates avoid html/template's
contextual-escape collisions.
- Senders: SESv2, Twilio (SMS), SMTP (Mailpit-friendly), Resend HTTP.
- PickEmailSender priority Resend > SMTP > SES > Log — system boots
cleanly in dev with Mailpit; production flips one env var.
- Webhook endpoints (Twilio status + SES SNS) — bounces add to suppression;
signature verification stubbed pending creds.
- Auto-send: POST /tokens publishes invitation.send; notifier renders +
delivers via the configured backend; suppression list honoured.
- Bulk + per-row invitation flow: POST /events/{id}/guests/invitations/bulk
returns per-guest tokens so phone-only guests can be SMS'd manually.
- Unsubscribe: signed HMAC token (no TTL) + /unsubscribe/[token] page.
- WhatsApp Option A+: wa.me click-to-chat wizard with per-guest progress
tracking, isLikelyE164 validation, edit-from-wizard.
- Token rotate (POST /tokens/rotate) invalidates the old URL — used by
the regenerate-link flow.
- Mailpit added to docker-compose for dev inbox.
Block E — CSV import
- Streaming parser: tolerant header detection, UTF-8 BOM + UTF-16 LE/BE
decoding, row-level validation, 5,000-row cap.
- Strict E.164 phone validation with helpful error message.
- POST /preview + /import + GET /template; preview UI on event page;
atomic per-batch with dedup on existing emails.
Phone capture across UI
- PhoneInput component: country picker (~50 ISO codes) + national input +
live E.164 preview + inline length validation.
- Used in Add Guest and Edit Guest modals. Smart paste-handling extracts
country code from full E.164 strings.
Block F — Billing (Stripe)
- Migration 0005: subscriptions table (user_id → tier/status/period_end +
Stripe customer/sub ids). Partial unique index keeps one granting sub
per user.
- internal/billing: Tier + Limits model (Free 1/50, Pro 10/1000, Business
∞/5000), Stripe SDK wrapper with IgnoreAPIVersionMismatch for newer
account API versions.
- /billing/checkout-session, /billing/portal, /billing/status,
/webhooks/stripe (signature-verified, lifecycle events).
- Tier enforcement: 402 on POST /events, /guests, /import with
{error, reason, tier, used, limit, upgrade_url} body.
- Frontend: useBilling composable, /dashboard/billing page (current plan,
usage bars, tier cards), global UpgradeModal triggered by useApi's
402 interceptor.
- Customer portal kept for self-service cancel/payment-method changes.
Block G — Backups & DR (application side)
- Every migration has a tested .down.sql.
- TestMigrationRoundtrip applies all ups → all downs → all ups against a
fresh container; catches asymmetric down migrations.
- cmd/restore-verify: 28-check post-restore invariant tool (schema
presence, no orphans across 10 FK relationships, email uniqueness,
single-active subscription, row-count snapshot).
- docs/RUNBOOK_RESTORE.md: 9-step restore procedure with RTO/RPO
targets, drill instructions, rollback path.
Block H — Privacy compliance (application side)
- Migration 0006: deleted_at + terms_accepted_at + privacy_policy_accepted_at
on users. Partial index on email for live-only uniqueness.
- GET /me/data-export — synchronous JSON dump (user, events, guests,
tokens, rsvps, access_logs, notifications).
- DELETE /me — soft-delete with PII scrub + refresh-token revocation;
re-signup with same email works.
- POST /me/accept-terms — idempotent consent recording.
- Frontend /privacy + /terms placeholder pages with substantive (pending
legal review) copy; footer links; signup terms checkbox; TermsGateModal
for accounts created before the rollout; export + delete buttons on
/dashboard/billing.
Tests
- All migrations verified up/down/up.
- Integration suite: TestE2EHappyPath, TestAuthFlow, TestCrossTenantIsolation,
TestRateLimitSignup, TestLoginLockout, TestUnsubscribeFlow,
TestSESBounceWebhook, TestTwilioStatusWebhook, TestCsvImportFlow,
TestCsvImportAtomicRollback, TestBulkIssueInvitations, TestBulkIssueExplicitSubset,
TestTokenIssuePublishesInvitation, TestTokenIssueWithoutGuestEmailSkipsInvitation,
TestGuestUpdate, TestGuestDelete, TestTokenRotate, TestSMTPSenderAgainstMailpit,
TestFreeTierEventLimit, TestFreeTierGuestLimit, TestBusinessTierBypassesLimits,
TestDataExport, TestDeleteMe, TestAcceptTerms, TestMigrationRoundtrip.
Full suite runs in ~120s against real Postgres + NATS + Redis + Mailpit.
- Unit suite green across internal/auth, internal/csvimport,
internal/notification, internal/ratelimit, internal/domain.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
135 lines
3.4 KiB
Go
135 lines
3.4 KiB
Go
// Package ratelimit implements a sliding-window rate limiter backed by
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// Redis sorted sets. Each call is atomic via a Lua script: it sweeps
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// entries older than the window, returns the current count, and (when
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// under the limit) records the new hit. Block C's "INCR + EXPIRE or a Lua
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// script for atomicity" requirement.
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package ratelimit
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/hex"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"time"
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"github.com/redis/go-redis/v9"
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)
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// Result is the outcome of one Allow check.
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type Result struct {
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Allowed bool
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Count int // current count within the window (post-increment when allowed)
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Limit int
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RetryAfter time.Duration // populated when Allowed=false
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}
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// Limiter checks rate-limit budgets against Redis.
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type Limiter struct {
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client *redis.Client
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script *redis.Script
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prefix string
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now func() time.Time
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}
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// New builds a Limiter against the given Redis client. The prefix namespaces
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// all keys (defaults to "rl").
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func New(client *redis.Client, prefix string) *Limiter {
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if prefix == "" {
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prefix = "rl"
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}
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return &Limiter{
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client: client,
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script: redis.NewScript(slidingWindowScript),
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prefix: prefix,
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now: time.Now,
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}
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}
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// Allow consumes one unit of budget under (name, key) against `limit` events
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// per `window`. Returns Allowed=true and the new count, or Allowed=false
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// with RetryAfter set to roughly the duration until the oldest hit ages out.
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func (l *Limiter) Allow(ctx context.Context, name, key string, limit int, window time.Duration) (Result, error) {
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if limit <= 0 {
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return Result{}, errors.New("ratelimit: limit must be positive")
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}
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if window <= 0 {
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return Result{}, errors.New("ratelimit: window must be positive")
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}
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member, err := randomMember()
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if err != nil {
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return Result{}, err
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}
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now := l.now().UnixMilli()
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windowMS := window.Milliseconds()
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redisKey := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s:%s", l.prefix, name, key)
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out, err := l.script.Run(ctx, l.client,
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[]string{redisKey},
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now, windowMS, limit, member,
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).Int64Slice()
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if err != nil {
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return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("ratelimit: redis: %w", err)
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}
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if len(out) != 3 {
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return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("ratelimit: bad lua reply: %v", out)
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}
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r := Result{
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Count: int(out[1]),
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Limit: limit,
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}
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if out[0] == 0 {
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r.Allowed = true
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} else {
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r.RetryAfter = time.Duration(out[2]) * time.Millisecond
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if r.RetryAfter <= 0 {
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r.RetryAfter = time.Second
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}
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}
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return r, nil
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}
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func randomMember() (string, error) {
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var buf [12]byte
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if _, err := rand.Read(buf[:]); err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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return hex.EncodeToString(buf[:]), nil
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}
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// Sliding-window check + record, atomic in Redis.
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//
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// KEYS[1] = bucket key
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// ARGV[1] = now (unix ms)
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// ARGV[2] = window (ms)
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// ARGV[3] = limit
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// ARGV[4] = unique member to insert when allowed
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// returns { blocked, count, retryAfterMs }
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const slidingWindowScript = `
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local key = KEYS[1]
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local now = tonumber(ARGV[1])
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local window = tonumber(ARGV[2])
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local limit = tonumber(ARGV[3])
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local member = ARGV[4]
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local cutoff = now - window
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redis.call('ZREMRANGEBYSCORE', key, '-inf', cutoff)
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local count = redis.call('ZCARD', key)
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if count >= limit then
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local oldest = redis.call('ZRANGE', key, 0, 0, 'WITHSCORES')
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local retry = window
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if oldest[2] then
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retry = (tonumber(oldest[2]) + window) - now
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if retry < 1 then retry = 1 end
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end
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return {1, count, retry}
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end
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redis.call('ZADD', key, now, member)
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redis.call('PEXPIRE', key, window)
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return {0, count + 1, 0}
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`
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